Towards European economic recovery in the 1980s. Report presented to the European Parliament. Working Documents 1983-1984, 31 August 1983 by Ball, R.J. & Albert, M.
31  August 1983 
English Edition 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1983-1984 
Towards European 
Economic Recovery 
in the  1980s 
DOCUMENT 
Report presented to the European Parliament 
by Mr M. Albert and Professor R. J.  Ball 
Revised Edition !Q~~BQ~-;~BQE;~~-£~Q~Q~l~_B;~Q~sBY 
l~_It!;_12§Q~ 
R  E  P  0  R  T  -----------FOREWORD 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER  1 
11  -The first  mistake:  sacrificing'the  f~ture to  the  present 
12  - The  second  mistake:· the  Community  of  'every  man  for  him-
self' 
CHAPTER  2  - !h~-~rif~_!Q_~~-~~ig_iQ_!h~_12~Q§ 
21  - Medium-term  growth  prospects  remain  poor 
22  - The  problem  of  unemployment  predominates 
23  - The  Balkans  of  the  third  industrial  revolution 
CHAPTER  3  - !h~_im~Q!~Qf~_Qf_!h~_§!~!~2 
31  - A unique  case 
32  The  obstacles to  the  countries  in  disequilibrium 
33- Can  the  'locomotive'  work? 
34  - It  is  no  longer  possible  to  go  it alone 
35  -The multiplier effect  of  Community  action 
36- Two  roles:  the  policeman  and  Father  Christmas 
CHAPTER  4  - ~~[Q~~~Q-~£QQQmi£_[~£Q~~[~ 
41  The  economic  problems  of  Europe:  analysis 
42  The  economic  problems  of  Europe:  seven  key  observations 
43  - Industry  and  the ·European  Community 
44  - Employment  and  the  European  Community 
45- Towards  a  European  policy  for  economic  recovery 
- 2  -CHAPTER  5  - Ib~-D~~-ffiQffi~D!~m_fQ£_9£Q~!b_wi!b_§!~~ili!l 
51  - An  extra  1%  for  3  years  would  be  enough 
52  - The  conditions  for  collective  pump-priming 
53  - How  is this  additional  growth  to  be  achieved? 
54  The  bases  for  a  creative  compromise 
55  - The  momentum  of  recovery  and  the  EMS 
CHAPTER  6  - ~£~~!iD9-~-S~£Q~~~D-~£~~-fQ£_iDQ~§!£l_~QQ_£~§~~££b 
61  - The  'uncommon'  video-recorder  market 
62- The  railways  of  the  year  2000 
63- The  new  fertility of  European  research 
CHAPTER  7  - ~-S~£Q~~~D-~~~B§~~~~-El~D~_fQ£_~D~£9l-~DQ_£~9iQD~l-~Qli£l 
71  - Explanatory  statement 
72  - Plan  of  action 
CHAPTER  8  - §£Q~!b_iD-~ffi~lQlffi~D!_!b£Q~gb_fl~~i~ili!l_Qf_l~~Q~£ 
81  - Unemployment,  in  Europe,  is  characterized  by  its 
inflexibility 
CONCLUSION 
82- Flexibility for  youth  employment 
83- Flexibility of  working  hours 
COMMENTARY  - Professor  BALL 
- Mr  Michel  ALBERT 
The  annexes  will  be  distributed separately. 
- 3  -FOREWORD  --------
On  14  December  1982  the  enlarged  Bureau  of  the  European  Parliament,  under 
the  chairmanship  of  Mr  DANKERT,  authorized  the 
1Group  for  Recovery  of  the 
European  Economy•~  consisting  of  the  chairmen  of  the  six  parliamentary 
1  '  committees  whose  terms  of  reference  include  economic  matters,  to  appoint 
economists  to  dra~ up  a  report  on  the  economic  crisis affecting  the 
European  Community  and  on  the  ways  and  means  of  bringing  about  a  recovery 
of  growth. 
The  Group, .whose  chairman  is  Mr  NIKOLAU  and  rapporteur  Sir  Fred  CATHERWOOD, 
asked  Mr  Michel  ALBERT,  former  head  of  the  French  Commissariat  au  Plan, 
and  Professor  James  BALL,  Principal  of  the  London  Business  School,  to  draw 
up  the  general  report.  This  report  has  been  completed  within  the  allotted 
time  and  is  attached. 
The  Group  also  requested  Mr  J.  WITTEVEEN,  Professor  L.  SPAVENTA  and 
Mr  U.  LANTZKE  to  submit  contributions  on  specific  points. 
Mr  Michel  ALBERT  and  Professor  James  BALL  wish  to  thank  these  three  eminent 
personalities  most  sincere~ for  their  contributions.  They  would  also  Like 
to  thank  the  European  Institutions,  the  authorities  of  the  Member  States 
and  the  numberous  individuals  and  bodies  who  have  been  kind  enough  to  pro-
vide  information  and  cooperation,~ and  also  the  services  of  the  European 
Parliament,  especially the  coordinator, .Mr  DEWAR. 
They  .would  Like  to  convey  their  sincere  gratitude  to  the  three  eminent 
experts  who  have  kindly  collaborated  with  them  in  conceiving,  preparing, 
drafting  and  correcting this  report:  Mr  John  DREW,  Mr  Francesco  PORRE  and 
Mr  Ludwig  SCHUBERT.  Their  tireless  commitment  and,  above  all,  the  calibre 
of  their  work  represent  far  more  than  a  mere  technical  contribution. 
1  Mr  Jacques  Moreau,  Mrs  Hanna  Walz,  Sir  Fred  Catherwood, 
Mr  Efstratios Papaefstratiou,  Mr  Pancrazio  De  Pasquale  and 
Mr  Michel  Poniatowski.  · 
- 4  -There  was  not  sufficient  time  to arrive  at  a  compromise  solution.  Indeed, 
a  compromise  document  would  have  been  Less  effective than  a  joint  analysis 
and  a  clear  indication of  the  differences  of  view  which  emerged  on  economic 
policy  guidelines. 
The  general  report  consists  of  two  parts: 
- the  first  part  contains  an  analysis  of  the  problem.  The  two  experts  agree 
on  this  analysis; 
- the  second  part  contains  proposals  on  which  there  were  certain differences 
of  opinion:  Chapter  4  'European  economic  recovery'  was  drafted  by 
Professor J.  BALL  and  the  other  chapters  by  Mr  M.  ALBERT. 
Finally,  Professor  J.  BALL  and  Mr  M.  ALBERT  have  each  set  out  their  personal 
comments  in  a  brief  note. 
Brussels,  27  June  1983 
- 5  -How  can  the  European  economy  recover  during  the  eighties?  The  European 
Parliament  has  given  ~s four  months  to  reply  to this question.  It  is  a 
challenge  we  have  accepted  with  some  trepidation.  Yet  such  a  deadline  is 
justified given  the  ~[9~0! need  for  the  economies  of  the  ten  member 
countries  of  the  European  Economic  Community  to  emerge  from  ten  years  of 
stagnation  and  from  the  last  three years  of  vi.rtual  standstill  (the  rate 
of  growth  between  1981  and  1983  was  0.1%). 
The  crisis  is  of  international  proportions,  but  its effects are  being 
felt.far  more  severely  in  the  countries  of  Europe  than  in other  countries. 
That  is  our  first  comment.  Europe's  surface  prosperity  masks  a  decline  which 
is  inflicting  immense  hardship.  It  has  still barely  impinged  on  the  public 
consciousness.  The  initial  stages qf  decay  always  have  the  gilded  softness 
of  the  first  days  of  autumn.  But  winte~and sickness  are  not  far  behind.  It 
grows  worse  with  each  passing  day,  and  we  shall  see  why  there  are  no  Longer 
national  remedies  and  why  recovery  can  only  be.achieved  by  Europe. 
But  by  which  Europe?  One  torn  apart  by  divergent  exchange  rates  and 
conflicting policies?  By  a  Europe  which  has  evolved  only  one  common  policy 
since  the  first oil  shock  a  common  policy  of  illusions? 
So  why  has  the  European  Parliament  commissioned  this  report  in  1983?  There 
is  a  world  crisis which  has  Lasted  10  years.  But  now  oil  ptices  are  falling. 
America  is  taking  off  again.  It  Looks  as  if  Europe  will  follow.  There  are 
two  errors  in  this  tempting  commonsense  argumetn.  Because  Europe  was  muc~ 
harder  hit  by  the.world  crisis than  its  OECD  partners,  it has  no  chance  of 
getting  in step with  the  US  by  practising  a  'wait-and-see'  policy:  it will 
simply ·fall  further  and  further  behind.  Secondly,  it would  be  a  mistake  to 
imagine  that  the  Ten  can  extricate  themselves  from  the  crisis by  playing  the 
role  of  wagons  attached  to  the  American  Locomotive:  that  would  only 
accelerate their decli.ne.  This  is  apparent  in  1983.  It  ~ill be  all  the  more 
so  in  1984. 
- 6  -The  Ten  must  look  to  Europe  for  a  lead.  It  is  there  that  they  will  find  the 
necessary  driving  for~e.  Demand-pull  inflation  has  ceased  to exist  in  the 
EEC  and  for  the  first  time,  in  1983,  all  governments  have  come  to  realize 
that  lax  financial  policies only  aggravate  the  economic  crisis which  they  are 
trying  to overcome.  But  what  is particularly significant  is that  this  truth 
is  now  also  bemg  grasped  by  the  vast  amjority  of  the  social  partners,  as  much 
by  workers  as  by  management. 
This  combination  of  change  of  circumstances  and  a  change  of  attitude offers 
us  a  chance  which  we  must  be  sure  to seize.  After  so  many  disappointments  we 
~~~! succeed  this  time. 
'We  must',  'it is  necessary'  ••••  It  is quite  natural  that  so  much  that  is 
written  by  Europeans  should  be  expressed  in  the  optative mood.  But  there  is 
too  much  talk  about  what  is desirable,  not  enough  about  what  is possible. 
Happily,  however,  the  European  Parliament  has  shown  itself to  be  concerned 
with  Q[2f!if2l_QQ~~i~ili!i~~, and  it  is  on  these  that  it sought  our  advice. 
Europe  has  been  much  harmed  by  those  who  insist  on  talking  about  it  as  though 
it were  a  comforting  dream  world.  The  time  of  the  Sleeping  Beauty  is  over. 
We  shall  exclude  from  our  report  all proposals  which  would  require  that  the 
Community  institutions  should first  be  reformed.  Admittedly,  the  Community 
institutions are  ill-suited to decision-making  and  have  been  enfeebled  by 
years  of  indecision.  But  reform  takes  years.  Wisdom  and  the  urgency  of  the 
situation  require  us  to  accept  the  institutions  as  they  are  and  to  make  the 
most  of  what  they  have  to offer. 
In  the  same  spirit,  we  shall  be  wary  of  the  now  fashionable  practice  of  calling 
at  every  turn  for  a  convergence  of  national  economic  policies,  since  we  know 
full  well  that  this  is  very difficult  to  achieve  and  that  national 
attitudes  to  the  problem  of  convergence  differ  markedly.  By  the  same  token, 
we  shall  have  nothing  to do  with  the  old  pretence  that  coordination  is  the 
key  to  the  solution of  all  intractable  problems:  the  Community  has  Lost  20 
years  by  clinging to  such  a  myth.  Let  us  not  be  too  naive:  there will  be  no 
convergence  and  no  coordination  of  national  policies  unless  and  until  the 
parties  involved  feel  that  such  action  will  effectively serve  their  intere&sp 
and  that  is precisely  one  of  the  reasons  why  it  is essential  to  ensure  a 
l2~!iD9 recovery  of  growth  in  Europe.  Instead  of  yet  again  denouncing 
- 7  -the  Community's  notorious  weakness,  its  'Lack  of  political will', which 
serves  no  useful  purpose,  we  shall  try  to  see  how  growth  can  be  revived 
without  continuing  to  insist  that  the  governments  adopt  policies  contrary 
to  those  on  which  they  were  elected. 
Our  proposals  are  no  more  Keynesian  than  monetarist.  The  i~portant factor, 
in  our  view,  is  that  they  are  ~r~f!if~Ql~·  In  this  regard,  we  are  quite 
aware  that  you  cannot  simply  decree  that  the  growth  rate shall  be  such  and 
such  a  percentage.  The  present  stagnation  is in  Large  mea~ure the  result 
of  cyclical  policies  which  were  aimed  at  stimulating  growth.  The  crisis 
compels  us  to  be  realistic:  we  can  no  Longer  expect  any  Lasting  solution 
to  produce  short-term  results.  That  is ~hy,  in  the  french  version  of  this 
report,  we  have  been  careful  to  use  not  'relance'  but  'r~9r~~~~~~Q!'  to 
render  the  English  term  'r~fQY~rt'·  We  have  proceeded  on  the  assumption 
that  this  'recovery'  will  take  5  to  10  years  and  have  taken  1990  as  a  rough 
target  date.  With  that  time-scale,  there  will  be  ample  room  for  manoeuvre 
and  the  partners,  who  may  have. some  difficultires when  their  immediate 
interests  are  at  stake,  may  find  that  they  can  approach  the  Longer-term  task 
of  joint  reconstruction  with  the  necessary  equanimity. 
0 
0  0 
This  report,  which  we  have  tried to  write  as  clearly  and  simply  as  possible, 
has  two  parts.  The  first  part  is analysis,  while  the  second  part  puts  for-
ward  proposals. 
The  central  theme  is  that  the  main  obstacle  to  the  economic  growth  6f  the 
European  countries  is  what  we  must  call  'non-Europe'.  This  is  Less  to 
denounce  the  sterility of  the  institutions or  the  defects  in  their  construc-
tion  than  to  underline  how  public  opinion  is  too  Little aware  of  the  role 
which  it must  play  from  now  on.  It  is this  QQQ:f~[Q~~,  Lacking  popular 
legitimacy,  which  is ossifying  and  declining  on  the  ~Jjpp~I~-~19P~_9j_QQQ-
9[Q~!b· 
As  for  our  proposaLs, it would  be  utopian- everything  will  remain  Utopian  so 
long  as  we  fail  to measure  the  evils  which  await  us  if  we  do  nothing- if  they 
- 8  -did  not  address  themselves  specifically  to  the  European  Parliament.  Their 
success  or  failure  depends  Less  on  the  political  will  of  governments  than 
on  the  economic  intelligence  of  public  opinion.  The  EEC  has  today  all  the 
resources  ne~essary to  pursue  a  ~~rQQ~~Q-~!r~!~9t_Qf_r~£QY~rtL_Qf_l~~!iQ9 
9rQ~!b_~QQ_Qf_~ffiQlQtffi~Q!_iQ_~!~~l~_fQQQi!iQQ~·  Harnessing  these  resources 
is  relatively  easy  on  one  condition,  and  one  only:  that  a  sufficient  body 
of  political,  economic  and  social  opinion  identifies  clearly  a  common 
interest. 
The  electorate will  next  year  elect  Members  of  the  European  Parliament.  If 
only  5%  of  that  electorate  takes  the  trouble  to  examine,  understand  and 
discuss  our  analysis  and  proposals,  even  to  reject  them  and  produce  others,then 
it will  no  Longer  be  over-optimistic  to  count  on  the  future  recovery  of  the 
European  economy. 
- 9  -THE  1970s:  TWO  MISTAKES  IN  THE  FACE  OF  THE  CRISIS 
1  It  is  urgent  - especially  for  Europe  - to  find  once  again  a  rhythm  of 
sustained  growth.  As  proof  of  this,  we  have  only  to  point  out  that: 
- the  rate  of  growth  of  the  EEC's  economy  fell  from  4.6%  per  annum  between 
1960  and  1973  to  2.3%  between  1973  and  1980.  The  corresponding  figures 
for  the  United  States  are  4.0%  and  2.2%.  Up  to 1973,  then,  the  European 
1 
2  economy  grew  at  a  significantly faster  rate  than  the  American  economy  • 
But  i!_b~§_§lQ~~g_gQ~Q_Q£~§!if~llt in  the  Last  few  years  (2.3  points 
down  as  opposed  to 1.8  in  the  United  Stat~s).  The  Longer  the  present 
situation continues,  the  more  pronounced  this difference will  be:  between 
1981  and  1984,  Europe's  percentage  Lag  will  stretch  to  roughly  3-5%  and 
will  make  it difficult  for  per  capita  in~ome to  catch  up: 
~hereas during  the  period  of  expansi~n of  the  1950s  and  the  1960s  Europe 
was  able  to maintain  full  employment,  even  managing  to place millions  of 
migrant  workers,  since  1973  it  is  the  only  area  of  the  world  to  have 
failed  to  create  jobs.  Between  1973  and  1983  employment  in  the  EEC 
actually decreased  by  3  million,  while  in  the  USA  it  increased  by  15 
million.  Consequently  the  unemployment  rate  in  Europe  rose  much  faster 
than  in  the  USA  and  the  average  period  of  unemployment  was  six  times  as 
Long  <six  months  as  opposed  to  one  month).  One  can  easily  understand 
that  the  economic  and  social  consequences  of  such  a  rate  of  unemployment 
<more  than  10%)  must  be  much  more  serious  in  Europe. 
This  word  is  used  here  to denote  all  the  member  countries  of  the  EEC.  The 
expression  'Non-Europe'  is  intended  to  convey  the  Low  Level  of  cooperation 
and  the  weakness  of  common  policies.  · 
2  Between  1959  and  1970,  the  Community  of  Six  managed  a  growth  rate  of  5.7%, 
as  against  4%  in  the  United  States. 
- 10  -During  the  years  of  rapid  expansion  the  peoples  of  Europe  evolved  a  variety 
of  systems  and  institutions  which  were  without  parallel  on  the  other  side 
of  the  Atlantic  and  which  Left  them  dependent  on  sustained  economic  growth. 
A notable  cause  of  this  situation was  the  development  of  social  security 
systems  which  risk  being  slowly  suffocated  by  stagnation  and  unemployment. 
In  Europe,  more  than  anywhere  else,  the  need  for  growth  is vital.  In  the 
face  of  this  evidence,  however,  the  Ten  committed  two  mistakes  in  the 70s, 
serious  enough  to mortgage  the  future. 
11  - The  first  mistake:  sacrificing the  future  to  the  present 
In  the  early  1970s,  Europe  was  suddenly  confronted  with  a  threefold  challenge: 
inflation,  the oil  shock  and  competition  from  new  industries.  No  other 
developed  region  of  the  world  was  so  severely  affected.  Not  only  was  it 
forced  into  a  position of  heavy  dependence  for  its energy  supplies,  it also 
had  to  suffer  the  penetration of  its  industrial  markets  both  by  Japan  and 
by  the  newly  industrializing  countries  (NICs),  all  new  forces  bent  on  the 
conquest  of  the  future.  To  make  matters  worse,  Europe  seemed  suddenly  to  be 
caught  up  in  the  web  of  its past,  adopting  what  the  psychologists  might  call 
an  'escapist posture'.  It  tried to  ignore  the  realities of  the  new 
situation by  boosting  wages  at  the  expense  of  profits  and  encouraging  con-
.  h  f  .  1  sumpt1on  at  t  e  expense  o  1nvestment. 
In all,  between  1973  and  1983  consumption  (private  and  public)  as  a  share  of 
GOP  increased  by  5  points  (or  6%  of  the  initial share),  whereas  the  share  of 
investment  fell  by  5  points  (or  20%).  Nothing  demonstrates  more  clearly  the 
full  extent  to which  the  EEC  has  been  prepared  to  sacrifice the  future  to  the 
present.  Suddenly  finding  herself  in  financial  straits, the  old  Lady  of 
Europe  has  sold  her  jewels  in  a  bid  to maintain  her  'standing'. 
It  is quite  remarkable  that  this  reaction  should  appear  to  a  Lesser  or 
greater extent  in all  the  Member  States,  despite  the  differences  in their 
avowed  policies  and  theories  as  well  as  in  company  management  and  in  the 
management  of  public  finances  within  each  of  them. 
111  - Analysis  of  table  No.  1 
On  the difficult question  of  the  relationship  between  income  and  employment, 
this table  sp~aks for  itself:  it  shows  that  faced  with  a  slow-down  in 
growth,  the  Europeans  reacted  in  a  very  characteristic  way,  giving priority  ------------- 1  See  Annex  1 
- 11  -Table  1  -------
Average  1961-70 
1973 
1975 
1978 
1980 
1983 
1961-73 
1974-80 
1981-83 
(estimate) 
1961-73 
1974-80 
1981-83 
(estimate) 
~~g~E~Qy~g~IL_g~E~Qy~g~I-~~Q_!~£Q~g~ 
g~BQEgL-~~!IgQ_§I~Ig§_~~Q-~~E~~ 
Rate  of  unemployment 
<%  of  total  working 
population) 
~c  USA  JAPAN 
--------~·-· 
2.1  4.6  1.2 
2.4  4.5  1.3 
4.1  8.0  1.9 
5.2  5.7  2.2 
5  .. 8  6.7  2.0 
10.8  10.1  2.4 
Per  capita  real  wages 
A  % p.a.  (b) 
1 Discrepancy  between· growth 
in  per  capita  real  wages 
and  GDP  in  volume  per 
employed  person  <a> 
EC  USA  JAPAN 
100.0  100.0  100.0 
106.4  103.3  100.7 
114.0  106.5  107.2 
112.3  105.4  104.2 
113.0.  106.8  98.7 
116.8  109.2  97.9 
GDP  in  volume  per  employed 
person  A% p.a. 
-------··-·----·--:----+-----.------.----
EC 
4.9 
2.5 
1.1 
EC 
0.24 
0.13 
-1.4 
USA 
2.5 
0.3 
0.5 
Employment 
6% p.a. 
USA 
2.0 
2.0 
0.2 
I 
! 
; 
JAPAN 
7.6 
2.3 
1.4 
JAPAN 
1.2 
0.85 
1.1 
EC  USA  JAPAN 
4.4  2.1  8.5 
1.6  - 0.2  2.8 
0.0  - 0.2  1.  7 
GDP  in  volume 
A% p.a. 
.  - - ·-·-··--·· ------..----------
EC  ~  U~A  I  JAPAN 
------------------~  -
.  . 
4.6  4.0  10.3 
I 
2.3  2.2  i  3.7  ,. 
o.1  o.s  l-·:s.,  1 
--- ----------------- __:_ ______________ ~_l  __________________ -------------------- ---- __________ l  __ - - - .....  1 
(a)  1961-70  indexes = 100,  index  of  the  remuneration  of  wage-earners  per  wage 
ea~ner, deflated  by  the  private  consumption  price  and  divided  by  GDP  in 
volume  per  employed  person. 
(b)  Deflated  by  the  private  consumption  price. 
Sources:  EUROSTAT:  National  accounts;  Employment  and  unemployment 
OECD  Economic  prospects 
- 11a  -to  individual  incomes  rather  than  b  employment. 
On  employment,  the  contrast  is  marked:  in  1983  American  and  European 
unemployment  rates  are  comparable,  but  since  1973  the  rate  has  only  doubled 
in  the  United  States  whereas  it  has  increased  fivefold  in  Europe.  Japan  is 
of  course  a  country  of  full  employment. 
Let  us  turn  to  the  three  right-hand  columns.  They  show  the  discrepancy  be-
tween  growth  in  per  capita  real  wages  and  GDP  in  volume  per  employed  person. 
What  does  this discrepency  mean?  Simply  that  GDP  in  volume  per  employed 
person  broadly  represents  the  wealth  produced  by  each  individual,  whether  in 
1  employment  or  unemployed.  The  real  per  capita  wage  gives  the  Least  distorted 
measurement  of  average  individual  incomes;  wages  represent  approximately  3/4 
of  the  national  income  and  are  better  documented  than  other  income.  It  is 
clear that  wealth  distributed  in  the  form  of  income  cannot  in  the  Long  term 
increase  faster  than  per  capita  GDP  without  some  ill effects. 
And  yet  this  is  what  has  been  happening  in  Europe  for  more  than  10  years. 
In  1973  the  difference  from  the  average  in  the  1960s  was  6%  in  Europe  compared 
with  3%  in  the  United  States  and  Less  than  1%  in  Japan.  It  is  easy  to  see 
how  after  the  first  oil  price  shock  and  the  subsequent  recession  wage-earners 
everywhere  attempted  to  maintain  the  increase  in their  purchasing  power  in 
spite  of  the  slowdown  in  growth.  But  they  succeeded  more  in  Europe,  where  the 
difference  reached  14%  in  1975,  than  in  the  United  States  and  Japan,  where  it 
was  only  half  this  Level  (7%).  This  difference  became  even  more  pronounced  in 
the  period  between  the  two  oil  price  shocks.  The  second  oil  price  shock  and 
the  1981  - 1983  recession  widened,the  gap:  7  to 8  points  higher  in  Europe  than 
in  the  United  States.  In  Japan,  not  only  has  the  situation not  deteriorated, 
it  has  actually  improved  slightly.  This  is  reflected  in  the  vitality and 
competitive  ability  of  Japanese  firms,  which  is  Linked  to  the  effectiveness 
of  their  fight  against  unemployment.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  clear  that 
behaviour  such  as  that  displayed  in  Europe,  marked  by  an  enormous  growth  in 
individual  incomes  compared  with  GDP,  indicates  a  preference  for  consumption 
to  the  detriment  of  investment  and  results  in  an  increase  in  the  costs  of 
undertakings  which  severely  Limits  their ability  to  invest.  Moreover,  in  view 
of  the  high  Level  of  wage  costs,  companies  are  attracted more  by  investments 
which  save  Labour  than  by  investments  which  create  jobs.  This  is particularly 
true  in  Europe,  since  the  taxes  and  related  charges  applied  to  wages  are  the 
highest  in  the  world  and,  as  we  shall  see,  they  have  increased  more  rapidly 
than  anywhere  eLse  over  the  Last  ten  vears. 
--------------- 1 
For  statistical purposes,  the  term  'active population'  denotes  all 
employed  and  unemployed  persons. 
- 12  -Thu~the increase  in  individual  incomes,  which  is  ~xcessive in  comparison 
to  the  wealth  produced,  increases  unemployment,  reduces  investment  and 
compromises  present  and  future  growth. 
The  reason  for  this  development  in  Europe  is  a  particularly  rigid posture 
on  incomes.  From  1974  to  1980  GDP  increased at  the  same  rate  on  both  sides 
of  the  Atlantic  (EEC:  2.3%- USA:  2.2%  per  annum).  But  in  Europe  real 
wages  increased  by  2.5%  and  employment  scarcely  grew  at  all  <0.1%  per  annum), 
whereas  in  the  United  States  real  wages  levelled  off  but  employment  increased 
by  2%  per  annum.  Similarly,  in  Japan1  the  growth  in  real  wages  <2.3%  per 
annum)  was  lower  than  the  growth  in  GDP  (3.7%)  and  employment  increased  by 
0.8%  per  annum.  Wage  flexibility  in  Japan  derives  in  large  measure  from  the 
adju~tments made  to  the  annual  bonus  p~id in  the  light  of  a  company's 
performance,  which  often  represents  a  third of  a  worker's  wages. 
When  overall  growth  falls,  the  only  two  ways  of  maintaining  increases  in 
purchasing  power  are  to  increase  the  external  debt  and  reduce  company  profits. 
Such  was  the  course  of  action  pursued  ~y the  Europeans.  To  all  appearances, 
this  is  a  'social'  choice.  In  reality it  is  a  short-term  calculation.  A 
few  years  later it became  apparent  that,  lacking  investment  capacity,  many 
European  companies  were  losing  their  competitiveness  and,  at  the  same  time, 
their ability to  create  jobs.  In  Japan  and  the  United  States,:on lhe other 
hand,  it seemed  as  if  empl~yees had  agreed  implicitly  and  in  advance  to  s6me 
arrangement  for  sharing  income  with  new  workers,  which  made  further  recruit-
ment  possible. 
'The  practice of. increasing  wages,  which  initially produces  a  favourable 
impression,  ultimately exerts  a  negative  influence  on  economic  Life  as ·a  whole. 
It generates  an  increase  in  demand  which  cannot  be  entirely satisfied and 
prevents  the  elimination  of  deficits  and  their evil  consequences  of  which  the 
workers  are  understandably  resentful'. 
Which  economist  sternly denounced  increases  in  nominal  wages  in  this way? 
It  was  none  other  than  Mr  Yuri  ANDROPOV,  First  Secretary of  the  Communist 
2  Party  of  the  USSR  •  His  analysis  has  much  relevance  to  the  situation  in 
Western  Europe. 
1 
2 
Following  the  squeeze  on  profits  resulting  from  the  first  oil  shock,  a  deli-
oerate  policy  of  curbing  costs,  particularly wage  costs,  was  pursued  by 
Japan.  This  'weight-reducing'  policy  enabled  the  country  to  recover  and  to 
prevent  ~age costs  from  again  spiralling during  the  second  oil  shock. 
Revue  Kommunist,  February  19R3 
- 13  -Tret  is  not  to  say,  however,  that  our  Leaders  have  a  monopoly  of  wisdom  and  that, 
irrespective  of  ideological  differences,  they  are  always  right  in  their 
prescriptions  to public  opinion  and  irresponsible  social  partners.  There  can  be 
no  better  proof  of  this  than  the  dramatic  rise  in  the  rate  of  inflation which 
followed  the  first  oil  shock.  This  rate  reached  17.5%  in  1972/73  and  continued 
at  13.5%  between  1975  and  1978,  that  is,  before  the  secondoil  shock.  If  wages 
were  rising  too  fast,  it was  certainly with  the  blessing  of  the  monetary 
authorities. 
112  - Industry  bears  the  brunt  of  the  crisis 
The  performance  of  European  industry  has  not  been  good.  It  is  somewhat  worrying. 
In  1980,  the  average  net  profit  of  the  hundred  Largest  European  industrial 
groups  represented  1.4%  of  their sales,  whereas  the  corresponding  figures  for 
the  hundred  Largest  Japanese  and  American  groups  were  2.4%  and  4.8%  respectively. 
If  we  exclude  the  oil  companies  from  this  sample,  the  situation becomes  even 
more  disturbing,  since  we  find  that  the  American  groups  recorded  a  net  profit  on 
own  capital  of  11.5%  and  the  Japanese  groups  13.8%  •..  but  that  the  European 
groups  had  a  deficit  of  0.1%. 
This  virt~L disappearance  of  profit  is  particularly serious  for  investment  since 
the  risk  premiums  have  increased  considerably  since  the  crisis  and  the  return  on 
capital  has  decreased.  This  Largely  explains  the  collapse  of  manufacturing 
investment  in  Europe.  Measured  as  a  percentage  of  GDP,  such  investment  was  twice 
as  high  in  Europe  as  in  the  United  States  in  1970.  Today,  a  fact  without 
precedent  since  the  fifties,  it  is only  slightly higher.  Certainly,  the  fall  in 
the  rate  of  investment  was  equally  spectactular  in  Japan.  N=vertheless,  in  1979 
Japanese  investment  stood  at  5.2%  of  GDP, i.e.  the. European  rate  recorded  in 
1970,  which  today  barely  to~ches the  3%  mark. 
This  general  pattern of  development  is all  the  more  dangerous,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  European  competitiveness,  in  that  most  European  countries  have  for 
several  years  now  given first  priority  in  their  economic  policies  to  the  support  of 
industrial  investment.  That  this  should  be  necessary  is  demonstrated  by  the  fact 
that  between  1973  and  1981  industrial  output  rose  by  26%  in  Japan  and  by  16%  in 
the  US,  but  by  only  8%  in  Europe.  But  investment  has  only  been  a  theoretical 
priority:  the  real  priority  has  been  public  finances,  to  the  detriment  of  produc-
tive activities.  This  has  created  an  unprecedented  situation,  fraught  with 
consequences  for  the  future  of  Europe,  especially  since  the  brunt  of  the  crisis 
has  been  borne  by  industry  rather  than  individuals. 
- 14  -Graph  1 
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+  0.6  +  1'  0 113- The  Loss  of  control  over  public finances 
Since  the  upheaval  of  1974,  public  expenditure  as  a  share  of  GDP  has  increased 
spectacularly  in  Europe  (see  Graph  1).  In  1982,  this  share  exceeded  50% 
whereas  in  the  US  and  Japan  it was  approximately  35%.  This  is  shown  by 
Table  2. 
The  difference  in  the  rates  of  increase  revealed  by  this table weighs  heavily 
on  the  prospects  for  growth.  It  merits  careful  attention  and  is  explained  by 
the  following  two  factors: 
- Firstly,  corporations,  of  every  description  acted  at  the  macroeconomic  Level 
in  the  same  way  as  income-earners  at  the  microeconomic  Level:  they  endeavoured 
to  maintain  the  increase  in  their  puchasing  power  by  demanding  some  sort  of 
compensation  from  public  finances.  They  retained  the  habits  acquried  during 
the  years  of  expansion,  expecting  the  State  to  continue  to maintain  the 
increase  in  collective  consumption  and  in  payments  to  households:  yet  another 
'social  choice',  which  in  the  Long  term  will  prove  just  as  mistaken  as  the  one 
already  discussed. 
An  inevitable  consequence  of  this  'choice'  was  that  public  authority  invest-
ment  as  a  share  of  GDP  fell  by  a  third  between  1973  and  1982  (from  4.1%  to 
2.94 ).  Over  the  same  period,  public  authority  f~rr~o!_~~Q~09i!~r~ as  a  share 
of  GDP  increased  by  a  third  (from  35%  to 47%). 
-The second  reason  for  the  Loss  of  control  over  public  finances,  namely  the 
dramatic  increase  in  social  security expenditure,  is  even  more  important. 
After  the  Second  World  War,  Europe  evolved  a  system  of  ~2£i~1-~~1f~r~ which  is 
without  parallel  in  the  rest  of  the  world:  the  Welfare  State.  Apart  from 
making  a  vital  contribution  to  improving  the  social  conditions  of  an  entire 
generation,  the  Welfare  State  also  played  a  decisive  part  in  cushioning  the 
shock  of  the  crisis,  insofar  as  there  was  scarcely  any  slackening  in  the  growth 
of  transfers  between  1973  and  1980  in  spite of  the  fall  in  economic  growth. 
The  expenditure  of  the  Welfare  State,  financed  by  compulsory  Levies  <taxes 
and  social  security  contributions),  could  easily  be  met  in  the  years  of 
vi~orous growth. 
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had  the effect  of  upsetting  this equilibrium.  Far  from  being  stabilized as 
they  should  have  been,  social  welfare  costs  continued  to  increase  !~if~-~~ 
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This  difference  is  attributable  to  the  rigidity  of  social  expenditure:  even 
if  things  go  badly,  advances  in  health  care  and  progress  in  medicine  will 
continue  to  inflate  the  health  bill.  The  growing  numbers  of  elderly  people 
will  place  an  ever  increasing  burden  on  pension  funds.  The  cost  of  unemploy-
ment  will  increase  twofold  because  of  the  Loss  of  social  security  contri-
butions  and  increases  in  expenditure  on  compensation  and  allowances. 
The  financing  of  these  services  and  benefits  has  become  so  difficult  that 
the  Welfare  State  is  in  a  veritable  state of  crisis, while  in  some  countries 
there  is  now  strong  resistance  to  the  constant  increase  in  the  compulsory 
Levies.  As  we  shall  see,  no  EEC  country  can  go  on  authorizing  a  growth  in 
social  transfers  which  is  too  much  in  excess  of  the  growth  rate  of  the 
economy  without  jeopardizing  the  competitiveness  of  its  industry  and  causing 
a  sudden  decline  in  purchasing  power.  In  all  European  countries  there  is 
evidence  of  a  contradiction  between  the  short-term  demand  for  social  services 
and  benefits  and  the  medium-term  exigencies  of  growth,  investment  and 
employment. 
This  contradiction  is  usually  overcome  in  two  ways,  both  of  which  have  their 
Limits:  by  increasing deficits,  and  by  raising  fiscal  and  parafiscal  charges. 
From  1974,  public  sector deficits  Literally  soared  in  the  EEC.  Whereas 
between  1968  and  1973  they  represented  on  average  only  0.6%  of  GDP,  this 
share  increased  sixfold  to  3.7%  between  1974  and  1978  and  ninefold  to  more 
than  5%  in  the  years  1981  to  1983.  These  deficits  have  to  be  covered  either 
by  Loans,  which  further  inflate  interest  rates,  thereby  curbing  company 
investment1,  or  by  increasing  the  money  supply,  which  feeds  inflation. 
1  In  the  FRG,  the  share  of  private  savings  available  for  the  financing  of 
companies  fell  from  approximately  100%  in  the  1960s  to  45%  in  1982. 
- 16  -Thus,  the  ability of  companies  to  invest -that is  to  say,  to prepare  for 
the  future  - is  severe~ restricted  by  the  inflation  created  both  by  the 
attitudes of  wage-earners  and  by  the  management  of  public  finances,  whi.ch 
reflect  the  extent  to  which  priority  is  accorded  to  the  present. 
True,  public  finances  deficits  are  almost  as  high  in  the  US  and  Japan  as  in 
Europe.  Nonetheless,  they  tend  to  be  Larger  in  Europe  for  two  specific  reasons: 
on  the  one  hand,  the  intolerably  high  Level  of  the  compulsory  Levies  acts  as  a 
disincentive  to  the  most  active  groups  in  the  population  (company  directors, 
executives, .technicians,  etc);  on  the  other  hand,  the  rate  of  growth  of  social 
security expenditure- which  has  been  excessive  from  the  outset  -tends to 
accelerate with. the  slowdown  in  economic  growth  and  hence  perpetuates  the 
factors  which  sustain disproportionately  Large  social  security  budgets. 
Developments  in  the  productive  sector  of  the  economy  and  in  the  management  of 
public  finances  show  that  they  have  had  .a  remarkably  similar  effect.  In  both 
cases,  the  Lack  of  flexible  public  expenditure  and  incomes  policies  has 
depressed  both  investment  and  employment.  Put  another  way,  the  exaggerated 
preoccupation  with  the  present,  the  restless  and  disturbing  search  for  the 
immediate  satisfaction of  needs,  are  inimical  to  growth.  In  this  way  what  is 
feared  is  actually  encouraged. 
12  - The  second  mistake:  The  Community  of  'every  man  for  himself' 
121  - Article  2  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  establishing  the  European  Economic 
Community  specifies  that  'The  Community  shall  have  as  its task,  by  establishing 
a  common  market  and  progressively  approximating  the  economic  policies  of 
Member  States,  to  promote  throughout  the  Community  a  harmonious  development  of 
economic  activities,  a  continuous  and  balanced  expansion,  an  increase  in 
stability,  an  accelerated  raising  of  the  standard  of  Living  and  closer  rela-
tions  between  the  States  belonging  to it'. 
The  message  is  clear:  the  creation  of  the  Community  was  regarded  by  its 
founders  as  the  io~~~!~~Q! par  excellence.  Each  Memqer  State  was  convinced 
that,  through  unification  with  its partners,  it  ~auld find  within  the  Community 
t~e means  of  facilitating  the  solution  of  some  of  its most  intractable problems. 
In  this  belief,  it was  ready  to  make  a  number  of  ~bQr!:!~r~-~§£rifi£~~, for 
example,  the  approximation  of  its economic  policy  with  that  of  the  other  Member 
States,  with  a  view  to  securing  the  1QQ9~r:!~r~_§Q~§Q!§g~~ of  expansion, 
- 17-equilibrium  and  stability.  This  required  that  the  Member  States  should  work 
together  to  achieve  what  is  the  very  definition  of  an  investment:  a  Q~QQ~f!i~~ 
9i~~r~iQO_Qf_r~~Q~[f~~- What  was  the  yield  on  this  investment?  No-one  can 
say  precisely,  because  it  is  impossible  to  rewrite  history.  But  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  the  remarkable  progress  made  in  all  areas  of  economic  and  social 
Life  in  Europe  in  the  fifteen  years  following  the  establishment  of  the  Common 
Market  was  in  Large  measure  attributable  to  the  Common  Market  itself. 
Be  that as  it may,  everything  tends  to  show  that  from  the  beginning  of  the 
1970s,  when  Europe  was  confronted  with  the  ordeal  of  slow  growth  and  rapid 
inflation,  the  Member  States,  instead  of  redoubling  their efforts  to  invest 
together  in  the  Community,  and  jointly accepting  the  need  for  a  further  prod-
uctive  diversion  of  resources,  were  disposed  to  regard  the  Community,  not  as  a 
collective  investment  asset,  but  as  an  object  of  individual  consumption,  in 
other  words  the  means  for  each  of  them  to  consume  more  and  to  improve  its  own 
short-term  situation by  increasing  its share  of  the  benefits  of  the  common 
budget  on  the  basis  of  the  principle of  a  'fair return',  with  each  convinced 
of  its entitlement  to  a  Larger  share  than  all  the  others. 
122  -This evidently  explains  why,  after energetically  tackling  the  major 
problems  of  the  time  (coal  and  steel,  atomic  energy,  the  unity  of  the  internal 
market  and  the  common  agricultural  policy),  Europe  has  for  ten  years  been 
virtually paralysed  by  hair-splitting and  protracted  Legal  disputes  and  inter-
minable  budgetary  debates,  all  of  ridiculously  small  importance  compared  with 
the  major  challenges  facing  it. 
This  inaction  is  well  illustrated by  the  following  five  examples: 
1.  As  we  have  seen,  Europe  should  have  given  priority  to  boosting  its  invest-
ments.  Since  the  slowdown  in  growth  and  the  resulting  scarcity of  savings 
made  it difficult  to  finance  them,  it  became  essential  and  urgent  to  create 
a  genuine  common  capital  market.  But  the  Member  States  preferred  to  main-
1  tain their  own  separate  policies  and  arrangements  . 
This  had  the  following  result.  In  the  1960s,  direct  US  investment  in  the 
Community  steadily  increased,  attracted  as  it  was  by  European  prosperity. 
The  flow  has  since  been  so  dramatically  reversed,  however,  that  in  recent 
years  Community  investment  in  the  United  States  has  been  4  to  5  times  1--------------
See  the  communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  on  financial 
integration  (COM(83)  207  final  of  18  April  1983). 
- 18  -greaterthan equivalent  US  investment  in  the  Community.  Paradoxically, 
Europe  still has  far  Larger  savings  than  the  United  States  (in  1980, 
430,000  million dollars  as  opposed  to  380,000  million.dollarsi,  but  they 
are  so  badly  mobilized  that  the  Loans  issued  by  the  Member  States  to their 
partners  amount  to barely one-fifth  of  those  raised  in  the  Community  by 
third  countries. 
2~  The  absence  of  a  genuine  common  market  for  public  orders  and  for  research 
and  development  and  all  the  other  obstacles  to trade  are  equivalent  to  a 
fiscal  surcharge  which  would  certainly  represent  ~pproximately one  week's 
work  per  vear  on  average  for  every  family  in  Europe  <see  Chapter  6). 
3~  It  is  well  known  that  the  severity of  the  crisis  owes  much  to  the  two  oil 
shocks.  It  is  equally  well  known  that  Europe  is particularly vulnerable 
in  the  matter  of  its energy  supplies.  In  1957,  it had  immediately  reacted 
to  the  threat  signalled  by  the  closing  of  the  Suei  Canal  by  cre~ting 
EURATOM  - to which  some  signatories  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  attached  such 
imp6rtance  that  they  evidently  regarded  it as  a  more  vital  institution 
than  the  Common  Market  itself. 
Afte~ the  first  oil  shock,  whi~h  Left  it with  a  few  million  unemployed, 
what  did  the  Community  do?  Virtually  nothing.  And  after  the  second  oil 
shock  which  followed  in  the  wake  of  the  revolution  in  Iran?  Again, 
virtually  nothing.  Indeed,  instead  of  promp'tly  taking  up  the  challenge 
we  seem  intent  on  inflicting  upon  ourselves  a  third oil  shock  by  neglecting 
our  energy  investments.  The  rate  of  energy  investment  in  Europe  remains, 
as  a  percentage  of  GDP,  2  to  3  times  Lower  than  in  the  United  States  and 
Japan. 
4.  There  is,  however,  an  even  more  striking  illustration of  this  European 
malady.  It  is  widely  held that there  is one  sector at  Least  in  which  the 
Common  Market  is  effective:  the  agricultural  sector.  But  what  is  the  truth 
of  the  matter?  Since  1969,  the  common  market  in agricultural  products  has 
been  virtually non-existent,  because  agricultural  products  can  no  Longer 
cross  frontiers  without  being  subject  to positive or  negative  customs 
duties:  the  notorious  monetary  compensation  amounts  (MCAs).  This  veritable 
protectionist  customs  Levy  is steadily  rising  and  today  stands  at  18%  on 
average  between  France  and  Germany!  And  it  is  the  most  efficient producers, 
as  well  as  all  consumers,  who  have  to  bear  the  consequences •. 
- 19  -5.  There  remains  a  fifth  factor  - surely  the  most  serious  - which  helps  to 
explain the  crisis - monetary  disorder.  The  more  the  economies  develop, 
the  more  they  become  interdependent  and  the  greater  becomes  the  need  for 
a  stable  international  Legal  and  financial  framework  within  which  they  can 
function  effectively.  The  central  element  of  this  framework  must  be 
monetary  and  exchange  rate stability.  Today,  however,  incessant  fluctu-
ations  in  exchange  rates  represent,  for  interdependent  economies,  a 
handicap  almost  as  serious  as  would  be  the  instability of  weights  and 
measures.  Can  we  imagine  doing  business  with  a  'floating•  metre  and  kilo? 
In  this  connection,  the  floating  currencies  which  should  allow  the  States 
concerned  a  Larger  measure  of  autonomy  and  reinforce  their  'national 
sovereignty•,  had  the  opposite effect.  Theyaggravated  the  international 
crisis and  the  resulting  international  constraints  and  hence  narrowed 
the  Limits  within  which  economic  policy  could  operate  freely  in  each 
country. 
Encouraged  by  the  abandonment  of  the  discipline of  fixed  exchange  rates, 
the  economic  policies  began  to  diverge  in  1973:  restrictive  in  Germany, 
strongly  expansionist  for  a  while  in Britain,  Italy  and  France.  Thus, 
these  countries  made  no  joint effort  to deal  with  the  crisis  and  the 
differences  between  them  grew.  It  was  only  in  the  spring  of  1979,  just 
after  the  second  oil  shock,  that  the  decision  was  taken  to  implement  the 
European  Monetary  System  (EMS).  In  terms  of  monetary  cooperation,  the 
EMS  has  undoubtedly  brought  about  considerable  progress  - the  only  real 
progress  achieved,  in  fact,  in  this  decade.  But  it must  also  be 
recognized  that,  despite  stagnation  and  unemployment,  free  trade  has  more 
or  Less  been  maintained  within  a  Common  Market  orginally  created  for  a 
world  of  growth  and  full  employment. 
However,  such  advances  as  have  been  made  need  to  be  consolidated,  and  they 
should  not  make  us  forget  the  essential  point  that  never,  since  its 
creation  a  quarter  of  a  century  ago,  has  the  Common  Market  been  so  torn  be-
tween  such  markedly  different  economic  policies,  as  reflected  in  the 
different  rates  of  inflation which,  without  counting  Greece,  today  exceed 
12  points. 
- 20  -We  are  now  in  1983.  Three  years  have  elapsed  since  the  deadline  for  the 
attainment  of  the  objective  which  the  Paris  Summit  set  itself  in 
October  1972:  •to  transform,  before  the  end  of  this  decade  and  in strict 
conformity  with  the  treaties alreidy  concl~ded, all  Me~ber States•  relations 
into  a  European  Union•,  including  an  economic  and  monetary  union,  whic~as 
we  have  seen,  is  now  totally  out  of  the  question. 
The  two  mistakes  outlined  in  this  chapter  give  rise to  four  s1mple  questions: 
What  happ~ned to  the  countries  of  Europe  in  the  1970s? 
The  1970s  saw  the  beginning  of  an  historic  change  with  immeasurable  con-
sequences:  the  Loss  of  those  ancient  privileges  bequeathed  to  us  by  our 
history  and  our  culture.  They  also  saw  the  beginning  of  a  massive  up-
heaval  of  the  world
1s  economic  geography  with  the  result  that  Western 
.Eur.ope,  in  addition  to  being  the  most  threatened  area  of  the  world  from 
.the  mili~ary point  of  view,  is  now  also  the  most  threatened  area 
economically.  For  a  Long  tim~ to  come,  West~rn Europe  will  be  a  focal 
point  of  historical  change. 
What  should  they  have  done? 
In  the  face  of  the  crisis  they  should  have  united  and  invested  to  safe-
guard .the  future.  These  two  objectives  are  not  unrelated;  the  propensity 
to  consume  and  the  priority given  to  the  short  term  have  always  militated 
against  European  unity. 
What  did  they  in  fact  do? 
They  did  the  opposite  of  what  they  should  have  done,  opting  for  immediate 
consumption and  disunity,  as  if  the  ~eriod of  prosperity  and  plenty  ha~ 
never  ended.  It  is  instructive to  note  that  Europe  reacted  to  her  problems 
in  the  1970s  just  as  France  had  done  in  the  1930s:  by  throwing  in  the 
sponge.  Not  only  was  there  a  drop  in  population  growth  and  a  fall  in  invest-
ment,  but  both  decades  saw  the  emergence  of  policies  of  self-delusion and 
escapism,  the  spirit  of  Munich  and  neutralism  •••  The  1930s  saw  an  ageing 
France  in  a  rejuvenated  Europe;  and  today,  we  have  an  ageing  Europe  in  a 
rejuvenated  world. 
- 21  -So  what  now? 
Europe's  two  grave  mistakes  will  cost  her  dear.  Let  us  hope  that  she  will 
not  commit  the  further,  equally  serious,  mistake  of  counting  on  the  upturn 
in  the  United  States  economy  to  bail  her  out  of  her  own  difficulties.  Not 
only  has  the  slowdown  in  the  rate  of  growth  been  much  more  serious  in 
Europe  than  in  the  United  States  over  the  past  ten  years,  it  has  also  been 
aggravated  by  the  following  four  handicaps: 
o  inflation:  as  far  as  this  handicap  is  concerned,  only  half  the  Community 
countries  have  obtained  results  comparable  to  those  obtained  by  the 
United  States  and  Japan. 
o  under-investment,  which  has  had  a  significantly greater  impact  in 
Europe  than  in  the  United  States. 
o  the  increase  in  compulsory  Levies.  Here,  Europe  has  had  to  pay  a 
terrible price,  the  magnitude  of  which  may  perhaps  be  appreciated  by 
imagining  that  the  OECD  is  made  up  of  three  competing  enterprises,  two 
of  which,  the  United  States  and  Japan,  pay  35%  of  the  overheads,  while 
the  third,  Europe,  pays  more  than  50%.  From  this  point  of  view,  the 
economy  of  Western  Europe  tends  to  bear  some  small  resemblance  to that 
of  Eastern  Europe. 
o  Lastly,  unemployment:  since this  has  increased  twice  as  fast  as  in  the 
United  States,  it  represents  a  major  handicap  for  Europe. 
Together,  these  four  handicaps  are  establishing  a  dangerous  pattern.  They  con-
stitute the  penalty  for  the  mistakes  committed  by  Europe  in  the  1970s,  for 
which  it is only  just  beginning  to  pay  the  price,  i.e.  from  the  beginning  of 
the  1980s. 
- 22  -CHAPTER  2 
THE  PRICE  TO  BE  PAID  IN  THE  1980s 
After  the  two  mistakes  it made  in  the  1970s,  the  worst  thing  would  be 
for  Europe  to  believe  that  it  can  avoid  paying  for  these  errors  in  the 
1980s.  On  the  contrary,  it is  bound  to  face  specific  problems  wh~ch 
will  continue  to  inhibit  growth,  worsen  employment  and  accentuate  the 
Lag  in  the  technological  field. 
21.  Medium-term  growth  prospects  remain  poor 
211.  A relatively  'optimistic'  projection 
In  1983  the  economic  growth  of  the  United  States  should  be  around  3%. 
Europ~s will  be  of  the  order  of  0.5%.  Precious  as  they  are,  the  direct 
benefits  of  the  upturn  in  the  American  economy  will  be  limited  according 
to  the  volume  of  trade:  6%  for  exports  and  8%  for  imports~ 
Tables  3  and  4  summari.ze  the  most  recent  projection  worked  out  by  the 
Commission's  services  on  the  basis of  the  Comet  model. 
This  projection  is  based  on  a  set  of  relatively  favourable  assumptions1 
It  forecasts  an  annual  growth  rate  of  2.3%  between  1984  and  1986,  which 
would  mean  not  only  an  end  to  the  recession  of  the  1981-83  period  but 
also  an  economic  performance  approaching  that  of  the  1970's  C2.9%).  Even 
so,  given  that  the  rate  of  increase  in  productivity  is  close  to  the  rate 
of  growth,  employment  will  increase  by  only JOO,OOO,  leading  to  an 
unemployment  rate  in  1986  of  12.4%  (14.9 million out  of  work),  that  is to 
say,  an  increase  of  over  2  million  in  three  years.  Assuming  a  continuation 
of  this  trend,  unemployment  is  likely  to  reach.13%  in  1983  or  almost 
16  million  out  of  work,  in  spite of  a  slight decrease  in  the  size  of  the 
working  population. 
1  These  include  an  increase  of  3.7%  in  the  volume  of  world  imports  outside 
the  Community  between  1983  and  1986;  long-term  interest  rates  in  the  U~ 
down  from  12.2%  in  1983  to  8%  during  the  reference  period;  oil  at  $29 
a  barrel  in  1983  and  maintaining  this  level  in  real  terms  during  the 
ensuing  years;  no  major  problems  raised  by  the  financing  of  the  developing 
countries'  deficit;  etc •••• 
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Table  3  GROUTH  AND  ~MPLOYMENT HYPOTHESES  FOR  THE 
T~END  FOREC~ST -.EUR-10 
1.  Working  population 
2.  GDP  <volume)· 
3.  Enployment 
4.  Productivity.4 =  3  ~  2 
5.  Work;ng  fiours  a) 
6.  Hourly  productivity 
6  =  4  :  5  b) 
,, 
J.  Working  population  (millions) 
8.  Employment  (millions> 
9.  Unemployed  <millions> 
10.  Unemployment  rate  as  X 
10 =  9  :  7 
a)  and  b)  Estimates  or  hypotheses. 
1961-70  1971-80  1981-83 c> 
1  2  3 
Average  annual  variations as  X 
0.2  0.6  0.4 
4.7  ·2.9  0.1 
0.2  0.2  - 1.3 
4.5  2.7  ,  1.4 
(-Q.8)  (-Q.8)  I  -
(5.3) 
109.2 
107.1 
2.1 
2.0 
(3.5) 
Final  levels 
116.2 
109.1 
7.1 
6.1 
117.6 
104.9 
12~7 
10  .. 8 
c)  Latest  available estimates early June  1983. 
d) Latest  Comet  t re-nu  forecast. 
1984-86 
Trend 
Forecast 
4 
0.7 
2.3 
0.1 
2.2 
c-o.n 
(2.9) 
120.1 
105.2 
14.9 
12.4 
27  June  1983 
~ Table  4  show~ on  the  other  hand,  that  since  1982  real  wages  have  stopped 
rising  faster  than  productivity.  Even  the  gap  between· real  wages  and  GDP, 
which  was  characteristic of  Europe  in  the  1970s,  i,s  closing  and  will 
continue  to  do  so  up  to  1986:  the  overall  trend  is  towards  zero  growth 
of  real  wages.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  this  is  accompanied· by 
rising  unemployment  ~nd a  virtually parallel  slowing  down  of  inflation 
and  of  the  rate of  increase  in  nominal  per.capita  incomes. 
The  results  of  these  'optimistic'  projections  are  hardly  encouraging. 
However,  they  have  to  be  taken  seriously.  Contrary  to  the  g~nral belief, 
medium-term  projections  of  this  type  have  forecast  major  trends  fairly 
accurately  in  the  past:  e.g.  slower  growth,  ris1ng  unemployment  and  higher 
inflation.  Where  they  have  erred  it has  almost  always  been  on  the  side  of 
optimism.  ALL  the  indications  are  that  this  forecast  will  beth~ same. 
There  are  technical  and  psychological  factors  which  suggest  that  the  EEC 
is  unlikely  to  achieve  a  growth  rate  of  much  over  2%  by  1986.  In  fact,  it 
is  very  Likely  to  be  Less  taking  ce~ain ~alitattve  cn~nges  into account,  such 
as  the  decline  of  the  welfare  state,  public  deficits  and  the  adverse  effects 
of  unemployment  on  investment. 
212.  'Now  the  welfare  state  is  restritting  gro~th.  As  we  have  seen, 
up  until  the  beginning  of  the  1980s  the  countries  of  Europe  were  able  to 
maintain  their  standard  of  Living  in  spite of  the  slowdown  in  growth, 
b~t  in  so  doing  they  sacrificed  the  future  for  the-present.  Basically, 
they  have  brought  off  the  crisis on  credit.  Thi~  cannot  go  on  forever. 
For  three  years  public  deficits  and  the  increase  in  compulsory  Levies  have 
not  only  become  intolerable,  they  have  also tended  to  aggravate  the 
stagnation  which  caused  them.  It  is  a  vicious  circle:  in  order  tQ  finance 
the  deficits  it  is  necessary  to  cut  investment,  which  in  turn  further  reduces 
growth  and  deepens  the  deficits  by  the  same  amount.  Because  of  this  it  will 
be  more  difficult  for  Europe  to  avoid  economic  dftpression  in  the  1980s  than 
it  was  to  avoid  stagnation  in  the  1970s.  This  is  especially  true  given  the 
fact  that  Europe's  population patterns- i.e.  an  ageing  society- militate 
against  consumption  <housing,  cars,· etc.)  and  in  favour  of  social 
expenditure  (unemployment  and  retirement  benefits, etc.). 
1  See  Chapter  1,  point  111 
- 24  -N  ..... 
OJ 
Tabtt  4.  WAGES,  PRICES  ANJ  MONEY  HYPOTHESES  FOR  THE 
TRE~~D  FOR~ECAST  - EUR..:10  - ~  % p.a. 
. ·. 
1961-70  1971-80  1981-83  a) 
. 
1  2  3 
1.  No~inal  per-capita  wages  8 .. 9  1l.l  9.4 
I 
- 2. Price of  GOP  4.3  9,8  8.4 
3. Real  per-capita  wages  = 1  :  2  4.,4  3.2  0.9 
4. Productivity: GOP  per  enployed  perSO"'\  4  .. 5  2.7  1.4 
s. Corrected  salary portion  = 3  :  4  ~ 0.1  o.s  - o.s 
6.  Wages  costs  per  unit  . 
4.2  10.1  7~9 
produced:  CWCUP)  = 1  :  4 
1  ..  No171inal  GDP  9  .. 1  13.0  8.5 
8.  ~oney supply  M2/3  10.1.  14.,0  10.5 
9. Liquidity= 8  :  _7  1.1  0.9  1.8 
10.Real  money  supply  = 8  :  2.  s.a  3.8  1.9 
11~1WCUP = 8  :  6  6.0  3.4  2.4  .  . 
1) ~atest availaule  estimates. 
b) Latest  Comet  trend  forecast,  see  annex. 
c) Illustrative data  not  derived  from  model. 
27 June  1981 
,  q  ~ 4  - 1  9  8  6  b) 
Trend  forecast  . 
1984  1985  1986  Average. 
1984-86 
4  5  6  7 
6.4  6.0  5.6  6.0 
6.0  5.8  s.s  5,8 
0.4  0.2  0,1  0 .. 2  -
1.9  2.3  2.,4.  2.2 
-1.5  -2.1  ~2.2  -z.o  ! 
4.4  3.6  l.1  3.1 
7.8  8.4  8.l  8.2 
9 .oc>  9.Sc>  9.5c)  9.4c) 
1 • 1  1.0  1.1  1.1 
2.8  l.S  3.,8  3.4 
•4 .4  5.7  6.~  s.s This  burden  of  public  spending,  which  is  already  handicapping  the 
European  economy,  is  becoming  heavier  and  penalizing  Europe  in. 
relation to  the  United  States.  The  difference  between  the  burden 
of  compulsory  Levies  on  either  side  of  the  Atlantic  has  risen  from 
5  points  in  1960  to  13  points  in  1982.  Over  the  Last  ten  years 
these  Levies  have  increased  twice  as  fast  in  the  EEC:  yet  it  was 
the  Americans  who  elected  Ronald  Reagan! 
This  situation  Leads,  by  an  invisible  but  inexorable  process,  to  an 
increasing  burden  of  compulsory  contributions  which  gradually  weakens 
the  system  of  production  itself.  We  are  slowly  killing  the  goose 
that  Lays  the  golden  eggs.  This  is especially  true  in  some  countries, 
such  as  France  or  Italy,  where  industry  has  to  bear  the  main  brunt 
of  social  contributions.  The  inevitable  consequence  of  this  inflated 
growth  of  the  welfare  state is  discouragement,  the  impoverishment  of 
industry  and  the  Loss  of  enterprise. 
If  we  are  to  find  a  way  out  of  this  vicious  circle without  delay, 
Europe  needs  to  make  a  collective effort,  of  which  there  is  as  yet 
no  sign.  Instead,  the  crisis  has  created  a  mood  of  Lethargy,  made 
worse  by  psychological  attitudes- scepticism,  inflexibility,  fear  of  the 
future  and  of  technical  progress,  despondency  and  a  refusal  to  face 
facts  - which  unemployment  helps  to  engender.  Europe  is  growing 
sluggish  and  Letting  herself slip  into a  fatalistic  mood  of  apathy. 
She  is  too  worried  to  find  fresh  hope  but  not  worried  enough  to  pull 
herself  together. 
- 25  -22.  The  problem  of  unemployment  predominates 
'The  increasingly  marked  slowdown  in  growth  over  the  Last  nine  years  has 
affected attitudes  towards  the  future.  After  the  first  oil  shock, 
eocnomic  forecasters  still considered  the  high  growth  of  the  1960s  as 
the  norm  to  which  the  world  economy  might  return.  In  the  1980s  it has 
been  realised that  this  norm  should  be  revised  downwards.  This  Lowering 
of  sights alone  is  a  formidable  obstacle  to  rapid  recovery  and  any  policy 
which  Lacks  a  convincing  basis  for  an  improvement  in  Long-term  prospects 
is  doomed  to  failure.• 1 
This  analysis  is particularly  relevant  to  the  problem  of  unemployment. 
221.  Prospects 
As  we  pointed  out  the  EEC  had  not  created  any  jobs  for  10  years:  in 
fact  3  million  jobs  have  been  Lost  as  unemployment  has  increased  5-fold. 
It  is  in  fact  in  the  country  whose  economy  has  remained  strongest  -
Germany  - which  has  the  worst  record  in  this  respect.  It  must  be 
recognised  that  this  trend  will  not  be  reversed  of  its own  accord,  and  the 
employment  crisis will  not  be  resolved  simply  by  a  rise  in  growth  or 
investment.  Nor  will  anyone  any  Longer  accept  -however effective it 
may  be  in  the  very  short-term  - the  solution  proposed  by  President  Carter, 
namely  a  slowing  down  in  productivity.  Although  a  number  of  countries 
may  have  had  more  success  than  expected  in  reducing  inflation,  none  have 
managed  to  reduce  unemployment. 
If  strong  growth  is  not  going  to  be  sufficient,  what  can  one  expect  from 
slow  growth,  which  is  the  more  Likely?2  Add  to  this  the  increase  in  the 
active  population  <0.7  per  annum  over  the  next  few  years,  taking  account 
1 
2 
Source:  Alfred  Steinherr,  'The  Great  Crisis:  a  repeat  in  the  1980s?' 
Economic  studies  by  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  - November  1982 
The  average  for  1981-84  will  be  of  the  order  of  0.5%  per  year; 
consequently  a  growth  rate of  3%  will  be  needed  in  the  subsequent 
years  to  reach  an  average  of  over  2%  for  the  decade  as  a  whole. 
- 26  -of  the  increase  in  female  employment  which  is still small  in  Europe) 1 
and  it  is  obvio~s that  unemployment  is bound  to  increase  in  the  EEC: 
this  will  ineviatbly  Lead  to  a  further  dismantling  of the  welfar~ 
state,  with  all  the  attendant  risks.  Since  the  start of  the  80s, 
throughout  Europe,  governments  have  been  trying  to  curb  health 
expendit~re:  by  increasing patients'  contributions,  introducing 
flat-rate  payments  for  hospital  treatment  and  so  on.  Even  the 
Netherlands,  the  champion ?f social  protection,  has  called  for  a 
freeze  on  all  social  benefits' in  1983  and  a  return  to  voluntary 
health  insurance  for  people  with  incomes  above  a  certain  Level.  .  '  . 
.  This  is only  a  beginning.  Every  citizen of  Europe  must  realise  this 
because  he  is  both  a  victim  of  and  responsible  for  the  sit~ation.  At 
the  moment,  an  individual  who  is  sick  or  old  can  be  Looked  after  in  a 
hospital  which  is generally  free,  clean  and  well-equipped.  In  Less 
than  ten years'  time,  if the  present  state of  affairs  con~inues and 
unless  we  begin  to  revive  growth  and  employment,  the  same  individual. 
will  have  to  pay  for  treatment  in  a  hospital  which  is dirty  and~­
equipped.  This  trend  had  already  begun:  in  1980,  Europe  had  ten.times  fewer 
.  2 
scanners  per  inhabitant  than  Japan  and  fifty  times  fewer  than  the  United  States. 
222.  Unemployment  means  anti-investment 
In.  America  unemployment  ~hich has  always  existed  and  mainly  affects 
minorities,  scarcely  seems·to alter the  vitality of  industry  or  the 
individual's  taste  for  technical  progress;  in  Japan  the  system  of 
Life-Long  guaranteed  employment  has  made  it easier to  introduce 
technological  change  into  industry.  Facing.these  two  competitors,. 
Europe,  with  its 12  million  unemployed~ Likely  to  become  20  million· 
in  1990  - seems  to  be  powerless.  Unemployment  is not  only  placing  a 
heavy  burden  on  its economy,  it  has  become  a  kind  of  cancer. 
For  the  nations  which,  for  a  generation,  have  staked  everything on'the 
possibility of  achieving- as  Beveridge  put it- 'full employment  in  a 
free 'society,  by  developing  social  benefits of all  kinds  without  equal 
1  50%  in  the  EEC  as  against  60%  in  the  United  States~  The  difference 
is 8  million  people.  Even  if  Labour  productivity  improves  by  not 
Less  than  the  current  2%  per  year,  certai~ countries  such  as  th~ 
·Netherlands  and  Ireland are  likely to  reach  more  t~an  ~OX  ~nemployment 
around  1990  (projections  of  the  Netherlands  Econom1cs  Instltute). 
2  Telesis,  the  European  Initiative Meeting  Report,  March  1983 
- 27  -elsewhere  in  the  world,  unemployment  is  becoming  a  veritable  mental  illness. 
Not  the  physical  pain  of  empty  stomachs,  but  the  psychosis  of  empty  hearts, 
the  cancer  of  the  soul.  A cancer  which  is  spreading  into all  the  organs  of 
society  and  which  saps  energies,  weakens  the  motivation  to  invest,  provokes 
the  rejection  of  new  technologies  and brings a  general  demoralization.  Here 
are  some  examples  of  the  warped  'public  spirit'  which  results. 
The  first  occurs  at  national  Level  and  is  too  familiar  to  require  much 
explanation.  It  is  protectionism.  A country  in  a  situation of  full 
employment  which  closes  its borders  is  Likely  to  harm  its own  population's 
interests  as  much  as  those  of  its partner  countries.  But  when  certain  imports 
threaten  the  national  economy  and  Lead  to  factory  closure after  factory  closure 
and  Lengthening  dole  queues,  where  is  the  national  interest?  What  is  the  duty 
of  the  politicians?  Unfortunately  this  is  becoming  Less  obvious  and  that  is 
1  dangerous. 
The  second  expression  of  this  warped  public  spirit  is  the  tendency  to  stand 
in  the  way  of  progress  in  industry. 
Imagine  asking  company  managers  the  following  question:  'Suppose  you  had  the 
opportunity  tomorrow  to  invest  in  a  highly  profitable  venture,  which  would 
involve  dismissing  10%  or  20%  of  your  workforce,  would  you  go  ahead  with  that 
investment  without  hesitation?'  The  question  causes  a  good  deal  of  hesitation. 
Indeed,  above  a  certain  Level  of  unemployment  there  comes  a  point,  whether  one 
Likes  it or  not,  where  a  kind  of  Latent  public  spirit  comes  into  play  in  Europe 
and  where  company  managers  prefer  to  slow  down  investment  rather  than  reduce 
their  workforce.  This  compounds  the  Loss  of  ground  in  the  technological  field. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  two  countries  which  are  by  far  the  most  advanced  in  the 
use  of  robots  happen  to  be  the  two  developed  countries  which  have  been  most 
successful  in  maintaining  full  employment:  Japan  and  Sweden2.  That  is  no 
accident. 
1 
2 
Are  those  who  complain  that  the  EEC  is  too  open  to  imports  and  too  insensitive 
to  the  needs  of  the  Third  World  aware  that  out  of  6000  tariff  headings,  there 
are  around  1000  quotas  on  imports  from  the  Third  World?  <OJ  of  the  EEC,  9.2.1982). 
The  number  of  'developed  robots  per  10,000  workers  in  1980:  Sweden  = 8. 
Japan= 6,  USA=  1.6,  Germany=  1.1,  Italy= 0.9,  France= 0.7,  United 
Kingdom=  0.3  (see  annex  3,  table  38).  These  disparities  in  the  order  of 
5  to  10  are disturbing  for  the  future.  They  are  surely  not  unrelated  to 
reactions  of  the  kind  voiced  by  the  Socialist  Group  in  the  European  Parliament 
whose  Members  'warn  against  the  consequences  of  ill-considered  use  and 
uncontrolled  dissemination  of  micro-electronics  ••.  and  therefore call, 
before  the  introduction of  a  new  technology,  for  its social  and  ecological 
impact  to  be  assessed  through  participation  in  undertakings  and  careful 
evaluation  of its compatability'  (Report  on  the  employment  situation  in  the 
European  Community,  amendments  37  and  38,  20  April  1983). But  it  is  not  only  at  national  and  company  level  that  unemployment  is 
distorting public  and  community  spirit; it also strikes at  the heart of  the 
individual  worker.  At  this  level  unemployment  not  only  fosters  resistance 
to  technical  progress  in  industry,  in  particular by  questioning  the  value 
of  education  as  a  means  of  social  advancement,  but  it also  lends  currency 
to  the  idea  that  by  working  a  little less,  by  reducing  his efforts,  the 
person  who  is  in  the  privileged position of  not  being  unemployed  is  helping 
his  comrades  queueing  outside  the  factory  or  the  office  to  get  a  job.  In 
the  extreme  case  an  individual  who  works  too  hard  or  too  well  comes  to  be 
seen  as  a  'blackleg'  or  a  'scab',  whose  zeal  is preventing  the  unemployed 
from  getting  jobs:  not  working  too  hard  is  a  sign  of  'altruism'.  As  a 
result  production  and  distribution circuits  seem  to  be  operating .less 
effic~ently everywhere,  and  delays  and  errors  and  a  general  laxity  are  on 
the  increase  in  certain  counrries,  particularly  in  the  tertiary sector. 
These  phenomena  become  increasingly  widespread  until  ultimately,  in  Europe, 
unemployment  generates  yet  more  unemployment.  Because  it never  stopped 
rising  in  the  1970s,  it  is  becoming  even  worse  in  the  1980s. 
23.  The  Balkans  of  the  third  industrial  revolution 
The  famo~s statement:  'the  Balkans,  ~  geographical  expression'  was  made  a 
century  and  a  half  ago.  This  was  the  period  of  the  first  industrial  revolution, 
the  age  of  steam.  The  Balkan  countries  at  that  time  were  rich  in  cultural 
achievement,  geographical  diveristy and  professional  skills.  As  hard-working 
peoples  with  a  gift  for  commerce,  they  could  have  become  a  driving  force  in 
the  process  of  industrialization.  At  any  event  their situation  was  sufficiently 
enviable  to  arouse  the  intereit  of  the  major  powers  at  that  time.  However, 
already  they  were  'balkanised',  obsolete,  divided.  They  slipped on  to  the 
downward  path  of  relative  underdevelopment,  until in  the  end  they  are  not 
even  'a geographical  expression',  because  they  are  now  cut  off  by  the  Iron 
Curtain.  All  credit  to  Greece  for  having  managed  under  these  conditions 
to  consolidate  its autonomy  and  its democratic  institutions  up  to  the  time 
when  it  joined  the  Eurppean  Community. 
In  many  ways  the  situation of  Western  Europe  today,  facing  the  third 
industrial  revolution  is  very  similar.  Instead of  pooling  their  resources 
in  the  fields  that  are  vital  for  the  future,  the  Ten  seem  intent  on  rendering 
them  unproductive  by  each  attempting  to  act  in  isolation. 
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revolution 
Even  excluding  intra-Community  trade,  the  Community  is still the  world's 
foremost  importer  and  exporter.  Better still, it  is  the  world's  major 
exporter  of  products  with  a  high  technology  content.  And  yet  its trade 
is  indisputably declining:  it  is  losing  ground  on  most  of  the  product 
markets  of  the  future,  those  which  represent  a  source  of  growth. 
The  figures  in  Table  No.  5  show  both  how  far  the  Community  has  fallen 
behind  in  terms  of  its export  structure and  the  worsening  of  this 
position,  which  must  inevitably  reduce  the  scope  for  the  growth  of  the 
European  economy.  If  we  are  to  bring  back  expansion,  we  must  be  prepared 
to  make  even  greater efforts  to  compensate  for  the  poor  results  of  the 
past. 
But  these  figures  are  alarming  for  another  reason:  products  with  a  high 
technological  content  include  the  new  energy  sources,  aeronautics,  space 
and  biotechnology,  areas  where  the  European  position  is still strong. 
Thus  they  tend  to  conceal  the  tragic  nature  of  our  poor  performance  in 
the  field  of  information  technology.  8  out  of  10  personal  computers  in 
Europe  are  imported  from  the  US;  9  out  of  10  video-recorders  sold  in  Europe 
come  from  Japan.  Europe's  dependence  is  even  greater  in  electronics  than 
in  energy.  It  has  suffered  a  veritable  'technological  shock'  no  less 
formidable  than  the  'oil shock'.1 
1 
Annex  3  illustrates this  extremely  well.  The  tables  are  taken  from 
the  report  drawn  up  by  Mr  Michel  Richonnier  (April  1983)  for  a 
meeting  of  the  working  party  of  the  French  Planning  Commission,  in 
Paris,  chaired  by  Mr  Jacques  Moreau,  chairman  of  the  EP  Committee 
on  Economic  and  Monetary  Affairs. 
- 30  -Table  5 
External  trade  in  high-technolo~y ~·~~~L~ 
Specialisation fi9ures  1963-1981 
<OECO  average  = 1.00> 
1963  1970 
...... 
COMMUNITY  (Total)  1,01 
1,27 
0,72 
0,90 
U S A  1,18 
JAPAN  1,07 
1978 
0,88 
1,27 
1,27 
. 1981 
0,87 
1,19 
1,37 
Source:  B.  CARDIFF.  T~hnological  innovation  in  European  industry.  1982 
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-' 30a  -Indeed,  every  type  of  economic  activity - banks,  factories,  administrations, 
hospitals  and  so on- will  be  drastically  changed  by  the  electronic  revolution. 
At  a  time  when  $100,000  will  buy  a  multifunctional  robot  which  can  replace  a 
number  of  workers  extremely  profitably,  the  countries  which  are  not  competitive 
in  the  manufacture  of  these  robots  will  be  condemning  themselves  to  stifling 
the  growth  of  their  economy,  to  multiplying  the  number  of  unemployed  and 
intensifying  the  resistance  in  industry  to  technological  progress. 
Even  if  cutbacks  in  staffing  levels  resulting  from  the  application of  electronics 
were  not  to  exceed  5%  over  the  next  10  years,  the  number  of  jobs  Lost  in  the  EEC 
would  be  seven  million.1  This  figure  alone  shows  how  vital  it  is  for  the  European 
economy  to  respond  to  the  electronics  challenge.  In  practice  the  opposite  is 
happening.  The  number  of  jobs  lost  due  to  the  application  of  electronics  is 
multiplying  in  Europe  while,  increasingly,  corresponding  jobs  are  being  created 
in  Japan  and  America.  Another  vicious  circle:  the  steady  loss  of  jobs  in  the 
front-Line  sectors  increases  the  decline  in  confidence  in  the  economies  of 
Europe  and  the  draining  away  of  European  resources. 
We  have  to  look  back  in  history  to  understand  the  implications  of  this  sudden 
sterility, this  dramatic  eclipsing  of  Europe.  For  the  first  time  since  the 
18th  century  the  major  formative  initiatives of  an  industrial  revolution  are 
not  originating  in  Europe.  Europe  is  'missing out'  on  the  third  industrial 
revolution. 
232.  The  cost  of  non-Europe 
In  fact,  it  is  not  Europe  which  is  missing  out  on  this  third  revolution  but 
non-Europe.  In  those  areas  where  Europe  is  united,  it  constitutes  a  market 
equivalent  to  that  of  the  United  States.  Thus,  the  necessary  demand  for 
development  of  new  products  and  processes  is  there.  So  is  the  necessary 
supply,  since  together  we  have  as  much  scientific,  technological  and  industrial 
capacity  as  our  competitors.  Taken  as  a  whole  the  countries  of  the  EEC  spend 
twice  as  much  on  research  as  Japan:  between  1977  and  1981,  $500  million  was 
earmarked  for  microprocessor  development  in  the  EEC  compared  to  250  million 
in  Japan.  And  yet  the  Japanese  have  managed  to  catch  up  with  the  United 
1  See,  in  particular,  Michel  Richonnier  'Crises  and  new  technologies', 
Paris  1982. 
- 31  -States,  capturing  40%  of  the  world  micro-processor  market,  while  Europe 
supplies  Less  than  10%.  Why?  Doubtless  there  are  several  reasons,  but 
the  main  reason  is  clear:  the  word  'Europe'  can  only  be  used  in  this 
context  in  an  ironical  sense.  In  this  respect  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
Europe,  there  is  only  a  non-Europe.  As  a  result  the  same  expenditure 
which  in  Japan  is  channelled  into productive  and  job-creating  investment 
is  squandered  in  our  countries  on  efforts  which  only  destroy  jobs. 
Despite  the  fact  that  European  cooperation  is  at  its most  relevant  when 
it  comes  to  the  development  of  high  technology,  where  economies  of  scale 
are  most  vital,  our  efforts  seem,  through  some  kind  of  perverse  reaction 
against  organizing  our  forces,  to  have  concentrated  on  yesterday's  sectors 
and  sectors  in  which  we  have  practically nothing  to  gain  by  working 
together.  It  is  not  Europe  which  is declining  on  the  downward  path  of 
relative  underdevelopment  and  non-growth.  It  is  non-Europe. 
We  are  beginning  to  pay  the  price.  Not  only  in  the  form  of  increasing 
taxation,  accumulating  debts,  failure  to  respond  to  ~he challenge  of  new 
technologies,  and  Loss  of  jobs.  More  seriously  we  are  suffering  from 
Laxity,  irresolution,  demoralization  and  insecurity.  It  is  only  a 
beginning. 
How  Long  will  we  go  on  paying  this price?  It  is  up  to  the  Europeans  to 
decide:  we  have  seen  in  the  preceding  pages  that  there  is  nothing 
inevitable about  what  has  happened,  but  that it is  the  result  of  m~ny 
errors  and  in  particular  a  Lack  of  awareness.  If  things  continue  there 
will  be,  in  Less  than  ten years'  time,  a  new  category of  country  alongside 
the  developed  countries  and  the  developing  countries:  namely.  the 
countries  which  are  becoming  underdeveloped.  Lack  of  unity  will  have  made 
- of  Europe  a  new  'geographical  expression'. 
- 32  -The  Member  States of  the  Common  Market  have  retained  control  of all  the 
various  instruments  of  economic  and  financial  policy.  Up  to  1973  these 
instruments  were,  on  the  whole,  used  to  achieve  closer  economic  convergence 
and  to  pave  the  way  for  genuine  economic  and  financial  union. 
The  crisis put  a  stop  to  this  development.  Over  the  Last  ten  years  or  so 
a  wide  variety of  policies  have  been  pursued,  based  on  widely  differing, 
often diametrically  opposed,  doctrines  ranging  from  Keynesianism  to  mone-
tarism  which,  taken  as  a  whole,  constitute  a  unique  body  of  experience. 
On  inflation and  the  external  balance  of  payments  there are  increasingly 
marked  divergences  in  performance  from  one  country  to  another.  Growth 
rates,  on  the  other  hand,  have  tended  for  several  years  to  converge,  but 
around  zero.  Even  countries  Like  Italy  and  France,  which  consistently 
managed  to  achieve  growth  rates  around  1%  above  the  average  prior  to 1973, 
have  gradually  Lost  this  Lead  and  are  now  running  at  around  the  average 
rate.  This  is  especially puzzling  given  that  the  two  main  constraints 
affecting  growth-orientated policies  are  precisely  the  inflation  rate  and 
the  external  balance  of  payments. 
There  are  two  explanations  to this paradox.  The  first  - which  is  weLL-known  -
is  that  certain  countries  suffer  from  internal  imbalances  which  penalize 
them  even  if their  performance  is  on  a  par  with  the  others.  The  second 
aspect  - Less  well-known  - is that  none  of  the  Community  countries,  even 
the  most  powerful  among  them,  is able  to  achieve  a  growth  rate  significantly 
above  the  average. 
It  might  be  thought  that  the  countries  which,  Like  Germany  and  the  United 
Kingdom,  have  had  the  most  success  in  their efforts  to  restore  a  healthy 
economy  in  recent  years  would  have  a  growth  rate  considerably  higher  than 
the others.  Closer  examination  shows  that  this  is  not  the  case. 
- 33  -These_  countries  can  be  divided  into  two  categories. 
The  first  consists  of  the  small  countries  (Benelux,  Denmark,  Greece  and 
Ireland).  In  order  to  escape  the  recession,  all these  countries  began, 
after the  first oil  shock,  to  run  up  deficits,  either  internal  or  ~xternal, 
and  quite  frequently  both.  Today  they  are  not  only  suffering  the  full 
effects of  the  world  recession  but  they  are  also  forced  to  pay  a  higher 
price  for  their earlier profligacy,  since  in  their  case  demand  is  by 
definition almost  all external.  Thus,  they  are  only  just  setting out  on  a 
long  road  of tribulation where  they  will  be  obliged  to depress  domestic 
demand,  including  household  consumption.  Not  only  will  they  be  unable  to 
benefit  as  they  should  from  the  current  economic  upturn,  but  they  will 
also  have  to  make  further  drastic  cuts  in  their production  system  in  order 
tci  restore  balance. 
The  prospects  for  growth  in  France  and  Italy are  also  poor  because  of  the 
imbalances  which  persist  in  these  two  countries:  the  gap  between  unit 
costs  and  productivity,  the  inflationary  trend  constantly  being  fuelled  by 
index  linking,  and  so  on. 
But  that  is not  all. 
Shortly after the  first  oil  shock,  the  two  Latin  nations  of  the  Common 
Market  discovered  to their  cost  that,  if they  attempted  in  isolati~n to 
improve  their  growth  rate,  they  ran  into  the  problem  of  external disequili-
brium.  But,  in  this  context,  the  case  of  the  United  Kingdom  is possibly 
the  most  significant. 
In  1973,  as  the  reader-Will  recall,  a  system' of  floating  ex'change  rates 
was  introduced.  A number  of  countries  believed at  th~t  time  that  this  would 
free  them  from  external  constraints  and  that,  at  the  risk  of  a  fall  in  the 
parity of their  currency,  they  should  take  advantage  of  the  new  system  to 
get  rich  more  quickly.  This  temptation  was  particularly  strong  in  the 
United  Kingdom's  case  since  its economy  had  been  stagnant  for  a  long  time. 
So,  as  Graph  No  2  shows,  it reflated  its economy  in  1973  to  the  point 
where  its growth  rate  was  1.5%  above  the  OECD  average.  However,  at  the  same 
time  it amassed  an  external  deficit  of  almost  4%  more  than the  OECD  average .of 
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I"') GDP  in  1974  and  endea  up  in  1978  with  a  growth  rate  of  6  points  below 
the  OECD  average  as  the  price  for  the  small  ~ain of  1.5  points  in  1973! 
The  even  more  pronounced  zig-zag  trend  in  the  graph  for  Italy  indicates 
here  too,  the  same  clear pattern of  cause  and  effect. 
The  French  example  undescores  the  same  pqint  (graph  No  2):  the  two  comparable 
experiments  carried out  in  1974  and  in 1982  underline  the  severity of  the 
increasingly  har~h  law  that  in  Europe  even  the  'major  countries'  must 
subject  themselves  to external  constraints as  soon  as  they  have  increased 
their  growth  rate.  This  was  true  in  the  case  of  France  which,  after 
taking  steps to  expand  consumption  in  1981-82  which  enabled  the  growth  rate 
to  be  increased  by  0.2%  in  1981  to 1.8%  in  1982  was  obliged  to  adopt 
restrictive  counter-measures  equivalent  to  a  reduction  in  growth  of  at 
Least  3  to  4%  of  GDP. 
These  policies  for stimulating the  economy  by  reflating demand,  when 
pursued  in  isolation,  have  therefore b~en self-defeating.  They  have  had  the 
opposite  effect  to that  intended:  instead  of  providing  a  boost  to  growth, 
the  ultimate  outcome  was  a  net  decline  in  growth. 
But,  the  argument  goes,  these  three  countries  were  already  in  a  precarious or. 
even  unbalanced  situation  in  certain  respects.  This  is  not  true  of  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  today.  What  has  been  said above  merely  serves 
to  highlight  Germany's  potential  as  a  ·~ocpmotive'  for  growth  in  Europe. 
First ·of  all,  it is the  most  powerful  and  therefore  the  most  autonomous 
economy.  Secondly,  since 1982  it has  recorded  a  substa~tial external 
surplus  and  a negative  growth  differential~  Thirdly,  in  Germany,  as  in 
S~itzerland and  Japan,  control  over  incomes  appears  to  be  firmer  than  in  the 
Anglo-Saxon  countries  since  it has  been  arrived at  not  so  much  by  the 
~i§fi~lio!r~ method  of  monetarist  constraints  imposed  from  outside  but  more 
by  a  'social  consensus'  based  on  !r~§! involving  free  negotiation  between 
both  sides  of  industry,  each  aware  of  the  urgent  need  to avoid  a  return  to 
cost-push  inflation. 
In  assessing  the  extent  to  which  Germany  might  be  able  to  play  this  role  of 
Locomotive  effectively,  it  is  illuminating  to  study  the  experience  of  the 
- 35  -period 1978-79. 
In  1978,  the  economic  situation was  not  unlike  that  of  1983:  oil prices 
were  beginning  to  fall  in  real  terms,  inflation  was  falling  and  so  were 
interest  rates.  Business  confidence  and  investment  were  picking  up. 
Nevertheless,  as  Graph  No  2  shows,  Germany  was  paying  for  a 
substantial external  surplus  with  a  growth  rate  nearly  1%  below  the  OECD 
average.  Its public  spending  programme  was  being  trimmed  and  the  gap 
between  real  wages  and  productivity  had  been  significantly  narrowing 
since 1975.  Hence  there  were  very  good  reasons,  both  nationally  and  inter-
nationally,  why  Germany  should  exploit  its  unused  margin  for  growth  and 
play  the  role  of  'Locomotive•  which  its  European  partners  and  the  United 
States were  asking  it to play. 
This  it agreed  to  do  after  much  hesitation,  implementing  the  decision  taken 
by  the  Bonn  Summit  of  16/17  July  1978  which  organized  concerted  action  to 
stimulate the  economy  by  increasing  the  budgetary  deficit  of  the  Community 
countries  by  an  average  of  around  0.6%  of  GNP.  However,  Germany  played 
the  principal  role  in  this  concerted action,  accounting  alone  for  half  of 
the  increase  in  the  overall deficit  in  1978  and  being  virtually alone  in 
pursuing  the  same  policy  in  1979.  This  joint  experiment  was  interrupted 
in  February  1979  by  the  revolution  in  Iran  which  was  to  trigger  the  second 
oil  shock. 
Nevertheless,  the  results obtained  are  significant  on  two  counts: 
o  at  the  Level  of  the  Community,  the  results  for  the  first  half  of  1979 
were  up  to  the  new  target,  namely  4.5%  as  compared  to  the  previously 
forecast  growth  rate of  around  2.7%;  this  was  the  best  performance 
achieved  by  the  European  economy  since  1973. 
This  helps  to  explain  why  certain of  Germany's  partners  are  now  urging 
it to  reintroduce  a  similar policy; 
o  domestically,  the  stimulation of  demand  enabled  Germany  to  speed  up 
investment  until  1980,  accompanied  by  a  slight  drop  in  unemployment 
which  made  it unique  among  the  Community  countries  in  the  period  between 
the  two  oil  crises.  However,  this acceleration  of  growth  made  the 
German  economy  more  vulnerable  to  the  second  oil  shock,  causing  a 
deficit  in  the  balance  on  current  account  for  the  first  time  in 
Germany  which  persisted  from  1979  to  1981.  This  prompted  restrictive 
- 36  -counter-measures  and  these  brought  in  their train a  dramatic 
increase  in  unemployment  which  contributed  more  than  somewhat  to 
the  resignation of  Chancellor  SCHMIDT  in  1982.  It  is  understand-
able  that  this  'Locomotive  policy'  has  not  Left  only  good 
memories  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany. 
As  a  result  certain misunderstandings  have  arisen  reg~rding the  new  margin 
of  expansion  achieved  by  Germany.  In  1983,  it will  have  a  surplus  on 
current  account  of  around  1%  of  GNP.  How  much  extra  growth  could  this 
surplus  sustain?  The  reply  is to be  found  in  Table  No  6  (upper  part): 
this  example  shows  that  if the  Federal  Republic's  growth  rate  were  1% 
higher  the  result  would  be  a  decline  in  its external  balance  of·payments 
equivalent  to 0.5%  of  GNP.  The  net  increase  in  growth  would  therefore  be 
around  2%,  but  the  public  sector deficit,  already  difficult  to bear, 
would  increase  by  around  1.2%  of  GNP  (2  x  0.6%).  It  should  be  stressed 
that,  in  view  of  the  size of  Germany's  budgetary  deficit,  the  German 
authorities  consider  that  it cannot  be  increased  any  further  under  any 
ciTcumstances.  Consequently,  Germany  is  trapped:  even  with  its powerful 
and  healthy  economy  it  can  do  virtually  nothing  to  improve  its growth 
during  the  1980s  because  of  the  errors  which  - though  to  a  Lesser  extent 
than others- it committed  during  the  1970s.  In.spite of  its disinflation 
and  its external  surplus,  the  course  of  sacrifice on  which  it has  embarked 
1  leads  only  to  a  dead  end  • 
Furthermore,  howeve~ desirable it might  be  for  Germany's  partners to  make 
use  of  the  German  margin  for  expansion,  it would  only have  a  limited 
effect  on  their  economies.  The  mechanical  effect  of  an  additional  one  per 
cent  growth  in  Germany  would,  in  the  second  year,  amount  to  no  more  than 
approximately  0.1%  for  France  and  Italy  (0.12%);  it would  be  slightly 
higher  for  the  Netherlands  (0.24%),  Belgium  <0.2%)  and  Denmark  (0.16%), 
but  insignificant  for  Ireland  and  the  United  Kingdom. 
The  lesson  to  be  drawn  from  these  experiments  is  extremely  important  for  the 
Community,  namely  that  any  Member  State - even  the  most  powerful  of 
them- which  autonomously  pursues  a  policy  of  recovery  will  soon  discover  that 
1  The  German  authorities  should  not  be  unaware  of  this  since  they  are 
extremely  anxious  to  find  an  escape  route  without  compromising  the  gains 
they  have  made  in  the  fight  against  inflation.  The  issue of  'Der  Spiegel' 
for  6  June  1983  reported  on  a  'confidential'  study  drawn  up  by  the 
Federal  Ministry  for. Economic  Affairs  which,  on  the  basis of  h~potheses 
described as  'fairly optimistic',  anticipateq unemplpyment  at  around  the 
3  million  mark  from  1988  onwards,  the  1983  average  b~ing roughly 
2.3 million. 
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_1  ___ it is  fooling  itself.  Any  country  that  goes  ahead  and  reflates derives 
only  a  short-lived advantage  and  must  then  pay  the  price  of  its gains 
and  for  a  much  longer  period.  Meanwhile,  the  short-term  improvements 
which  it  has  achieved  merely  benefit  its trading partners.  Thus,  thanks 
to the  economic  revival  of  Germany  ~n 1979,  the  sales of  French  cars  in 
Germany  beat  all  records.  Thanks  to  the  French  economic  revival,  1982  saw 
a  spectacular  increase  of  German  car  sales  in  Fran~e.  In  essence  this 
means  that  in  the  EEC,  where  national  economies  have  become  so  interde-
pendent,  those  who  take  the  initiative - and  the  risks  - of  an  economic 
revival  are  working  for  the  others  ...•• 
It  was  not  until  1982  that  this  fact  became  fully  clear,  i.e.  that  the  EEC 
countries  have  virtually  no  scope  any  longer  for  autonomous  medium-term 
expansion.  ~!!~ro~!  constrain~s, as  we  have  seen,  are all  the  more  restric-
tive  the  smaller  the  country:  France  is  less  autonomous  than  Japan,  and 
Belgium  less  so  than  France.  However,  France  and  Germany  have  now 
realized  what  Italy and  the  United  Kingdom  discovered after  the  f~rst oil 
shock:  as  far  as  economic  policy  is  concerned,  they  have  become  §ffi~!! 
countries.  ---------
!O_Q!b~[-~Q[Q§L_iO_!b~-~~f_i!_i§_QQ_!Q09~[_QQ§§iQ!~_fQ[_~-D~!iQO~l-~£QOQffii£ 
QQ!i£~_!Q_9i~~rg~-~2Q~~-!b~-~~~r~g~_Qf_!b~_Q!b~r§_~i!bQ~!_io_9~~-£Q~r§~ 
gr~i~9i£iD9_!b~-o~!iQD~l_io!~r~§!_Qf_!b~!_£Q~D!r~~~-8o~_gQ~~rom~o!_~bi£b 
QQ!~Q_fQ[_§~£b_~_fQ~[§~L_ffiQ[~Q~~[L_~Q~!Q_Q~_Q!~~i09_lO!Q_!b~-b~OQ§_Qf_l!§ 
QQQQ§i!lQD· 
In  these  conditions,  the  only  way  that  national  policies  can  continue  to 
converge,  as  they  have  done  since  1982,  is  towards  a  lower  level~  through 
curbs  and  restrictions of all  kinds,  in  other  words  by  cutting  back  growth 
and  increasing  unemployment.  The  vicious  circle of  Community  recession  is 
thus  self-perpetuating. 
Why  this distressing  dilemma?  Why  these  harsh  constraints?  Because  the 
more  close-knit  and  developed  an  economy  is,  the  more  deeply  it is 
involved  in  the  fabric  of  international  trade.  International  trade  is, at 
one  and  the  same  time,  a  source  of  constraint  and  wealth.  During  the  great 
period of  prosperity,  it  increased  twice  as  rapidly  as  the  growth  in 
- 38  -production.  That  was  no  accident.  In  the  medium  term,  the  rate  of  increase 
in  imports  outstrips  the  rate of  increase  in  per  capita  incomes.  In  the 
short  term,  the  income  elasticity of  demand  for  imports  is of  the  order 
between  2  and  4  in  the  European  countries1•  There  are  many  examples  of 
this:  the  development  of  tourism  abroad  or  the  purchases  of  Japanese 
audio-visual  equipment  increase  far  more  rapidly  than  our  incomes. 
This  new  constraint  is  imperative.  Any  country  attempting  in  isolation  to 
free  itself  from  it  can  do  so  only  by  drastically  cutting  the  purchasing 
power  of  its people. 
Does  this mean  that  nothing  can  be  done?  That  since  no  European  country  is 
able  to act  as  a  Locomotive  for  the  Community,  the  Community  has  no  future 
other  than  as  a  goods  waggon  for  the  United  States? 
The  answer  is  a  definite  no.  ALL  the  studies  show  that  Community  action  has 
a  multiplier effect  and  that  this multiplier only  needs  to  be  applied 
skilfully to  revive  growth  without  jeopardizing equilibrium.  This  is  shown 
in  Table  No  6  based  on  the  Comet  III  model  on  simulations. 
The  principle of  these  simulations  is  simple.  It  is  assumed  that  the  EEC 
countries'  public  investment  during  a  given  year  is  increased  by  1%  of GDP. 
It  then  examines  two  hypotheses: 
(a)  that  this action  is  undertaken  by  each  country  io9i~ig~~l!~ 
(b)  that  the  same  action  is  taken  at  Community  Level  in  a  fQQf~r!~g manner. 
The  model  then  calculates,  country  by  country,  the  effects of  this  initial 
impetus  over  the  following  two  years  on  growth,  external  balance  of  payments 
and  public  expenditure.  In  each  case,  for  the  various  countries  and 
aggregates  considered,  concerted  action  is  seen  to  produce  a  far  better 
result.  Hence  the  m~!!i~!i~r-~ff~f!_Qf_~Qmm~oi!~-~f!iQD does  exist.  Joint 
action  pays  dividends.  Depending  on  the  individual  country,  the  effect  is  of  the 
order  of  2  to  4  for  growth  and,  compared  with  isolated action,  an  improvement 
of  20  to  66%  for  the  external  balance  of  payments  and  government  spending. 
1  Having  increased  its growth  rate  by  1.6%  between  1981  and  1982,  France's 
imports  increased  by  some  5%  in  1982. 
- 39  -The  finding  is  not  confined  to  the  COMET  model  used  by  the  Commission  in 
Brussels.  ALL  the  studies  carried out  over  a  number  ofyears  confirm  the 
existence of  this multiplier.  This  is  a  factor  and,  to all  intents  and 
purposes,  an  instrument  of  e~treme importance  which  could drastically 
alter the prospects  for  the  European  economy  in  the  second  half  of  the 
1980s. 
It  is explained  on  the  one  hand  by  the  fact  that  since  half  of  the  external 
trade  of  the ,Member  States  is  intra-Community  trade,  any  imbalances  tend  to 
cancel  each  other out.  It  will  be  readily  appreciated  that  if Germany 
reflates  its economy  in  isolation,  its exports  to  France  will  tend  to 
decline  and  its  imports  from  France  to  increase.  However,  if  France  does 
the -~arne  thing  at  the  same  time,  the  two  opposing  movements  will  tend  to 
cancel  each  other out.  We  have  seen  above  (paragraph  33)  that  the  smaller 
a  country  is,  the  greater  the  ~~!~ro~l constraint.  Overall,  the  Community's 
rate of  external  dependence  is of  the  same  order  as  that  of  Japan  and  the 
United  States  (10- 15%  of  GNP),  while  the  rate of  individual  countries 
such  as  Germany  or  France  is  25  - 30% •. This  ~emonstrates the  wisdom  of  the 
maxim  'strength  through  unity',  provided  this  unity  is  put  to  proper  use. 
For  the  purpose  of  these  simulations  it  has  been  assumed  that  public  invest-
ment  is financed  by  an  increase  in  the  budgetary deficit.  However,  it,is 
obvious  that,  with  public  spending  deficits  which  are  reminiscent  of  the 
financial  management  of  the  ·Last  of  the  Czars  or of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  the 
Member  States of  the  European  Community  are  no  Longer  in  a  position to  increase 
these deficits,  even  in order  to  stimulate  growth.  We  shall  have  to  take 
account  of  this fact  in  the  proposals  in  Chapter  5.  It  is  clear  from  this 
Last  remark  that  in  order  to  make  effective  use  of  the  Community  multiplier, 
the  Member  States  must  begin  by  putting their  own  house  in  order. 
Putting  a  house  in  order  involves  cleaning  up  and  straightening out.  What 
scope  there  is  for  national  autonomy  in  the  medium  term  consists essentially 
of  a  choice  between  policies  which  accommodate  inflation- a  source  of 
impoverishment  - and  policies to  combat  inflation which  impose  Lasting 
sacrifices  but  are  not  sufficient  in  themselves  to  bring  a  growth  rate 
noticeably  higher  than  the  average. 
It  is  up  to  each  individual  country  to  fight  inflation because  inflation 
- 40  -is  due  principally  to  three  national  variables:  budgetary  policy,  monetary 
policy  and  the  behaviour  of  prices  and  incomes.  Of  these  three  it  is  the 
Last  which  is  the  most  important,  but  it  is also  the  most  difficult  to 
control  because  it  is  based  on  a  paradox:  in  order  for  there  to  be  Lasting 
disinflation,  in  a  world  where  market  forces  have  Little  influence  on  the 
fixing  of  incomes,  the  two  sides of  industry  must  jointly  acknowledge  the 
validity of  the  following  paradoxical  equation:  2_i~_9I~2!~I_!b2Q_1Q-
Indeed,  if  the  nominal  increase  in  incomes  is 10,  this will  Lead  in  the 
short-term  to  further  inflation  and  in  the  medium  term  to  Lower  average 
purchasing  power.  A nominal  increase  of  5%  will  ultimately  result  in  greater 
purchasing  power  than  a  nominal  increase of  10%.  Unless  these  ~Qfi21 
I~~~QQ~i~ili!i~~-2[g_[gfQ9Qi~~g, the  only  way  to  a  healthy  economy  is  through 
IDQQ~!2It_I~~!I2iQ!·  Ultimately  it  is  the  national  governments  who  deter-
mine  which  course  is  adopted.  Although  the  European  Monetary  System  implies 
and  encourages  the  convergence  of  economic  policies,  it  cannot  impose  that 
convergence. 
* 
Thus,  future  recovery  of  the  European  economy  will  become  Less  and  Less 
the  responsibility of  the  Member  States;  it  now  depends  primarily  on  the 
international  context  in  which  these  states act  - first  and  foremost  the 
Community.  From  now  on  we  must  accept  this  basic  rule:  ~Qt  __ fQ~Q!It-~i§biQ9 
!Q_gQ_i!_2!QQ~_iQ_~~I~~i!_Qf_9IQ~!b_i~-~Q~Qg_!Q_!Q~~~--~Qt_fQ~Q!It_~bifb, 
b2YiQ9_~~!_i!~-Q~Q_bQ~~~-iQ_Q[Qg[L_29[gg~_!Q_9Q_fQ[_9[Q~!b_~i!b_!bg_Q!bg[~ 
2QQ_2ffQIQiQ9_!Q_I~l~~-I~fl~f!iQ9_!bg_fQ!!gf!iYg_iQ!grg~!_i~-~~Ig_!Q_92iQ 
~l_!bi~_2f!iQQ·  Only  the  Latter  approach,  the  Community  approach,  is 
compatible  with  the  interests of  the  270  million  Europeans  and  in  particular 
the  12.5  million  unemployed  who  have  been  somewhat  short  on  good  news  in 
recent  times. 
The  existence of  the multiplier effect  of  Community  action  is of fundamental 
importance.  Nevertheless,  it calls  for  three  remarks: 
o  this  new  situation as  regards  growth,  namely  that  the  r~~rg~~iY~ 
function  is of  necessity  national  and  the  ~~IIDi~~iyg function  is  increas-
ingly  international,  is  the  opposite  of  the distribution of  roles  which 
most  of  the  Member  States  are  trying to maintain  within  the  Community  -
condemned  to play  the  role  of  policeman  when  really  they  would  prefer  to 
play  that  of  Father  Christmas. 
- 41  -o  by  playing  the  role  of  Father  Christmas,  many  governments  are  tempted 
to  have  people  believe  that  in  order  to  improve  the  economic  situation 
of  a  country  it  is  necessary  to  rely  on  them  and  to mistrust  every-
thing  that  comes  from  abroad.  This  is a  fable,  but  the  real  moral  of 
this  fable  is one  of  the best  kept  secrets~  In  fact  the  tendency··of 
national  economic  policies to  diverge  so  much  stems  from  the  widespre~d 
feeling  that  each  country  should  distinguish  itself from  the  others. 
This  b~lief in  the  virtues  of  every  man  fo~ himself,  of  national  corpora-
tism,  runs  counter  to  the  new  reality  and  go~s a_  long  way  to  explain~ng 
what,  according  to  the  chairman  of  the  European  Parliament's  Committee 
on  Economic  and  Monetary  Affairs,  is  the  most  salient  feature  of  the 
current  situation  in  Europe:  'In  25  ~ears the  European  Comm~nity hag·· 
established  itself as  a  real  influence at  international  level;  on  the 
other  hand,  !b~r~_i!_QQ_!Q09~!_!~f!~!!_~~!f~~!iQO_Qf_!b~_Y!~fY!D~!§_Qf 
!b~_£QIDIDYDi!~ on  the  part  of  many  of  those  who  are  active  in  the 
political,  economic  and  social  fields  in  the  Memb~r States1 .'  But  the 
result  of  all this  is that  the  more  the  Member  States  refuse  to 
practise  convergence,  the more  they  condemn  themselves  to  play  the  stern 
policeman. 
o  but,  even  if governments  and  public  opinion  have  not  yet  fully  grasped 
it, this  new  reality  is bound  to establish  itself more  and  more  firmly 
because  it is  Linked  to  the  very  development  of  their  economies:  the 
paradoxical  recipe  for  growth  in  a  developed  i.e.  interdependent, 
world  is  that  real  charity  begins  by  being  on  good  terms  with  the  other 
members  of  the  family. 
At  the  same  time,  the  traditional  problem  of  sharing  out  roles  between 
national  governments  and  international organizations  has  been  reversed. 
Public  opinion  rightly  calls  for  a  limit  on  the  power  of  international 
organizations  where  such  power  is  likely  to  be  contrary  to national 
interests.  Today,  however,  where  growth  is  concerned,  exploiting the 
potential  of  the  international organizations  - and  in  the  case  of  the 
Europeans  this means  above  all  the  institutions of  the  Community  - is  the 
key  to  national  progress. 
1  'Which  Europe~n strategy  for  France  in  the  1980s?  Repo~t  by  Mr  Jacques 
MbREAU  and  Mr  Michel  RICHONNIER  for  the  Commission  for  National 
Planning.  La  Documentation  Fran~aise, April  1983 
- 42  -Some  ten  years  ago  zero  growth  was  the  fashionable  new  idea  in  Europe 
and  many  people  saw  stagnation  as  a  kind  of  perfect  state. 
It  is  now  generally  acknowledged  that  three  years  of  zero  growth  have  been 
enough  to  raise  the  number  of  unemployed  in  the  ten  countries  of  the 
Community  to over  12  million.  But  that  is  not  the  whole  story. 
In  the  fossilised  societies of  zero  growth  each  person  becomes  an  obstacle 
to  the other.  Anyone  who  is already  established  can  only  remain  by  keeping 
out  the  newcomer,  the  young  person,  the  foreigner  - in  other  words,  the 
weak.  No  one  can  improve  his  situation without  worsening  someone  else's. 
Soft  growth  makes  for  hard  societies  and  slow  growth  for  run-down  societies. 
It  is  no  accident  that  the  history  and  geography  of  democracy  and  public 
freedoms  coincide  with  the  history  and  geography  of  economic  growth.  The 
two  must  be  consolidated  if  we  are  to  restore  the  growth  of  the  European 
economy. 
- 43  -The  European  economy  has  not  merely  been  stagnating  for  three years: 
it has  been  in  decline  for  ten  years.  This  decline  - if it  continues  -
will  be  increasingly  painful  for  individuals  and·dangerous  for  society 
as  a  whole. 
However,  no  state  is  capable  any  Longer  of  est~ping frbm  it by.  its 
own  resources.  The  recovery  will  be  Community-wide  or  there  will  be  no 
recovery. 
How  is  it to  be  organized? 
1  - First  by  beginning  to  understand  where  the  common  interest  lies.  At 
first  sight  this  seems  utopian:  the  social,  economic  and  political 
forces  - particularly  the  individual  states - are .. cpnstantly  vyir.g 
with  each  other,  each  trying  to  increase  its share  of  the  cake. 
'  .  . 
But  precisely  where  does  this  Lead?  To  the  opposite  of  what  was  .  .  .  . 
intended.  The  reason  the  growth  in  real  incomes  in  Europe  is  tending 
towards  zero  is  largely  because  for  ne~rly 10 years  we  have  been 
doing  our  utmost  to  raise  them  excessively:  the  more  a  particular 
professional  group  or  state tries to  increase  its share  of  the  cake 
at  the  expense  of  the others,  the  smaller  the  cake  becomes. 
Ultimately,  therefore,  they  are  damaging  their  own  interests. 
This  surrealistic  process  is  absurd  to  such  a  degree  that  one  day  it 
must  inevitably  come  to  an  end.  Chapter  5  has  been  written  in 
preparation  for  that  day.  It  demonstrates  how,  as  from  now,  we  can 
improve  the  outlook  together,  in  a  modest  but  radical  manner  and  at 
Little  cost.  The  most  difficult  part  is  not  making  the  effort  but 
understanding  - and  making  everyone  else  understand  - where  the  real 
point  of  that  effort  lies.  Assuming  that  they  can  satisfy that 
condition,  Europeans  are  capable  collectively of  generating  the 
momentum  for  growth  with  stability proposed  in  Chapter  5. 
- 44  -2  - The  three  chapters  which  follow  propose  a  response  to  the  three 
major  challenges  of  our  time: 
- the  !~fbOQlQ9if~l_fb~ll~09~ which  is  endangering  European  industry 
<Chapter  6); 
- the  ~Q~£9~_fb~ll~09~ and  how  to  ensure  that  not  only  the  Least-
favoured  regions  of  the  Community  but  also  the  applicant  countries, 
the  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP)  States  that  have  signed 
the  Convention  of  Lome  and  the  countries  of  the  Mediterranean 
basin  share  in  the  progress  achieved  (Chapter  7); 
- the  fb~ll~og~_Qf_~o~m~lQ~m~o! and  how  to  open  the  way  towards  a 
Q~~-fQQf~~!_Qf_f~ll-~m~lQ~ffi~O!·  We  shall  Look  at  ways  of  reducing 
and  reorganizing  working  hours  in  a  manner  which  does  not  affect 
the  competitiveness  of  the  economy  <Chapter  8). 
0 
These  broad  guidelines  do  not  amount  to  a  complete  programme  nor  a 
detailed  List  of  decisions.  But  they  do  form  a  coherent  entity  whose 
individual  components  are  interactive.  None  of  the  proposals  is  above 
discussion.  They  will  have  a  far  greater  collective  impact  if  they 
can  be  further  enriched  by  greater awareness  and  debate. 
- 45  -EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC  RECOVERY  --------------------------
We  are  substantially  in  agreement  about  the  diagnosis  of  the  economic 
prohlems of the European Community.  I  accept much of the analysis of the 
situation as presented in the first  three chapters of the report which might 
be summarised as follows: 
41.  The Economic Problems of Europe: Analysis 
1 
The economic problems of Europe have  in  part shimmed from  the general 
'  .  .  . 
problems  of  financial  instability reflected in  fluctuations  in interest rates 
and  exchange  rates  following  the  breakdown  of  the  Bretton  Woods 
Agreement. 
In addition, the response of the Community to the two oil  price shocks have 
resulted  in  an  excessive burden  being  imposed  on  the  private  sector  as  a 
result of the  failme  of governments to ensure that the public sector share~  . 
· equallv in tJ-.e  adjustment process. 
Furthermore the  expansion of fiscal deficits, in some cases also  associated 
with  substa...,~ial  monetary  growth,  has  been  used  to  proteCt · pul:>lic 
consumption including social transfers at the expense of the business sector. 
At the same time, the burden imposed on private industrv has been borne in 
the  main· by  profits  rather  than  wages,  which  has  reduced  the  rate  of 
investment and impacted on the level of employment. 
Finally,  the  inflexibility of the  labour  market,  when  combined  with  major 
increases in non-wage labour costs, has reduced profitability and had led to 
the  substantial  loss  of  jobs  in  the  Community  so  that  companies  could 
maintain international competitiveness arid survive in the long term. 
In preparing this chapter, 1 am grateful for the assistance I have received from Mr 
J.S.N.  DREW-
- 46  -This  analvsis does not  imply that the growth  in unemployment in  Europe is 
simply related to the inappropriateness of real wage levels.  Equallv it does 
not sav that the explanation of rising unemplovment that cannot be ascribed 
to an excessive growth of real labour costs can be attributed to something 
that is described as a  general deficiency of demand.  Those who believe this 
recommend that part of the programme for 'F.:uropean recovery should entail 
a  general relaxation of fiscal policy and we do not support this. 
Those  favouring  fiscal  policy  relaxation  fail  at  the  outset  to  distinguish 
whether  they  are  talking  about  real  or  nominal  demand.  Of  course,  the 
approximate cause of a  rise in unemployment  is  a  fall in real demand.  But 
this  is  nothing  more  than  a  truism.  Policy  does  not  directly  affect  real 
demand.  It affects it  only  through  its  influence  on  nominal  demand.  A 
starting point for the argument that, in some significant sense, demand has 
been  deficient  and  therefore  accounts  for  the  rise  in unemployment  since 
the  second  oil  price  shock  must  rest  its  case  on  a  deficiency in  nominal 
demand.  But nominal demand or  expenditure  in  the Community since the 
second  oil  price  shock  has  risen  at  an  average  rate  of  11%  per  annum 
compared  with  13%  between  1971  and  1980  and  9.1%  between  1961  a.11d 
1970.  SincE"  the  second  oil  price  shock,  the  overall  money  supply  in  the 
Com rnunity,  as  measured by the broader definition of money, has risen alsq 
by  11%  a  year  in  line  with  total  spending.  By  historical  standards,  in 
nominal terms these are not excessively restrictive figures. 
It  is,  I  believe  true  that  the  rise  in  unernplovment  in  the Community,  as 
elsewhere,  is  not  due  solely  to  inappropriate  levels  of  real  wages.  It  is 
surprising  that  certain  recent  commentary  suggests  that  anyone  would 
suppose that it was.  However, the rise in unemployment is equally not due 
in  any  significant  sense  to  a  lack  of demand, but  in  the  main  to  a  major 
imbalance between monetarv and fiscal policy.  This is not to discount other 
factors  such  as  demographic  trends,  new  technology,  the  employment  of 
women and the rate of anticipated growth. 
It  is  hard  to  believe  that  the  monetary  targets  pursued  generally,  both 
within  and  without  the  Community,  have  been  in  any  historical  sense 
particularly tight.  They have in  a  sense been made so by substantial fiscal 
deficits which have resulted in both high nominal and real interest rates for 
given  monetary  targets.  For  a  given  monetary  target,  the  more 
- 47  -governments have  to borrow  as their deficits rise, other things being equal 
the  higher  will  be  the level of  interest  rates.  In  the  case  of  the  United 
l<ingdom  in  1980  and  the  United  States  more  recentlr,  this  kind  of 
imbalance between monetary and  fiscal policy has had  material effects on 
interest  rate  levels  and  subsequently on  exchange  rates,  with concomitant 
effects on the profitabilitr of existing business and of new investment.  But 
this has not heen the result of any general lack of monetary demand as such, 
but of the inherent inconsistencr of fiscal and monetary policy. 
The European situation regrettably reflects all these influences.  In the case 
of  the  United States,  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  oil  price  shocks have 
reduced either the underlying rate of economic growth in absolute terms or 
the  underlying rate of return  on  investment.  It is  true  that productivity 
growth overall in the United States has shrunk to z'ero.  Nevertheless, both 
the  United  States  and  Japan  were  able  to  generate  major  increases  in 
employment between 1Q74 and 1980. 
42.  The Economic Problems of Europe: Seven key observations 
Much of the remainder  of this report deals with industr'y and employment and 
suggested  policy areas where action  could  be  ta1r.en  at  the  Euro';:lean  level. 
:·We  have  broadly  agreed  on  the  analysis,  the  seriousness  of  the  presen\ 
situation and the desirability of certain ends.  Although  we  are not  able  to 
agree the means and  we write separately about these, we do wish to make a 
number of observations in common which follow in part from our analysis: 
The importance of dialogue with the United States 
Excha.•ge rate stabilitr and the EMS 
The balance between fiscal and monetarv policr 
The importance of creating the right economic environment 
The importance of economic and political expectations 
The  importance  of  a  genuine  cha."lge  of  will  on the part of Member 
States 
The  importance  of  changes  in  labour  market  expectations,  private 
sector growth and public sector restraint. 
The importance of dialogue with the United States 
Fiscal  and  monetary  po11cr  in  the  Communtiy  cannot  in  general  be  set 
without regard  to  the international world as a  whole.  Any consideration of 
the  Commtmitr's  absolute  and  relative  stance  with  regard  to  fiscal  and· 
monetarv policy should be seen in the context of the Community's relations 
- 48  -ann  rlialog--..1e  with  the  United  States.  The  future  behaviour of  the  United 
States' fiscal <ieficit and the associated effect on interest rates must remain 
the  most  serious  threat  to  sustaining  the recoverv in  output that is  taking 
place  both  in  the  United  States  and  elsew~ere.  International  financial 
stability  should  be  achieved  in  cooperation  with  the  United  States  and 
Japan.  While  the Community has achieved something through the existence 
of  the  E\-iS,  as  is  reflected  by  the  recent  round  of  exchange  rate 
adjustme:1ts, t'here are strict limits to what  can be achieved  in  the absence 
of  any  general  agreement  with  the  United  States as to  t~e future  of the 
international  m:Jnetary  ~ystem.  The  Community should  take  the  initiative 
to  establish a  more effective  working dialogue  with the United States with 
regard  to  the  inte:-national  implications  of  fiscal  and  monetal"y  decisions. 
Such  a  dialogue should move on a  working and continuous basis rather than 
be related to sporadic summit meetir.gs, and  might be conducted within the 
framework of the International Monetary Fund.  Such  a  development might 
pave  the  ~ay  toward  a  more  general  agreement  with  regard  to  the 
convergence of policies, which is currently so hard to. achieve. 
Exchange rate stabilitv and the EMS 
As  far  as t'::e  more internal considerations of the Community are concerned1 
it must be reiterated that exchange rate stability is ultimately rooted  ~ot in 
institutiolis per se, but in the conduct of national economic policies.  Those 
who  are  sceptical  about  the  E"iS  have  felt  that,  to  some  extent,  the 
founders  of  the  EMS  put  the  cart  before  the  horse,  and  judge  that  the 
current system is in effect no mo:e than a  crawling-peg arrangement  which 
has  at  least  facilitated  the responses  to divergent  macroeconomic policies 
rather than brought  about  any  further  convergence.  Views  on  this matter 
diffe:.  However,  further development  of the EMS  and.  any extension of its 
influence  makes  necessa:y the  participation of the United  Kingdom  and  a 
more  generalised  use  of  the  ECU.  · Some  of  the  initial  objections  of  the 
United  Kingdom  to  joining  the  svstern,  such  as  the  substantial  initial 
divergence between its monetary stance and that  of the  Federal Republic, 
no  longer seem  as relevant  as they did  and indeed - apart from  the benefit 
to  the  Community  - there  may be  some logic  from  the  United  Kingdom's 
own p:Jint of view in using membership of the EMS as part of the process of 
preserving monetary and price stabilitv that has been achieved domestically. 
- 49  -The balance between fiscal and monetary poliq 
We  continue  to  believe  therefore  that  there  is  some w~v  t,o  go. in  the 
Corn rnunitv to restore  a  proper balance bet ween fiscal and  monetary policy 
as  a  step  toward  the  lowering  of  inflation  and  real  interest  ra'te:!i  and  .  . 
stabi!ising exchange rates  •  .In  this context we believe that monetary gro~th, 
taking  into  account  changes  in  velocity,  should  be  targetted  on  an 
accepta1le rate of inflation plus a  reali:able ~ate of economic growth.  Such 
targets will  clearly vary from country to country.  At the same time, there 
should  where  appropriate  b~ a  progressive  reduction in the observed fiscal 
deficits  as  part  of  a  general  process  of  lowering  both  real  and  nominal 
interest rates.  The  precise  mix  of  fiscal  and monetary policy will clearly 
vary  from  country  to  cou.11try.  However,  any  general  relaxation  of  fiscal 
policy  in  the  Community as  a  whole  is  likely to increase both inflationary 
expectations and nomina1 interest rates.  A  belief in the power of incomes 
policies to alleviate the effects of a  major expansion of nominal demand on 
prices and incomes is little more than wishful thinking.  A tternpts to divert 
domestic  expansions  of nominal demand  to  domestic outputs by the use of 
import  cont::-ols  of  one  kind  or  another. would  only  return  us  to  the  trade 
conditions  of the  thirties,  and  are  in. any  case inconsistent  with  the  spirit 
and raison.d'etre of the Community. 
The importance of creating tbe right economic environment 
Our  view  about  econo:::dc  policy  is  that  it  is substantially  about  creating 
environments  within  wl-dch  economic  agents can function  more 'efficiently  •. 
Whatever changes one makes in the economic  e~v~,ro.nment to enable agents 
to behave  more efficiently, one can never guarantee that they will.  There 
axe,  however,  some  medium  term  policies  which  we  describe  below  in 
paragraph  25  and  which  we  support.  There  is  a  margin  of manoeuvre· for  .  ' 
better growth, employment and stability given the will of member states in· 
the med1urn term. 
The importance of economic and political expectations 
Economical and political expectations are a  key, if not the most important, 
part of that  environme:1t  which dictates how  economic agents  will  behave. 
'  '  "'  . 
~urope's  economic  prooiems,  in  our  view,  have  originated  in. excessive 
- so  -e:q>ectations  about  increases  in  real  incomes  in  changed  economic 
circumstances,  and excessive expectations as  to  the  provision of increased 
real  public  welfare  which  is  mistakenly  perceived  to  be  provided  free. 
These  e:w:pectations have been manifested  in  wage  and  price behaviour  and 
the  imbalance  between  the  public  and  private  sectors  since  the  oil  price 
shock of  1973  and  probably  before.  Inflation  and  employment  in  Europe, 
which  is  in large measure of a  di(ferent  kind  from  that in the US  is, in our 
view,  a  reflection  of  the  gap  between  expectations  and  reality.  The 
political  process  in  Europe  has  in  large  measure  accommodated  those 
expectations.  Europe's  position  in  the  world  is  largely  its  own  fault. 
Moreover,  on top of these expectational problems which, to some degree or 
other,  have  existed  throughout  the  Community,  the  interests  of  national 
governments have seriously prevented any attempt to make the Community 
an economic reality. 
The importance of a  genuine change of will on the part of the Member 
States 
This  leads  us  to  the two  most important  conclusions that we  would like to 
get  ever  both  to  politicians  and  to  the  public,  before  any  detailed 
consideration  whatsoever  of specific economic policies.  In the  first place, 
I 
without  <H'lY  genuine  ch<illge  of  will  on  the  oart  of  national  governments, 
economic  initiatives,  whether  promoted  by  the  Parliament  or  bv  the 
Commission, are likely to be q'...lite  ineffective.  This change of will requires 
a  change  in  public  opinion.  We  hope  this  report  will  contribute  to  this 
change. 
The importance of changes in labour market expectations, business sector 
growth and public sector restraint 
Secondly,  no  real  and  lasting  ch<illge  in  European  competitiveness  and 
growth potential is  likely to come  about  unless  associated  with  changes in 
labour  market  expectations  and  their  associated  costs  and  changes  in 
expectations  as  to  the  importance  of  the  private  sector  a.TJd  the  need  to 
restrain public sector growth.  Given the fundamental nature of the problem 
that has arisen over a  period of years, we need to be cautious.  There is no 
set of short  term economic policies that can be devised  to prod'-lce  a  rapid 
alleviation of the problems of slower growth  and high unemployment.  It is 
for  this  reason,  we believe, that  we have  wiselv  chosen to reject the word 
'relance' in favour of the word 'redressernent'. 
- 51  -43.  Industry and the European Community 
With  regard  to  the  industrial  position  of  the  Community,  I  am  in  much 
agreement with many of the sentiments put forward by M. Albert  in Chapter 
6  of  the  Report.  The  Community  has  failed,  and  continues 'to  fail,  to 
produce a  common market.  National interests continue  to predominate  in 
industrial  matters.  The  need  for  increased  standardisation  in  the 
Community is paramount if it is to mean anything to its member  states in 
the  immediate future.  The need  for  a  common public procurement market 
is a  part of the story.  But little is likely to happen without a  major  cryan~;e 
of will and an increased commitment among the member states. 
If the Community is  to mean anything in industrial terms, there  must be a 
meaningful  European  industry.  The  development  of  such  an  inrlustry 
requires  a  new  perception  of  and  commitment· to  the  integration  of 
European industry at  the  company  level.  It  is  not  Europe. that  competes 
with  Japan  and  the  United  States.  It  is  ICI  that  competes with  Dupont, 
BMW  that  competes  ~ith  General  'Motors,  Olivetti  that  competes  with 
Xerox, Philips that competes with Matsuchita.  Strength must be created at 
the  level  of  individual  companie~.  Specialisation  within  the  Community 
must  beco~e  a  reality.  Rational:sation  of  basic  commodity  industries 
wi~hin  the  Commu;•ity  must  not  simply  represent  a  sharing  of  the  pain 
among its r.:Jembers. 
Much of this does not require vast amounts of money.  It requ:res leadership, 
cornmitrne:1t and organisation.  If the will and commitment al'e not there, no 
amou..'1t  of money wlll maJ.-.e  a  reality of European industry exploiting in any 
significant way the benefits of a  large internal market. 
An  essential  element  in  the  development  of  the  concept  of  a  European 
industry must entail a  radical re-appraisal of Comrn~nity competition policy 
as  applied  by  the  Commission.  Indeed,  in  the light of the recent  decision 
with  regard  to  Philips  and  Thomson  Brandt,  national  com~etition policies 
shou!d be  examined  with  regard  to European needs.  It is  a  clear nonsense 
that, while many- (including M. Albert in Chapter 5 of the Report) - call for 
a  European policy for bformation techology, the major European companies 
- 52  -in the  field are busy signing agreements for Japanese technology rather than 
undertaking  a  programme  of  European integration.  A  revised competition 
policy should apply equally to private and public corporations where they are 
competing in the same markets. 
As  part  of  the  process  of  establishing  a  dialogue  with  regard  to  the 
integration of European industrv, I  propose that there should be established, 
under  the  auspkes  of  the  European  Parliament,  a  European  Industrial 
Council  of  business  leaders  within  the  Community  and  members  of  the 
European Parliament.  Such a  Council  would provide a  forum  for discussion 
of  the  problems  o!  the  development  of  European  industry.  It  should  be 
supported by  the Commission services to the extent  this is consistent  with 
its rights and duties under the Treaty of Rome. 
Some  options are discussed  at  Appendix A.  The role of the Economic and 
Social  Committee  and its relations  with  the Parl1ament  is  fundamental  to 
this  suggestion.  It may be that  the ESC  cot.:ld be  in~olved in  the proposed 
European  Industrial  Council  in  a  positive  way.  We  are  aware  of  the 
ciffic-ulties  in  suggesting  yet  another  organisation.  However  there  is  an 
urgent  need  to  provide  informed  input  to  the  Parliament  to  improve  the 
level of its L:1owledge ar.d  d~bate on complex industrial issues. 
44.  EmplO'Vlll!"-nf  and the European Community 
We  turn  lastly  to  the  irnportal"lt  and  difficult  questio:.1  of  unemployment. 
Unlike nany commentators, I personally do not see une':nplcyment in Europe 
growing  continuously  and  bexorably  without  limit,  for  the  reasons  given 
below.  It  is  clear  that,  whatever  policies  are  pursued,  however, 
unemployment  levels  in  the  Community as  a  whole  will  continue to rise in 
the immediate future, but I  am not at all clear that this trend will continue 
beyond 1984.  M. Albert's views and mine differ not en the seriousness of the 
issue  but  on  the  likely  trends  and  therefore  on  the  type  of  policies  which 
might need to be adopted. 
The  truth  of  the  matter  I  believe  is  that  forecasting  the  behaviour  of 
unemployment in the Comnunity is an even  ma~e uncerta:n occupation than 
ever  be~ore.  The  forecasts  that  have  been  made  with  regard  to 
U."lernployment,  given  certain  forecasts  about  the  futcre  growth  of  real 
output,  are  in  most  cases  relatively  naive  extrapolations  based  on 
- 53  -mecha..,ical  interpretations  of  the  past.  None  of the  economic  models of 
which  I  am  aware  for  any  of  the  Community  countries  has  adequately 
modelled  the behaviour of the supply side of the economy in general,· and the 
behaviour of the labour market in particular.  Most existing forecasts do not 
reflect the influence of real wage behaviour and profitability on the level of 
employment.  To the extent  that  one  believes that  real  wage behaviour  is 
likely to be moderated at least for some time by the very existence of heavy 
unemployment  in  itself,  one  cannot  but  believe  that  ·there  are  some 
corrective  forces operating through the market system that  will mean that 
the generality of unemployment forecasts into the eighties are likely to be 
pessimistic.  Wine lakes dry up, butter mountains melt and, in the long run, 
even unemployment will fall if we are to place any modest credence in the 
working of market forces. 
None  of  this  is  to  predict  an  early  fall  in  unemployment  levels  in  the 
Community,  or  to  suggest  that  nothing  should  be  done  to  alleviate  the 
economic and social consequences that are abunciantly clear to us.  However 
this does mean in my view that we should start from the premise that, in the 
end,  market  forces  will  tend to reduce unemployment  and that the  market 
will work to price people back into work.  'However, given the intransigence 
of  orga.'1ised  labour  which  has  contri'.:Juted  to  the  inflexibility  of  labou~; 
markets, this is a process which will take years rather than months 
Fro:n this point of view it is therefore crucial, I believe., that nothing should 
be done  wit~in the Community to inhibit  the process of market adjustment 
in  gettir.g  people  back  to  work.  Against  this  background,  proposals  for 
work-sharing  and  a  re-organisation  of  the  basic  economics  of  work  are 
merely  attempts  to  treat  the  sy:-nptoms  of  the  disease  rath·er  than  the 
underlying problem.  It is about time that the Community as a  whole had the 
courage to  face the reality of the unemployment problem which has in part 
been rooted in restrictive labour practices, which devices like work-sharing 
will  only  paper  over  and  underwrite.  Michel  Albert's  views  which  differ 
from mine are set out in Chapter 7  and my further comments a!'e in Chapter 
8. 
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Against  the background of the seven key observations (paragraphs 8-15),  we 
would  support  the  fol1owing  policies,  which  we  think  would  assist  in  the 
process  of  achieving  a  more  satisfactory  economic  environment  and 
encourage the development of a  new sound basis for the further growth and 
prosperity of Europe. 
a)  '~easures designed to reduce monetary growth in line with a  sustained 
inflation target in Europe of less than 5%, cou'Pled with a  progressive 
reduction in the budget deficits of member states overall. 
b)  Measures  to  alleviate  the  social  distress  caused by  unemployment, 
including  aid  to  early  retirement  and  the  provision  of  training 
facilities and special job schemes for young people. 
c)  A  reconsideration 
gover::1ments,  a."ld 
ventures  designed 
private industry. 
of 
an 
to 
capital  expenditure  progra:nmes  by  member 
encouragement  to  undertake  public  capital 
prc•ide  increased  services  and  facilities  for 
d)  The  development  of  an  effective  energy  policy,  combined  with 
possible  initiatives  both  with  regard  to  energy  saving  and  energy 
augr::enta tion at both the country and the Community level, possibly 
linkec to the suggestion of a11  import tax on oil. 
e)  Measures to facilitate a  greater flexibility in the labour market. 
n  Comrr.unity  initiatives  to  facilitate  the  rationalisation  of  basic 
commodity industries within  the  Community,  and  to  encourage  and 
support  the  creation  of  European  companies  through  mergers 
acquisitions  and  joint  ventures,  particularly  in  the  high  R  and  D 
technology  and  energy  fields.  (Added  to  a  reconsideration  of 
Community competition policy in this context- see 'Paragra'Ph 19). 
g)  Consideration to be given  to  the way in which the Community might 
facilitate  restructuri:-.g  by bearing  some  of  the  costs  that  normally 
fall on private companies in this process. 
h)  The  development  of  a  constructive  Community  policy  with  regard  to 
overseas  investors,  integrating  their  contributions  into the 
development  of  the  Community  ·rather  than  treating  them  as  invaders 
hostile  to  domestic  industry. 
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specific  things that  might be  done  with  which  we would  have sympathy.  I 
would not have sympathy with any of the following,  which roughly speaking 
divide  into  two.  The  first  is  any  policy or set  of  policies  which  seem  to 
represent  the  treatment of .the symptoms of  Eu~ope's underlving ecornomic 
problems, wit'h  the sole exception of the alleviation of the distress directly 
experienced  by  the  unemployed.  These  include  incomes  policies, 
protectionism, the subsidization in general of private investment other' than, 
perhaps,  in  energy  creation  or  energy  saving,  all  of  which  represent  a 
papEring-over of the cracks,  a...;·1d  which  will  encourage  politicians  to  go  on 
trying to accommodate expectations that are inconsistent with reality. 
Secondly,  we  do  not  believe  that  expansion  in Europe is  synonymous with 
acceleratin.g monetary growth and  rising national fiscal deficits.  This is not 
to  say  that,  over  short periods,  monetary and budgetary policy in any one 
country may not  be  too  tight.  We  have sympathy,  for  example,  with  the 
argument  that  US  monetary policy may have been too tight during part of 
1982.  But  none  of  this  gives  credibility  to  the  view  that  there  should  be 
some  major  expansionary s::ift  in fiscal and monetary policv.  Much will be 
gained  fro:n  a  c::mtinued attempt  t·::J  achieve  a  more  appropriate bng-term 
balance betwee::1  monetary growth  and  the  fiscal balance ass::Jdated with  a: 
further reduction both in interest rates ar1d  the rate of inflation. 
As regards pol:cies under the headbgs mE-ntioned in paragraph 2.S,  rnan'7 a:-e 
already beir:g actively dev'eloped by the Community institutions.  We  would 
like  to  see  the  European  Parliament  proposing  a  comprehensive  and 
consistent set of actions to support these policies. 
In  Chapter's  6,  7  and  8  Michel  Albert  proposes certain actions  which he 
. believes wi11  contribute to the debate.  I have studied them with interest and 
we  have  discussed  them  during  Otu'  meetings  with  experts  from  busines~, 
trades tL"'lions,  government  and academics across Europe•  My comments on 
these  proposed  actions  and  the  reasons  why  I  cannot  agree  to  them  are  set 
out  at  the  end  of  this  report. 
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THE  NEW  MOMENTUM  FOR  GROWTH  WITH  STABILITY 
Since  the  establishment  of  the  Common  Market,  the  Member  States  have  passed 
through  three  stages:  a  high  Level  of  growth  without  inflation during  the 
1960s;  Low  growth  and  high  inflation during  the  1970s,  and  finally  inflation 
with  zero  growth.  Even  though  some  countries  (United  Kingdom,  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany,  Netherlands)  have  brought  inflation  under  control,  they  are still 
suffering  from  the  recession.  Each  country  is  in  fact  its  own  and  the  other 
countries'  prisoner,  when  only  a  slight  increase  in  overall  growth  - albeit 
under  quite  specific  conditions  - would  be  sufficient  to alter  the  climate,  to 
create  a  new  momentum  which  would  be  self-sustaining,  in  a  word  to  change  from 
decline  to  recovery.  The  EEC  would  thus  contribute  to  the  preparation of  a 
new  world  economic  order  based  on  the  stabilization of  exchange  rates  and  the 
development  of  trade  and  solidarity  between  nations. 
How  is  this  to  be  achieved? 
The  main  difficulty  is  psychological  rather  than  technical.  Before  spelling 
out  the  proposed  macroeconomic  policy 
1
,  we  must  emphasize  again  that,  in 
isolation,  the  Member  States  are  powerless,  paralaysed. 
51.  An  extra  1%  for  three  years  would  be  enough 
511.  The  paralysis  of  the  Member  States 
Let  us  Look  first  at  the  countries  which.have  managed  to  shrug  off  inflation. 
After  all  their efforts,  and  at  a  time  when  it  is  urgently  necessary  for  them 
particularly  because  of  worsening  unemployment  - to  reap  the  benefit,  they 
appear  to  be  paralysed.  First  by  what  we  have  called  in  Chapter  3  the 
'Father  Christmas  and  policeman•  approach  and  secondly  by  the  size  of  the 
persistent deficits.  Investment,  which  is  at  the  root  of  all  Lasting 
growth,  cannot  be  self-generating  as  Long  as  public  budgets  and  company 
balance  sheets  have  not  been  restored  to  a  balanced  state.  On  the  one  hand, 
it is  no  Longer  possible  to  continue  raising  taxes  as  in  the  past  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  President  Reagan's  experience  is  a  demonstration  of  how  difficult 
it is  to  cut  public  spending. 
1 See  annex  2.  - 57  -This  paralysis  in  budgetary  policy is so  inhibiting  that  in  the  spring  of  1983 
the  UK  and  the  FRG  have  been  obliged  to  expand  their  money  supply,  by  around  4% 
and  7%  respectively  in  real  terms.  Even  though  there  was  some  room  for 
slackening  the  control  over  the  money  supply,  these  figures  are  nevertheless 
very  high.  They  indicate  that  the  monetary  authorities  in  these  countries  are 
so  worried  about  the  risk  of  stifling any  cyclical  upturn  that  they  prefer,  by 
.·  ... 
relaxing  the  controls  over  the  money  supply,  the  risk  of  a  return  to  inflation 
in  two,years•  time. 
This  is a  serious  risk.  It  is  our  duty  to emphasize  this,  especially since  it 
is  Likely  to  rebound  on  the  second  group  of  Member  States,  i.e.  those  who  Like 
France  and  Italy are still  in  the  grips  of  inflation.  These  countries,  which 
are still only  at  the  first  stage 1n  the  essential. reorganization  of  their 
economies,  are  even  more  paralysed  than  their partners. 
What  do  all  these  countries  need  most?  The  answer  is  more  collective  g~owth. 
This  can  only  Lead  to  a  real  recovery,  however,  if  certain  very  strict 
conditions  are  observed. 
52.  The  conditions  for  collective  pump-priming 
In  order  to define  these  conditions  we  have  used  the  forward  projections  for 
1984-86  which  are  summarized  in  Tables  3  and  4  (Chapter 2- No.  21).  This 
projection  is  reproduced  in  Tables  7  - 9  and  in  graph  3  which  compare  the 
Likely  development  on  the  basis  of  current  trends  with  the  assumption  of  a 
..  1 
1%  annual  increase  in  growth  over  three  y~ars  (end  columns)  • 
These  tables  show  that  it  is  possible  to  achieve  three  very  important 
objectives  simultaneously: 
-a stabilization of  real  per  capita  inc6mes  <Table 9- Line  10- columns 
9  to  11)  in  spite  of  a  slowdown  in  the  growth  of  nominal  wages  and  a  further 
reduction  in  working  time  (1.9%  as  oppo~ed to  0.7%  according  to current 
trends)  (Table  No.  7- columns  6  and  7;  Line  5);  without  this  reduction, 
real  wages  would  rise  by  as  much  as  0.8%  p.a.2• 
1  This  period  C1984  to  1986)  has  been  chosen  merely  to  illustrate the  argument. 
Naturally  in  more  detailed  studies  more  complex  timescales  would  have  to  be 
considered 
2  This  is particularly  important,  for  the  trend  in  real  wages  tends  towards 
zero  - and  may  well  become  negative  - without  a  recovery  in  growth 
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Table  7 
EEC 
A~SUMPTION~ CONCERNING  GRO~~H AND  EMPLOYMENT  UP  TO  1986 
EUR  - 10 
1 9 a 4  - 1  '  a ' 
1961-70  1971-80  1981-81  Comet  pro- Example 
1% extra  growth 
assumption 
jection  ·~uper- A:'V.atnout  )B:w1th 
I 
based  on  growth'  6  t  C)  6  t  d) 
r:urrent 
oiL 
(I)  (2)  0)  ·.:ren141)  ( 5)  (6)  (7) 
.  Average  ~~~u~l percentage variation 
1.Working population  0,2  0,6  0,4  0,7  0,8  0,1  0,1 
z.GNP  in  volume  4,7  2,9  0,.1  2,3  7,1 ..  3,3  3,3 
]. Employment  -
0,2  0,2  - 1,3  0,1  1,1  0,3  1, 1 
4  Producti\'ity  4,5·  2,7  1,4  2,2.  5,9  3,0  2,2 
• 4 =3: 2  . 
5. Working  hours  .,  (-0,8)  (-o,8)  - (-Q,7)  (-0,  7)  (-Q,7)  <~1,9) 
6.llnurly productivit  <5,::5)  n,5>  - (2,9)  (6,  7)  <3, 7)  (4, 2> 
,,--4:':>  b)  . 
l.rv0lC:  C~t  f'nd  of period  ' 
Working  pnpul~tion  109,2  116,2  , 17,6  120,1  120,4  120,1  120.,1 
7  •  ( m  i 11 ion  E  )  . 
a.r::mployment  107,1  109,1  104,9  105,2  108,4  105,8  108,3 
(millions) 
2,1  1,1  12,7  14,9  1Z,O  14,3  11,8  9. yneT~loxe1  rn1  10  s 
10.Unemployment rate  2,0  6,1  10,8  12,4  10,0  11,9  9,8 
; n  c/  , 
lC:-:~: 7 
-------- -
a)  and  b)  Estimates  or  a£sumptions 
c)  Assumption  A:  no  additional  reduction  in  working  time  {trend= 10.7% per  year) 
d)  Assumption  B  :  including  additional reduction  in  working  time  (1.2% per  year,  giving  a  total of  1.9%) 
e)  Most  recent  Comet  projection  adjusted  to  ~llow for  new data  for  1983 
l 
I ~EC 
hbh  8  l\~ST_l!-lP! J ONS  CONCERNING  Wl~GES  r  PRl  CES  A.tlD  CUPFEUCY 
!  1970  a)  1980  ")  1981  1982  1983  c 0  •  •  t  c)  Assuming  extra  1%  9ftd1h _. 
I  1960  1970  b)  b)  b)  1984  1985  1986  1984  198S  1986  -
(I)  . (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  .  (7)  (3)  (9)  (10)  (!J) 
---
1.Nominal  per  carita  8,9  13,J  11,5 
wa~es 
Z.Gt\_)  prices  4,3  9,8  9,1  . 
J.Feal  per  Fapita 
salarles  -:: 
4,4  3,2  2,2 
4~ PYoductivi ty  G~~P  4,5  ~F1  1,2 
1COC 
5. Cor r e c ted  .c: a l  c:; n  ·  .~~ 
shetre  - 4 
-0,1  0,5  1,0 
6.  wag~s costs  per  unit  1  4,2  10,.3  10,2 
pr  ucea  -
7  G  No  nd n a l  Gt~  P  ~  9 ,.1  13,0  8,7 
'L  f-: :' /3  0  10,4  11._~0 
9.  L i o u i d i t y  r a t  1  ~-- 1,2  0,9  ",  .  ._,  = 8:7 
G~JP 
m.r-!/P  ~  10 = 8:/'  5,8  3,8 
i1 1'1/WCVP  =  B:G  6,0  3,4  .. 
S':"JfCII!s:  a> 
b) 
Europec:n  EconoJTl·.·  No.  J ~ 
Econcrr.i c  Ludqet!:- 1•12y !June  1 983 
9,6 
9,2 
. 0,4 
1,7 
-1,3 
7,8 
9,6 
- -
7,2  6,4  6,0  5,6  6,0  5,2 
6,8  6,0  . 5,8  5,5  6,0  5,2 
0,4  0,4  0,2  0,1  0,0  0,0 
1,5  1,9  2,3  2,4  1,7  2,6 
-1,1  -1,5  -2,1  -2,2  -1,7·  -2,6 
5,6  4,4  .  3,6  3,1  4,2  2,5 
7,3  7,8  8,4  8,3  8,7  9,1 
9,0  9,S  9,5  9,7  10,1 
1,1  1,0  -1  .. 1  1,0  1,0 
. 
2,8  3,5  3,8  3,5  4,7 
4,4  5,7  6,2  5,3  7,4 
c)·  RefE:H'!lCe  ~irr.ulation,  'sponlaneous 'evolution  bwsed  on  economic  buds~".!tS  for  May/June  1983 
4,2 
4,2 
0,0 
2,5 
-2,5 
1;7 
8,2 
9,2 
1,0 
4,8 
7,4 
\J1 
OJ 
CJ 
d)  Sim'0Jc:t_i(m  irclu:1ins  a~diticnal  lS~ gro·"th,  incomes  p~licy and  additlO!!<ll  reduction  of working  time 
hav  inc:  no  effect  on  cnsts 
' 
I 
I 
j Table  9  ANNUAL  MOVEMENT  IN  CERTAIN  $TRAT£GIC  VARIABlfS  INCLUOfD  JN  fORECASTS  20  June  1983 
EUR0-10/\%  p.a.  or%  GOP 
1970  , 9!0  Trend  Pr·oj~ction b)  Si111ulation  t urope .. n  -- , 981  1Y82  191}. I  -
1960  19?0  .  )  Q)  0)  1954  195,  19~<'>  19~4  J  H~5  - 1. GOP  vulu111e  4,7  2.,9  -<l,4  O,l  0,)  1,7  2,.S  2,7  'I  2,5  3,1 
2. [mp loyment  0,2  0,2  ·1,6  -1,4  •1,1  -<l,;t  O,Z  O,l  A  0,0  O,l 
•  0,1  1,1 
]. Uneaaploy•ent  rate  2,1  4,2  1,]  9,1  10,9  11,6  U,1  12,4  A  11,4  11,1 
I  10,7  10,4  ...  Productivity•l:2  4,S  Z,7  1,2  1,7  1,6  ,,,  2,J.  2,4  A  :1,5  3,4 
I  1,7  2,6 
5. lnvest•ents  S,7  '·' 
-4,7  -z,s  o,o  1,7  J,7  '·' 
4,6  S,4 
'· 
Pub I i c  deficit_ as 
~ GOP  ..  -o,4  -2,1  -s,z  ·S,l  ·S,4  -s,z  •,4,1  -4,4  -4,1  -4,6 
7.  External  balance 
.IS  % GOP  0,2  o, 1  0,05  0,]  0,6  0,1  0,6  0,4  0,4  O,J 
s. Prices  in  GOP  4,]  9,1  '·' 
9,2  6,4  6,0  5,3  '·' 
6,0  S,2 
9.  No111inal  per  A  6,1  6,0 
:.apita  wages  1,9  1l,l  , ·' 
9,7·  7,2  6,4  6,0  '·'  •  6,0  S,l 
10.~cal  per  capita  A  0,1  0,1 
wages  •  9:8  ~ ...  1,2  2,2  o,s  0,4  0,4  o;z  0,1  •  0,0  0,0 
a)  la~t  available  forecasts· 
b)  last  trend  foreca~ts  in  Comet  model,  see  annex  2. 
c)  for  the  si1ulati~n of  European  recovery  see  annex  2.  This  siaaulat~on  wds  effe~ted  with  the  Comet 
model  on  the  bas1s  of  the  hypotheses  used  by  the  author'  and  is  not  binding  on  the  Co 1mission•s 
departments.  ~:  H~pothesis excluding  further  reduction  in  working  hours;  B:  Hypothesis  excluding 
further  reduct1on  1n  working  hours. 
'"'
158c-
Rccover·v--CJi 
.. -
, ? •.  ~.  ----
3,!1 
o,s 
1,1 
11,9 
9,1 
l,l 
Z,S 
6,2 
-4,\ 
-o,1 
4,2 
:s,o 
4,Z 
o,a 
0,0 Table  No.  7,  line  9  shows  that  if  there  is  no  change  in  the  trend  in  average 
working  time  the  impact  on  unemployment  of  an  extra  1%  growth  is  slight; 
there  will  be  14.9  m  i ll  ion  unemployed  instead  of  14.3  .. miltion,  a  drop  of 
0.6  million.  The  av~rage  reduction  in  working.time  assumed  in  hypothesis 
B  (1.9%  per  year)  could,  however,  help  to  bring  about  a  further  reduction. 
of  around  2.5  million  in  the  number  of  unemployed  over  3  years  as  compared 
to  current  trends1. 
-Lastly, this  stabilization of  real  incomes  and  this  reduction  in  the  number·· 
of  unemployed  are  accompanied  by  an  appreciable  improvement  in  comp~ny profit 
margins  since all  the  increases  achieved  in  productivity,  i.e. 2- 3%  per 
year  on  average,  are  channelled  in  that  direction  (Table  8,  lines  4  and  5, 
column  6). 
In  Chapter  8  we  shall  look  at  the  conditions  under  which  the  reduction  in 
working  time  can  be  compatible  with  an  increase  in  company  profit  margins. 
It. should  be  emphasized  straight  away  that  the  cure  would  be  worse  than  the 
illness itself it if were  to  lead  to either  a  deterioration  in  industrial  .  ·,  . 
competitiveness  or  further  inflationary pressures.  This  is  why  one  of  the 
essential  conditions  for  the  success  of  the  policy described  in  this  simulation 
is that  shown  in  Table  9  <Lines  8  and  9,  columns  9  to 11  ),  namely  a  mor'e 
pronounced  sLowing  down  in  nominal  wages  than  inditated  in  the  forecasts 
coupled  with  a  reduction  in  inflation2• 
To  summarize: 
- Even  assuming  an  optimistic  international  climate,  the  countries  of  the 
EEC  - including  those  which  have  made  the  greatest effort  to  emerge  from 
the  crisis - are  now  paralysed  and  incapable  of  achieving  a  Lasting 
upturn  in  growth. 
- A modest  amount  of  additional  collective growth  for  the  Community  as  a  whole· 
would  be  enough  to  ease  the  situation  and  considerably  improve  the·outlook, 
provided  it  is  accompanied  by  a  more  marked  fall  in  the  average  rate  of 
inflation  in  the  EEC  and  provided  productivity gains  are  used  to  improve. 
company  profit  margins. 
1To  achieve  the  same  result  without  speeding  up  the  reduction  in  averd~~ 
working  time,  t.he  growth  rate  would  have  to  reach  7%  (Table  7;  col.  5) 
2  This .applies  to  the  Community  average  and  is vital  for  countries  with  a  high 
inflation  rate;  in  countries  with  low  inflation,  the  rate  must  be  held  steady 
- as  must  the  growth  in  nominal  wages 
- 59  -• 
...  (a)  Growth,  inflation  and  unemployment 
••  •• 
- t 
average 
4  ., s  '· 
'4 
• 
• 
•  • 
Index 
.. 
---~-· 
_.,.  ,  ....... __ _ 
-:=--...  -· 
GNP  prices,  D.,  % p.a.  and  weighte~ 
de9iation  of  national  inflation  raie 
Unemployment  rate  as  % 
of  working  population 
~:::·--·  '•-.a 
·~---·-l  ··--.... 
--·  .::::._ -·· 
.. 
(b)  Investment,  difference  between  weal  ~ages 
and  GNP  per  person  employed  and  employment 
in  volume  .-----• 
...--'" 
f  .-·--...  ••  . .  •  • 
/  .. '· 
Difference  between  real  per  capita wages  ana 
GNP  volume  per  person  employed,  av.  indices 
1961-70 •  100 
Employment  in  millions 
..Graph  3 
SOME  KEY  PROJECTION  VARIABLES 
EUR  = 10 
I.  Reference  proj~ctior 
II.  'Recovery  of  European  economy· 
·simulation 
"II<a>  without  a  further·  reduction 
in  working  hours 
II(b)  with  a  further  reduction 
in  working  hours 
See  Annex  2 
(c)  Raal  wages,  external  balance.of  payments  and 
public  spending  deficit 
Real  per  capita wages 
As ., ••• 
.....  '.J..'ia'it'ii','• 
:~'  average  •O  4% 
-
External  balance  of  payments 
(goods  +  services)  as  % of  GNP 
.~  .......  I  ··-··--.:::- •• 
•  ...  I  II  I  il ' i. ' 1°1  '  it  .. 
... 
National  public  sector  borrowing 
~equirement~  as  % of  GNP 
'''•'i.'J.'i.  ••  i.  ~ 
- 59a  -With  this  dual  proviso,  the  efforts  of  the  most  advanced  countries  in  the  fight 
against  inflation  could  be  rapidly  rewarded  by  a  new  upturn  in  growth.  However, 
couritries  th~t  squander  the  fruits  of  this growth  by  adding  to  inflation would 
thereby  be  making  a  further  rod  for  their  own  backs. 
Above  a.ll,  and  this  is  perhaps  the  most  important  Lesson  from  this  simulation, 
once  the  effects of  growth  and  higher  profits  combine  to  encourage  investment, 
-the  process  becomes  self-sustaining  (as  Long  as  it does  not  side-slip  into 
price,  income,  budgetary  or  monetary  disequilibrium).  Graphs  3a  and  3b  show 
this  clearly with  regard  to  growth  and  investment. 
Given  all  these  conditions,  it  is  possible  in  a  Community  framework  to  set  in 
train  a  real  medium-term.recovery  in  the  growth  of  the  European  economy  on  the 
basis  of  a  modest  initial  stimulus. 
The  key  question  now  is: 
53.  How  is  this  additional  growth  to  be  achieved? 
A number  of  studies  have  been·carried  out  since  the  1970s  on  the  subject  of 
economic  recovery.  Generally  speaking  they  have  proposed  that  the  Member 
States  should  undertake  a  coordinated  increase  in  their  budgetary deficit  to 
provide  a  collective  economic  stimulus.  It  takes  someone  who  is  badly  out-
of-touch  with  reality  to  recommend  such  a  course  of  action  nowadays,  even  in 
more  or  Less  camouflaged  form.  The  public  secto~ deficits  in  the  Community 
are  now  so  high  that  no  government  can  countenance  increasing  them  any  further. 
The  issue  now  is  no  Longer  about  stimulating  consumption  by  deficit  budgeting 
'but  about  stimulating  investment  - above  all  productive  investment  - to  be 
finanted  other  than  from  national  budgets. 
How  is this to  be  done?  This  is  the  first  question  to  address,  from  two 
arlgles,  namely  additional  borrowing  and  an  oil  tax.  The  crucial  factor  for 
providing  a  fresh  impetus  to  growth  in  the  medium  term  is  not  financing 
but  a  combination  of  all  the  conditions  needed  for  disinflation  and  a  rebirth 
of  corporate  investment,  which  presuppose  a  kind  of  vast  creative  compromise 
at  Community  Level  (see  No.  54  below). 
- 60  -531.  Additional  borrowing 
How  much  additional  investment  is  needed  to  raise  the  EEC's  growth  rate  by  1%? 
Approximately  0.6%  of  its  GNP,  or  not  even  15,000  million  ECU1  per  year. 
Are  sums  of  this  size  unreasonable?  Certainly  not  in  relation  to  Community 
GNP:  a  stimulus  of  1%  is  within  the  range  of  0.5%  to  2%  of  GNP  common  to 
traditional  economic  recovery  programmes.  Nor  are  they  unreasonable  in 
relation  to  the  overall  flow  of  investment:  15,000  million  ECU  are  equiv~Lent 
to  no  more  than  3%  of  gross  fixed  asset  formation  in  the  Community. 
Will  the  financial  systems  and  capital  markets  be  able  to  provide  the  Community 
with  credit  on  this  scale  without  difficulty for  three  years  in  succession? 
The  reply  to  this question  is  composed  of  three  parts. 
5311.  In  fact  the  additional  15,000 million  ECU  would  have  to  be  borrowed 
in  the  first  year  only  because  a  1%  rise  in  the  growth  rate will  Lead,  on  the 
present  simulation  and  despite  company  tax  relief  worth  11,000  m ECU,  to  a 
reduction  in  national  public  sector deficits equivalent  to 0.2  to  0.3%  of 
GNP2•  Thus,  from  the  beginning  of  the  second  year  the  additional  borrowing 
required  for  the  initial  stimulus  would  be  not  more  than  8  to  10,000  million 
ECU. 
5312.  In  the  event,  in  1983,  the  Community  will  be  borrowing  around  10,000 
million  Ecu3  on  the  markets  through  various  borrowing  and  Lending  instruments, 
the  main  one  being  the  European  Investment  Bank  CEIB) 4• 
There  are  three  good  reasons  for  making  use  of  these  instrumenAr:  first, 
Loans  contracted  by  the  Community  increase  neither  the  budget  deficit  nor  the 
external  debt  of  the  Member  States  even  if  these  are  ultimately  guaranteed  by 
them.  Secondly,  although  any  increase  in  the  growth  rate  does  have  an 
adverse  effect  on  the  external  balance,  this effect  is  approximately  halved 
1  The  value  of  the  ECU  is  very  close  to  that  of  the dollar;  as  at 
3  January  1983,  1  ECU  was  worth  $0.9688. 
2  See  Table  9  and  graph  3c. 
3  This  figure  reflects  a  rapid  growth  in  the  volume  of  borrowing,  which  was 
only  4,800  million  in  1982" 
4  The  EIB  is  responsible,  inter alia,  for  administering  the  New  Community 
Instrument  (NCI)  which  was  in  fact  created  in  1978  when  the  policy  for 
recovery  referred  to  in  Chapter  2  was  being  Launched;  the  other  instruments 
are  the  ECSC  and  EURATOM. 
- 61  -if the  action  is  taken  on  a  Community  basis;  in  the  context  of  the  policy 
proposed  here  the  effect  would  in  fact  be  quickly  offset  by  the  upturn  in 
inv~stment.  The  third advantage  is  that  by  using  the  Community  instruments 
the  complications  of  coordinating  the  positions  of  the ten  Member  States  are 
avoided:  it is sufficient  to establish  the  general  rules  which  the  Community 
institutions  must  apply  in  the  general  interest. 
5313.  There  is  no  reason  why  the  additional  investment  programme  should  not 
be  financed  entirely  by  Community  Loans.  There  is  nothing  to prevent  the 
EIB,  for  example,  from  undertaking  co-financing  transactions  in  association 
with  the  banking  systems  concerned,  along  the  Lines  of  the  World  Bank. 
Whatever  the  case,  it .stands  to  reason  that  a  medium-term  programme  that 
closely  combines  stability with  growth  must.base  its  finan~ing, year  after 
·year,  on  the  state of  the  markets,  avoid  disturbing  them  in  any  way  and 
seek  as  a  priority to  maintain  the excellent  credit  rating  enjoyed  by  the 
Community  instruments.  This  would  appear  to  be  possible  since  this  programme 
will  have  only  a  marginal  effect  if sufficient  banks  and  financial 
institutions  are  associated  with  it1• 
In  addition,  two  aspects  of  this  programme  are  conducive  to  the  vital 
Lowering  of  interest  rates  in  Europe:  the  reduction  of  budgetary deficits 
directly  related  to  the  improvement  in  growth  and  the  more  pronounced 
slowdown  in  inflation. 
532.  Oil  tax 
5321.  Why  a  tax? 
From  the  macroeconomic  viewpoint  an  additional  annual  investment  of  15,000 
m~Llion ECU  per  year  is  enough  to  generate  an  additional  1%  growth.  However, 
as  soon  as  one  gets  down  to  the  specifics of  implementing  the  recovery 
2 
programme,  it becomes  clear  that  the  Community  needs  new  resource~  for  three 
reasons. 
The  first  reason  is  that  a  Large  proportion  of  the  Loans  contracted  to  finance 
additional  investment  will  have  to be  at  cheaper  rates  of  interest.  While 
1 .. rn  1982  the  combined  value  of  international  bond  issues  plus  international 
banking  Eurocredit  amounted  to  around  $170,000  million.  T~ere is no  reason 
why  the  EEC  should  not  be  able  to  absorb  5  to  10%  of  that  amount  especially 
since  the  net  balance  of  its direct  investment  in  the  United  States was  over 
$10,000  million  per  year  on  average  in  1981-82  and  purchases  of  American 
2  stock- mainly  treasury bills- amounted  to  $18,000  million  in  1982. 
See  annex  5. 
- 62  -we  are  not  unaware  of  the  risks  of  distortion  of  competition  to  which  the  use 
of  this  procedure  may  give  rise,  only  investment  which  complies  with  the  criteria 
Laid  down  in  Article  130  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  can  qualify:  this  covers  invest-
ment  in  projects  of  regional  or  Community  interest  whose  purpose  is  to  create 
new  activities  connected  with  the  gradual  establishment  of  the  Common  Market, 
with  particular emphasis  on  investment  with  high  innovative  content,  for  the 
introduction  of  advanced  technologies  or  to assist  SMUs  and  craft  industries. 
The  only  exceptions  to  these  criteria are  investments  in  applicant  countries 
and  in  the  associated  ACP  and  Mediterranean  countries.  Lastly,  the  choice 
of  projects  would  be  Left,  in  the  main,  to  the  EIB  which  is  normally 
responsible  for  such  matters.  There  are  a  good  many  viable  projects,  of  all 
kinds,  which  cannot  be  financed  because  of  current  interest  rates1  and  worsening 
company  balance  sheet  situations. 
The  second  reason  is  that  some  investments  which  should  be  given  priority 
attention  require  financial  support  from  the  Community's  budgetary  resources. 
This  applies  particularly  to  investment  in  energy  and  in  new  Community 
research  and  development  programmes.  These  two  sectors,  which  require  Large 
amounts  of  additional  investment,  are  described  in  Chapters  6  and  7. 
The  third  and  final  reason  is  the  following:  we  have  seen  that,  increasingly, 
the  source  of  growth  in  Europe  is  the  Community  itself.  But  this  source  is 
being  gradually  polluted  by  the  ridiculous,  even  catastrophic  manner  in  which 
the  institutions operate,  spending  their  time  bickering  over  the  common  budget. 
Expenditure  under  the  Community  budget  will  soon  burst  through  the  ceiling of 
own  resources.  Although  economies  are  admittedly  necessary  and  this  is  where 
a  start  must  be  made,  this  must  not  provide  an  excuse  for  the  proliferation of 
Community  bureaucracy:  the  Community  administration  employs  Less  than  20,000 
officials, equivalent  in  size to  the  municipal  council  staff  of  a  town  of 
2  to  3  million  inhabitants.  What  is  more,  unless  new  resources  are  found 
for  top  priority  investments,  the  Community  will  no  Longer  be  able  to  avoid 
dissolution  and  bankruptcy.  If  that  happens,  the  source  will  no  Longer  be 
polluted but  dried  up.  In  order  for  it to  nourish  and  fertilize  the 
Community  economy,  much  greater  use  must  be  made  of  it and  common  interests 
must  be  created  which  are  so  closely  interrelated that  ultimately  the 
term  'Community'  will  take  on  its  real  meaning. 
1  Currently  at  such  a  high  Level  that  in  most  industrialized  countries 
pension-holders  are  in  a  privileged  position  compared  to entrepreneurs 
- 63  -5322.  Why  an  oil  tax? 
First  of  all,  the  situation  Lends  itself to  it:  oil prices  have  fallen  by 
around  $4  per  barrel  since  the  end  of  1982.  Admittedly this fall  offers 
an  opportunity  for  the  recovery  of  the  European  economy  which  has  been  so  badly 
hit  by  the  two  oil  shocks.  On  the  other  hand, inspite of  its extreme  dependence 
. on  energy,  Europe  invests  between  2  and  3  times  Less  in  energy  than  Japan  and 
the  United  States. 
With  blithe disregard  and  ~hildlike irresponsibility  we  are  therefore  paving 
the  way  for  the  third oil  shock  just  as  we  did  with  the  two  previous  ones. 
Would  people  have  us  believe that  it is wiser  to  use  the  gains  from  the  f~LL 
in oil prices  for  immediate  consumption  rather  than  to  invest  them  to 
safeguard  our  fut~re?  Do  they  believe that  we  should  squander  rather  than  husband 
our  resources,  even  though  this still means  putting millions  of  jobs  at  risk? 
Ultimately  the  question  of  a  tax  on  oil  is  about  choosing  between  ~he short 
term  and  the  Long  term,  between  consumption  and  investment,  between  the 
impulses  of  instinct  and  the  path  of  reason,  between  the  temptation  to 
fatalism  and  the  call  to  recovery. 
In  fact  it was  this  argument  that, after  careful  deliberation,  convinced  the 
Commission  (see  Chapt~r 6).  The  tax  it has  in  mind,  however,  is  a  tax  on 
consumption.  We,  on  the  other  hand,  are  proposing  an  import  tax  fdr  a 
reason  which  is  central  to  the  thesis  of  our  project:  it  can  be  adopted 
very  quickly  without  the  need  for  ratification by  the  national  parliaments. 
An  initiative by  the  European  Parliament  along  these  Lines  would  therefore 
assume  a  symbolic  value.  During  our  talks  with  government  representatives 
it was  occasionally  pointed  out  to  us  that  such  a  tax  would  be  too  favourable 
to  the  United  Kingdom.  This  argument  is typical  of  the  devious  way  of 
thinking  and  the  obsession  with  'a fair  return'  which  have  become  the  poison 
of  the  Community  institutions.  Lastly,  this oil  tax  would  be  flexible  and 
highly  productive:  it would  raise  around  $2,500  million  if  the  charge  were 
·1  ECU  a  barrel.  The  Commission's  energy  programme.calls  for  1,500  to  2,000 
million  ECU  per  year  and  an  interest  rebate  of  2%  on  the  entire additional 
borrowing  requirement  proposed  would  cost  around  2,000  million  per·year  for 
three  years.  This  tax  could  therefore  be  set  at  between  1  and  2  ECU  per 
barrel. 
- 64  -54.  The  basis  for  a  creative  compromise 
Let  us  make  no  bones  about  it.  Even  if  the  Community's  debts  are  minimal  at 
present  (Less  than  10,000  million  ECU),  its borrowing  capacity  is  not  unlimited. 
It  must  be  managed  carefully  as  an  irreplaceable asset.  Similarly,  even  if 
the  Community  budget  amounts  to  barely  2%  of  the  budgets  of  the  Member  States 
it  has  to  be  administered  in  an  exemplary  fashion.  This  is  why  the  implementation 
of  these  financial  proposals  must  be  made  subject  to  a  specific  and  firm 
commitment  by  the  Member  States  and  the  two  sides  of  industry  to  the  overall 
project.  Otherwise  it would  be  better  to  do  nothing  at  all  and  to wait  for 
collective  suffering  to  bring  collective  common  sense 
We  have  therefore  proposed  the  basis  for  an  overall  compromise  in  such  a  way  as 
to benefit  each  of  the  parties. 
541.  The  Member  States 
In  addition  to  their  agreement  on  the  general  financing  arrangements  <which 
would  involve,  inter alia,  an  increase  in  the  volume  of  the  NCI),  the  Member 
States  would  be  required  to  give  three  undertakings: 
To  contribute  to  the  gradual  deceleration  of  prices  and  of  nominal  personal 
incomes.  Naturally,  this  reduction  would  have  to  be  adjusted  from  one 
country  to another  on  the  basis  of  Community  recommendations.  In  countries 
with  high  inflation  it  is essential  to  enable  the  initial  collective 
stimulus  to  be  translated  into  real  growth  and  into  jobs  instead  of 
fuelling  even  higher  inflation.  In  those  countries  it will  generally  be 
necessary  to  demand  temporary  sacrifices especially  from  civil  servants 
and  the  Like:  firstly,  the  effect  for  example  on  the  public  sector  is 
considerable:  secondly,  the  high  Level  of  unemployment  places  a  greater 
premium  on  job  security.  If  the  plan  is  to  succeed,  it  is essential 
that  more  moderate  rates  of  increase  in  personal  incomes  should  quickly 
be  extended  to  the  entire economy.  In  Low-inflation  countries,  the  task 
is easier.  Personal  incomes  and  pri~es must  not  be  allowed  to  get  out  of 
hand  when  growth  resumes.  Naturally,  national  traditions  in  these  areas 
will  continue  to  play  a  decisive  role.  The  more  highly  developed  the 
social  dialogue,  the  more  these  traditions facilitate  the  recovery  of 
growth. 
- 65  -- An  additional  1%  growth  would  mean,  ceteris  paribus,  a  reduction  in  the 
public  administration deficits  of  0.6  to  0.7%  of  GNP  after  two  years. 
In  view  of  the  urgent  need  for  a  sharp  upturn  in  investment  and~ hence, 
in  industrial  performance,  the  Member  States  would  have  to .undertake  to set 
aside  much  of  this  reduction  in  their  budget  deficit  to  lower  taxes  on  company 
profits.  Estimating  this  reduction  at  11,000 million  ECU  per  year  and 
assuming  that  it  is  set  aside  on  a.statutory basis  for  corporate,investment, 
such  investment  would  increase  as  a  result  of  this  action  alone  by  3%  per 
annum.  Moreover  - as  we  saw  in  5311  - the  n~tional deficits  would  be 
reduced  by  around  0.3%  of  GNP1•  This  should  help  in  particular  small 
undertakings  and  firms  in  zones  receiving  priority aid  under  the  regional 
policy.  Without  going  into details,  as  that  is  not  strictly the  purpose 
of  this  report,  we  should  note  nevertheless  that  in  line with  the  proposed 
tax  cuts  it would  be  appropriate,  from  a  social  viewpoint,  to  formulate  an 
assets  policy at  national  level  and,  from  an  e~onomic viewpoint,  thus  to 
increase  the  fluidity  of  financial  resources  and  the  strategic flexibility 
of.undertakings  by  improving  their  capital  situation. 
- Lastly,  it  is essential  that  the  recovery  of  growth  is  not  compromised  by  an 
excessive  expansion  in  the  money  supply.  In  the  proposed  programme,  the 
addition  to  the  money  supply  from  external  borrowing  is  offset  by  the  increase 
in  investment  and  the  fall  in  no~inal  incomes,  ensuring  that  the  liquidity 
ratio of  the  economy  does  not  increase. 
Surely  these  three  conditions  would  cost  relatively  little compared  to  the 
advantages  of  a  significant  and  lasting  recovery  in  growth. 
542.  Workers  and  their  trade  unions  must  be  prepared to accept  the 
necessary  reduction  in  nominal  incomes.  In  fact,  instead  of  running  the  risk 
of  a  gradual  reduction  in  real  incomes  they  would  maintain  their  purchasing 
power  in  spite of  an  additional  reduction  in  average  working  time.  As  far 
as  civil  servants  are  concerned,  given  the  precarious  situation  in  Europe, 
smaller  increases  in  their nominal  salaries  are  essential  if  they  are  to 
ultimately  maintain  their  purchasing  power. 
1  After  lowering  the  taxes  on  company  profits 
- 66  -Lastly,  the  reduction  and  reorganization  of  working  hours,  which  must  go  hand-
in-hand  with  negotiations  on  working  conditions,  should  make  it possible  to 
create overall  some  3  million extra  jobs  in  three  years  as  we  shall  see  in 
Chapter  8. 
There  is  good  reason  to  hope  that  a  proposal  which  safeguards  purchasing 
power  and  brings  a  gradual  reduction  in  the  number  of  unemployed,  provided  it 
is  drawn  up  at  the  highest  Community  Level,  will  receive  broad  support  from 
public  opinion,  especially  when  it  is  understood  that  there are  only  two 
alternatives  to  market  forces,  which  are  often unsatisfactory  when  it  comes 
to  incomes:  namely,  collective  responsibility  or  monetary  restraint. 
543.  Companies  and  their  representatives  are  particularly poorly  equipped 
to  give  commitments  on  behalf  of  their  shareholders  at  Community  Level.  It  is 
therefore essential  that  they  should  do  so  at  national  Level  in  one  crucial  area: 
the  rapid  development  of  new  forms  of  organization of  working  hours  and  in 
particular  the  freedom  of  workers  to  choose  their  working  hours,  so  as  to 
increase  the  number  of  jobs  without  placing  a  heavier  burden  on  industry. 
The  Lowering  of  taxes  on  company  profits  should  make  allowance  for  this 
where  appropriate. 
Apart  from  that,  we  must  rely  primarily  on  the  change  of  climate  which  will 
undoubtedly  accompany  the  new  surge  of  growth  to  enable  companies  to derive 
full  benefit  from  the  new  investment  opportunities  which  the  improvement 
in  their profit  margins  will  bring.  ALL  the  proposals  set  out  in  Chapters  6 
and  7  are  designed,  moreover,  to  give  companies  what  they  Lack  most,  namely 
confidence  in  the  future. 
544.  How  is  this  creative  compromise  to  be  drawn  up? 
place  to  decide  on  such  matters. 
This  is  not  the 
What  chance  have  these  proposals  of  being  accepted?  It  is  not  the  task  of 
this  report  to  answer  that  question.  It  all  depends  on  the  degree  of  public 
understanding  of  the  real  problems  and  of  the  solutions  required.  This  is 
why  it  is  essential  that,  at  the  same  time  as  the  debates  which  will  be  held 
in  the  European  Parliament,  all  the  media  should  play  their part  in  informing 
the  public. 
- 67  -The  public  will  then  understand  that,  if a  government  refuses'to  join  in  the 
necessary  compromise,  this would  be  tantamount,  in  economic  terms,  to  working 
against  the  development  of  its own  country  and,  in  political  terms,  to  working 
for  the  opposition.  Trade  uni~ns may  also  reject  the  compromise  but  by  so 
doing  they  would  be  opting  for  more  unemployment  and  a  continuing  decline  in 
purchasing  power.  Companies  may  also  choose  not  to  take  advantage,  but 
then  it will  be  a  long  time  before  they  get  such  a  good  opportunity  again 
55.  The  momentum  of  recovery  and  the  EMS 
In  order  to  give  an  informed  opinion  on  this  programme  it  is necessary  to  take 
into  account  its  inherent  momentum,  which  can  develop  not  only  at  inter-
national  level  but  also at  national  and  tommunitt  level. 
The  special  feature  of  this  programme  is  that  it provides  a  framework  for  a 
.medium-term,development  which  is  conducive to  the  smooth  functioning  of  the 
EMS,  which  a~  the  .. present  time  is  as  ~ss~ntial as  it  is precarious: 
- essential,  because  there  has  never  been  a  time  in  the  last fifty  years  when 
international  financial  instability,  as  reflected  in  the  differences  between 
inflation  rates,  interest  rates  and  exchange  rates,  has  had  such  an  influence 
on  growth  and  em~loyment,  in particular via  the  ne~ forms  of  protectionism. 
-precarious,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  EMS  is  a  house  built  on  weak 
foundations  (that  explains  the  failure  of  the  transition to  the  second  phase 
in  1981),  but  above  all  because  of  the  instability and  diverg~nce of  national  ·, 
policies~  National  policies are  not  the  result  of  chance:  faltering  growth 
leads  to  rising  unemployment  which  leads  in  turn  to  criticism of  governments, 
of  whatever  complexion.  This  is  why  since  the  recession  of  the  1980s 
virtually every  election  in  nearly  every  country  in  Europe  has  Led  to  a  change 
in  the  majority  •••  but  to  what  end,  if  not  to  change  the  economic  policy? 
Consequently,  instead  of  the  peaceful  convergence  required  for  financial 
stability and  economic  expansion,  the  European  Co.mmunity  has  witnessed  a 
Brownian  movement  of  economic  policies  which  merely  further  aggravates  the 
problems  of  growth  and  employment,  spreading  uncertainty  and  discouraging 
investment. 
But  this vicious  circle  need  not  continue.  It is  the  product  of  our  own 
behaviour  which  is itself  the  product  of  our  errors. 
- 68  -Let  us  begin  by  injecting  a  Little  more  growth,  employment  and  stability.  We 
have  seen  that  this  is  possible.  Then  everyone  will  appreciate  that  his 
overall  interest  coincides  more  and  more  closely  with  that  of  his  partners: 
1  all  the  proposals  in  this  report,  in  particular  the  financial  proposals  ,  are 
aimed  at  generalizing  the  benefits  of  convergence. 
There  are  those  who  complain  that  the  EMS  has  put  the  cart  before  the  horse. 
Admittedly  seven  parity  realignments  in  four  years  is  a  Lot.  Exchange 
rate  stability should  not  precede  but  follow  economic  stabilization and 
convergence.  Indeed  it  is this  concept  which  distinguishes  the  EMS  from 
the  'snake',  although  it  has  remained  almost  entirely  in  the  realm  of  theory. 
If  this  criticism  is  justified then  the  scope  of  this  proposed  programme  is 
even  greater:  the  medium-term  policy of  growth  and  stability of  which  it 
will  form  the  basis  provides  the  framework  essential  to  the  permanence  and 
strengthening  of  the  EMS.  It  should  thus  be  made  easier  for  the  United 
Kingdom  to  join  and  at  the  same  time  its membership  would  be  decisive  in  paving 
the  way  for  the  wider  use  of  the  ECU  and  opening  up  at  Last  a  constructive 
dialogue  with  the  United  States. 
Until  Europe  has  established  its  monetary  identity  even  the  concept  of 
dialogue  wiLL  remain  a mere pious  hope.  Even  though  the  countries  of  the 
Community  hold  one-third of  the  world's  foreign  exchange  reserves  and  half 
of  its gold  reserves,  in  monetary  terms  they  form  nothing  but  a  non-Europe, 
squandering  their  most  precious  assets.  The  Bank  for  International 
Settlements  stated  in  its  Latest  report  that  the  surest  way  to  avoid  the 
recovery  being  short-Lived  would  be  a  Lowering  of  American  interest  rates, 
but  non-Europe  has  a  great  deal  to  answer  for.  It  is  failing  to  ~se the 
resources  at  its disposal  to  create  a  second  major  monetary  axis  at  world 
Level  which  would  partially  replace  the  Bretton  Woods  system. 
Consequently  it  is vital  that  an  immediate  start  should  be  made  on  stimulating 
growth  as  proposed  above.  This  will  soon  Lead  to  the  natural  momentum  of 
growth  taking  over.  The  strengthening  of  the  EMS  and  the  recognition 
of  the  ECU  as  a  fully-fledged  currency  by  the  monetary  institutions,  being 
1  The  experts  on  the  MacDougall  committee  also  took  the  view  that,  in  order 
to  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  convergence  of  national  policies,  the 
Community  budget  should  be  raised  from·under  1%  of  GNP  to  around  2.5% 
- 69  -used  on  the  markets  and  being  held  by  financial  institutions and  central 
banks  outside  Europe:  all  this will  be  a  natural  process;  at  the  same 
time  a  new  seam  of  growth  will  have  been  tapped  i'n  Europe. 
ALL  the  parts  of  this  programme  form  a  coherent  whole  because every  aspect 
has  been  covered.  It  does  not  attempt  to  impose  disciplines  in  the  form 
of  extra  constraints but,  on  the  contrary,  to  set  up  machinery  for  cooperation 
such  that  all  the  partners  have  everything  to gain  if they  choose  to 
participate  and  everything  to  Lose  if  they  prefer  to  ignore  it.  Furthirmore, 
it can  be  adapted  and  reversed  at  any  time  except  in  one  respect:  under  no 
circumstances  must  the  Community  squander  its  bor~owing capacity,  because 
it is  not  renewable. 
- 70  -CHAPTER  6 
CREATING  A EUROPEAN  AREA  FOR  INDUSTRY  AND  RESEARCH 
There  is  no  such  thing  as  European  industry.  When  we  say  it  is  the  second 
Largest  in  the  world,  we  are  not  calculating on  a  comparable  basis.  An  industry's 
identity  is determined  by  the  content  of  its market.  Even  though  Europe  has 
established a  customs  union,  it  has  not  yet  created  a  real  market  for  industry. 
A good  number  of  European  firms  operate  at  the  world  market  Level.  There  are 
practically  none  for  whom  the  European  market  is  a  homogeneous  industrial  base. 
There  is  no  such  thing  as  European  research.  The  Ten  still have  the  second 
Largest  research  and  development  potential  in  the  world.  The  word  'still'  is 
used  advisedly,  because  increasingly  this  potential  is  being  'sterilised'  in 
universities,  Laboratories  and  research  centres  deprived  of  the  necessary 
resources  for  research.  If this state of  affairs  continues,  a  growing  pro-
portion of  research  workers  will  be  condemned  to  become  curators  of  museums  of 
science  and  technology. 
Those  are  the  facts.  They  are  so  formidable,  that,  at  this  stage,  prescribing 
a  solution  is of  secondary  importance.  The  main  thing  is  to  examine  the  reality 
of  this  rather  'uncommon'  market.1 
61  The  'uncommon'  video-recorder  market 
611.  In  1981,  the  European  market  for  video-recorders  was  around  30%  of  the 
world  market  and  twice  that  of  Japan.  It  was  growing  at  the  rate  of  20%  a  year, 
i.e.  more  rapidly  than  the United  States'  market.  However,  European  productions 
of  video-recorders  was  no  more  than  5%.  Understandably,  the  three  major  home 
electronics  companies  decided,  at  the  end  of  1980,  to  combine  their efforts: 
TELEFUNKEN  in  GERMANY,  THOMSON  in  FRANCE  and  THORN  in  the  UNITED  KINGDOM  (the 
~hree T's').  However,  for  their  venture  to  get  off  the  ground  they  needed  to 
join  forces  with  the  owner  of  the  technologyr  the  Japanese  firm  JVC.  The 
French  Government  refused.  TELEFUNKEN's  Losses  accumulated.  In  mid-1982  an 
alternative solution  emerged.  Max  GRUNDIG,  the  founder  of  the  firm  bearing 
his  name,  agreed  to sell  his  shares  to  THOMSON.  This  opened  the  possibility 
of  a  joint venture  between  THOMSON  and  PHILIPS.  This  time  it was  the  Federal 
German  Monopolies  Commission  (BUNDESKARTELLAMn  which  refused  on  the  grounds 
1 See  annex  6. 
- 71  -that  THOMSON  would  then  acquire  a  dominant  position  in  Germany.  Last  act: 
THOMSON  bought  TELEFUNKEN:  The  'three T's'  are  now  only  two  plus  the1r 
Japanese  partner.  In  the  process,  Europe  has  Lost  yet  another  opportunity  for 
its· firms  to  unite  and  our  video-recorder  industry. has  wasted  three  years. 
Three  years!  A fleeting  instant  in  the  timescale  of  the  public  administrations 
which  prosper  from  procrastination,  but,  an  eternity for  this  forward-. 
Looking  industry. 
612.  Why  these obstacles  and  wasted  time?  Had  the  three  T's  operated  in  the 
Japanese  or  American  markets,  they  would  have  been  in  a  real  'common  market'. 
We  shall  see  below  (paragraph  62)  that  there  is practically  no  common  European 
market  for  public  contracts.  Here  we  are  talking  about  popular  consumer  pro-
ducts  and  yet,  as  we  have  seen,  the  European  market  is still far  from  common: 
it  is  a  kind  of  economic  equivalent  of  feudalism.  This  is  because,  in  most 
front-Line  sectors,  national  administrations  have  so  much  say  that,  25  years 
after the  Treaty  of  Rome,  no  new  transnational  European  group  has  been  set  up. 
Those  which  do  exist  already  existed  in  1958  (PHILIPS,  SHELL,  UNILEVER).  Joint 
ventures  between  FIAT-CITROEN,  DUNLOP-PIRELLI,  AGFA-GEVAERT,  UNIDATA  (CII-
SIEMENS-PHILIPS)  all  failed.  One  reason  is  that  the  legal  statute  for  a  Euro-
pean  company,  which  has  been  on  the  Community's  agenda  for  20  years,  has  still 
not  materialized.  In  1983,  if  two  complementary  firms  wish  to  join forces,  one 
in  France  and  the  other  in  Germany,  they  have  no  option  but  to  set  up  a  new 
joint  company,  which  must  be  either  German,  complying  with  German  law,  or 
French,  subject  to  French  Law.  This  situation  is  just  as  restrictive  for 
evolving  small  and  medium-sized  undertakings  as  it is dangerous  for  the  major 
established  companies  because,  in  the  first  case,  the  French  would  feel 
swallowed  up  and  in  the  second  the  Germans  would  appear .to  be  dominated. 
An  American  firm  is  American  first  and  Texan  second;  no  one  knows  TOYOTA's  or 
SONY's  province  of  origin,  but  everyone  knows  that  - free  to  act  on  their 
domestic  markets  -these firms  have  used  them  as  a  springboard  to  conquer  the 
world  market,  while  European  firms  get  tied  up  in  knots  in  their  own  back 
yard;  Europe  of  the  1980's  is  np  more  than  a  common  market  for  industry  than 
were  in  France. under  the  Ancien  Regime  or  in  the  Germany  of  the  Zollverein. 
The  two  exceptions  - Airbus  and  the  Ariane  Launcher  -merely  confirm  the  rule. 
613.  One  need  only  walk  into  a  shop  selling  household  goods  to  realize  what 
this  is  costing  us:  most  of  the  traditional  'white  goods'  are  made  in  Europe, 
- 72  -but  the  newer  'brown  goods'  are  almost  all  imported.  That  much  less  growth. 
That  many  more  unemployed.  Unfortun~tely this  situation,  which  is  plain  from 
the  goods  on  sale,  reflects  not  a  stable  balance  but  the  beginning  of  the 
supremacy  of  our  foreign  suppliers  and  the  decadence  of  European  manufacture. 
Once  public  opinion  has  understood  this,  the  solutions  will  come  automatically: 
the  rules  of  competition  will  be  fixed  at  Community  level.  It  seems  strange 
that  a  flight  from  Paris  to  Athens  or  from  London  to  Rome  should  cost  almost 
as  much  as  flying  from  New  York  to  Paris  or  to  London.  This  is  largely  due 
to  the  absence  of  an  'integrated'  European  air  space  which  allows  third  country 
airlines,  in  particular  American  airlines,  to operate  intra-European  routes  as 
international  flights,  without  offering  any  similar  concessions  in  their  own 
vast  internal  network;  they  can  recoup  on  intra-European  routes  losses  made 
within  the  United  States.  Similarly  a  telephone  call  from  London  to  Paris  is 
much  more  expensive  than  a  call  from  London  to  Edinburgh. 
However,  it is  in  the  financial  field  that  the  most  still needs  to  be  done  to 
develop  a  European  services  industry:  the  compartmentalization  of  the 
Community's  financial  market  is  such  that  approximately  two-thirds  of  the 
Member  States'  external  long-term  financial  transactions  take  place  outside  the 
Community's  financial  circuits  and  in  1981  loans  issued  by  the  Community 
countries  to  their partners  barely  exceeded  20%  of  those  issued  by  third 
0  1  countr1es  . 
This  situation  impedes  growth  and  contributes  to  unemployment  in  a  less  obvious 
but  just  as  serious  manner  as  the  situation  in  the  field  of  electronics  for 
mass  consumption:  the  major  financial  institutions  tend  to  favour  large  rather 
than  small-scale  concerns,  they  prefer  the  old  to  the  new,  the  past  and  the 
retrograde  to  the  future  and  progress. 
62  The  railways  of  the  year  2000 
621.  In  the  19th  century,  when  the  railways  were  invented,  the  Europeans  did 
not  think  of  creating  a  'Common  Market',  but  they  did  realize  that  it would 
be  a  mistake  not  to  adopt  the  same  rail  gauge.  As  everyone  knows,  apart  from 
Russia  and  Spain,  they  all built  their  railways  to  the  same  specification. 
Likewise  their postal  and  telegraphic  systems. 
1communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  on  financial  integrationr  op.  cit. 
- 73  -After  all,  if  we  were  expected  nowadays  to ·change  trains  at  every  frontier,  we 
would  consider  this  to  be  absurd,  costly  and  intolerable.  In  fact,  harassment 
of  this  kind  is  on  the  increase  within  the  Common  Market,  but  it is  not  widely 
realized  because  in  general  it  is done so  hypocritically  and  deceptively  that 
the  consumer  is  taken  in  and  the  taxpayer  pays  without  realizing. 
Take  colour  television.  The  system  is  not  the  same  in  Germany  (PAL}  .as  it is 
in  France  CSECAM).  So  a  French  factory ·cannot  sell  its  French  television sets 
in  Cologne,  just  as  German  sets are  not  suitable for  Strasbourg.  Thinking  to 
protect  himself,  everyone  in  fact  penalises  himself.  Instead of  providing  an 
asset  for  industry,  the  commercial  ~rea remains  fragmented~  Each  factory, 
geared  only to national  markets,  produces  smaller quantities at  higher  cost. 
It  is  the  consumer  who  pays  the  difference  and  the  Japanese  who  reap  the  benefit: 
in  1981,  all  European  factories  which  were  still  wor~ing showed  Losses  while· 
all  the  Japanese  factories  made  considerable  profits. 
The  President  of  the  European  Parliament  has  had  to have  two  telephones installed 
in  his  car:  one  which  Links  up  only  with  Belgium  and  a  second  which  complies 
with  the  specifications of  the  neighbouring  countries.  At  a  time  when  the 
space  age  is  just  beginning,  the  PTT  and  the  Bundespost  are  pursuing  separate 
technical  and  industrial  policies.  Each  Lays  down·  its  own  standards,  chooses 
its national  champion  and  pursues  a  •cLosed  shop•  policy  to  the  point  where  it 
is  much  Less  difficult  for  a  European  telephone  manufacturer  to sell  his  equip-
ment  in  Latin  America  or  Asia  than  it is  on  the other  side  of  the  Rhine~ the 
Alps,  or  the  Channel!  This  anomaly  explains  another:  because  of  the  restrictions 
within  the  internal  market,  European  concerns  are  often obliged  to  give  priority 
to  Links  outside  the  Community  (e.g.  Philips  - ATT). 
These  are  just  a  few  examples  to  illustrate a  virtually generalized  phenomenon 
which  is  extremely  significant  for  the  European  economy:  the  Common  Market  is 
genuinely  •common•, more  or  Les~ for  ordinary  products- shoes,  glass  or  mutton 
- that  people  buy  everyday.  The  situation  is  radically different,  however, .when 
it  comes  to  products  purchased"by  the  state  and  the  other  public  administrations. 
These  products,  which  often  involve  advanced  technologies  - in  particular 
armaments  - and  where  consequently  a  deregulation  and  an  extension  of  competition 
would  be  most  useful,  are  treated as  special  products,  reserved  in  each  country 
to  the  •purveyors  to  the  Royal  Court•,  that  is, the  state.  Efforts  to deregulate 
national  markets  have  met  with  so  Little  success  that  the  Commission  stated  in 
- 74  -February  1983  that,  since  the  Council  had  been  unable  to  reach  unanimous  agree-
ment,  it was  necessary  to start  again  from  scratch,  making  it  clear that  even 
where  common  procedures  exist  'they  are  often  not  correctly applied'. 
One  example  illustrates all that  has  been  said:  1n  the  field  of  high-speed 
rail transport,  French  and  German  research  has  been  carried out  independently: 
France  has  developed  its own  TGV  (HST)  system  while  Germany  has  gone  for  a 
monorail  system  with  electro-magnetic  Levitation.  There  is  a  serious  risk 
that  the  trains  of  the  year  2000  - and  worst  of  all, the  high-speed  trains  -
will  have  to  stop at  national  frontiers  because  the  specifications of  the 
neighbouring  country's  rail  systems  are  incompatible.  Even  now,  trains travel-
Ling  from  Paris  to  Amsterdam  have  to  change  voltage  three  times! 
622.  This  aspect  of  Non-Europe  is  one  of  the  most  costly.  First of  all  in 
financial  terms.  Public  contracts  account  for  approximately  15%  of  Community 
GNP,  including  purchases  of  military  and  space  equipment  of  about  400,000  million 
ECU.  Let  us  assume  that  the  average  additional  cost  is  around  10%.  This  seems 
a  modest  estimate  given  the  amount  of  technical  and  economic  progress  which 
might  well  have  been  achieved  over  the  Last  15  years  if all  public  contracts 
had  been  deregulated  when  intra-Community  customs  duties  were  abolished  in 
1968.  At  Least  40,000  million  ECU  are  thus  Levied  pointlessly  from  the  tax-
payer  and  wasted  each  year. 
To  enable  these  taxpayers  to  appreciate  the  extent  to  which  they  are  exploited 
by  their national  administrations,  we  should  add  the  cost  of  the  queues  of 
Lorries  waiting  at  customs  posts!  The  total  cost  of  passing  intra-Community 
1  frontiers  can  be  estimated  at  around  12,000  m ECU  a  year  .  This  makes  a  total 
of  around  50,000  million  ECU,  i.e.  2%  of  GNP,  or: 
o  for  an  average  family  of  4  an  amount  of  800  ECU  per  year,  or  the 
equivalent  of  a  week's  income, 
o  15%  of  personal  income  tax  (EEC  11.5%  of  GNP  in  1980), 
o  two-thirds  of  the  tax  on  company  profits  <2.7%  ofGDP  in  1980), 
o  twice  the  Community  budget 
1The  report  by  the  Commission  to  the  Council  (COM(83)  80  final). 
- 75  -So,  when  you  tra~el by  train,  lift  the  telephone  or  pay  your  electricity bill, 
you  are  like  the  peasants  of  the  Middle  Ages  who  had  to  pay  a  tithe to  their 
Lord.  What  is this tithe?  It  is  one  of  the  costs  of  'Non-Europe'.  More  pre-
cisely,  every  worker  in  the  Common  Market  works  on  average  one  week  per  year 
to  p~y for .the  customs  and  associated  services,  a~ well  as  the  industrial  under-
takings  which  have  the  privilege of  being  'purveyors  to  the  Royal  Court'.  As 
for  the other  firms,  virtually all  of  the  tax  they  have  to  pay  on  profits  -
which  restricts their  investment,  so  desperately  needed  by  Europe  - goes  to 
finance  disguised  handouts  to their  tompetitors  who  have  the  privilege  to  be 
'purveyors  to  the  Royal  Court'  .. 
This  additional  cost  of  the  order  of  2%  of  GNP  is  also  the  equivalent  of  more 
than  one-third  of  the -deficit  shown  by  public  administrations  in  Europe.  We 
are  therefore  right  to  assume  that  'reasons  of  state'  do  not  constitute  an 
adequate  explanation.  There  is also  on  the  part  qf  the  administrations  the 
desire  to  protect  and  extend  their  powers  by  playing  Father  Christmas:  the 
closing off  of  public  contracts  is  one  of  the  most  effectiv~ forms  of  non- . 
tariff  protectionism. 
623.  That  is  not  all.  If  one  examines  the  same  phenomenon  from  an  economic 
viewpoint,  one  finds  that,  far  from.strengthening  the  'national  champions'  on 
which  it bestows  its privileges,  the  state ends  up  by  enfeebli~g them.  As  this 
J 
industrial  protectionism  becomes  an  increasingly  taboo  subject  it  has  to  be 
hidden  in  research  and  devetopment  (R  & D)  policies.  Admittedly,  this  is 
nothing  new.  All  developed  countries  try  indirectly to  help  their. industries 
by  financing  part  of  their  industrial  research.  What  is  really  serious  is 
that  within  Europe  the  sectionalisation of  industry  reinforces  the  sectionali-
sation of  research,  bringing  with  it ever  increasing  waste  and  inefficiencies 
(see  above  no.  63).  Too  bad  for  the  research  workers;  too  bad  for  Europe's 
scientific elite.  Of  all  social  categories  they  are  the  most  important  for 
our  future  and  as  a  group  they  are  among  those  who  suffer  most  as  a  result  of 
'Non-Europe'.  An  undertaking  which  ran  its affairs  in  the  way  the  European 
countries  make  use  of  their  Rand  D potent1al  would  provoke  justifiable 
rebellion  amongst  its personnel. 
While  in  the  short  term  and  on  a  sector-by-sector  basis  this  policy  may  be 
understood  in  the  light  of  national  traditions,  globally  and .in  the  medium-
ter~ the  products  of  the  people  and  those  of  the  'Court'  are  one  and  the 
same.  When  the  'Court'  overprotects  its suppliers,  they  become  less efficient 
- 76  -and  the  products  of  the  people  suffer  the  consequences,  with  the  result  that 
ultimately  the  people  are  taxed  twice,  as  taxpayers  and  as  consumers.  At  the 
same  time,  growth  is  slowed  down  and  unemployment  increased. 
624.  This  is  why  Community  action  in  this  field  must  begin  by  improving  the 
information  provided  to  consumers.  This  policy  of  increasing  public  awareness 
runs  counter  to  the  ideology  which  advocates  transposing  national  industrial 
policies  to  European  level  together  with  the  compartmentalization  of  public 
contracts  which  that  implies.  This  is  likely  to  multiply  all  the  failings  of 
national  administrations.  It  is  not  concern  shown  by  administrations  that 
will  reawaken  industry  in  Europe,  but  the  spur  of  competition. 
Competition  in  the  field  of  public  contracts,  however,  raises  the  problem  of 
standards.  It  is essential  that  a  Community  body  should  be  given  the  task  of 
laying  down  European  standards  which  should  gradually  replace  national  stan-
dards.  In  fact  it  is  the  very  •officialese•  of  these  administrations  which 
acts  as  the  best  protection  for  these  •purveyors  to  the  Court•. 
The  first  responsibility  of  a  Standards  Agency  should  be  to  study all  the 
major  public  contracts  and  to  pass  on  its  comments  to  consumers  and  competitors. 
It  should  also  seek  the  views  of  the  professional  associations of  the  Community 
to  ensure  that  European  standards,  promote  international  trade  by  remaining 
consistent  with  international  standards. 
This  task  is  an  extremely  difficult  one.  Defining  common  standards  naturally 
means  choosing  the  best.  In  other  words  strengthening  the  strongest,  forcing 
the  weakest  firms  to  adapt  their  specifications  late  in  the  day  to  those  of 
their  most  advanced  competitors.  For  certain  countries  it means  the  risk  of 
having  to  bow  to  the  successes  of  the others.  In  order  to  accomplish  this 
task  the  Community  has  to  be  able  to  redeploy  its budgetary  resources  in  order 
to exercise  its  powers  of  compensation  in  a  large  number  of  areas.  One  way  of 
providing  the  necessary  compensation  would  be  to  earmark  a  part  of  the  available 
financial  resources  to generate  growth  <see  Chapter  5)  through  a  programme  of 
public  works  with  a  high  technological  content  involving  most  Community  countries 
(Chapter  7). 
In  any  event  it is  now  more  important  than  ever  to  deregulate  European  public 
contracts,  since the  United  States  and  Japan  are  considering  the  possibility of 
an  agreement  on  the  mutual  deregulation  of  public  contracts  in  all  fields  except 
- 77  -the  most  sensitive military  areas.  Such  an  agreement  would  force  the  European 
countries  either to  follow  suit  or  to  be  relegated  to  the  second  rank  in  the 
international  industrial  scene.  The  Community  has perhaps  no  more  than  five 
years  to establish  a  common  market  for  public  contracts.  This  illustrates the 
significance of  the  proposal  submitted  by  the  Commission  to  the  European 
Council  of  Stuttgart  in  June  1983  for  the  creation  of  a  European  Telecommunications 
Agency. 
625.  The  European  countries  should  now  pool  their  resources,  or  at  Least 
e~tablish federal-type  Links  between  certain  major  public  services  whose  role 
will  be  crucial  to  the  strategy  for  making ·up  ground  in  the  field  of  technology; 
the  examples  in  Table  10  show  how·important  this  is.  There  is  an  urgent  need 
to  set  up  European  agencies,  not  just  for  telecommunciations  but  also  bio-
technology,  deep-se~ mining  and  new  forms  of  transport.  The  aim  is  not  to 
extend  the  public  sector,  nor  to  increase  the  intervention  by  public  authorities 
in  these  sectors,  but  to  rationalize,  harmonize  and  thereby  to  lessen  the  amount 
of  state  intervention,  which  is  badly  ~rganized. 
It  is therefore  n~cessary to  define  the  remit  of  these  European  agencies, 
namely:  to establish  networks  and  standards  so  as  to  avoid  incompatibilities 
of  the  PAL-SECAM  type;  to  ensure  the  homogeneity  and  transparency  of  Europe; 
to  encourage  innovation  in  industry,  place orders,  strengthen  competition  by 
Lending  it a  Community  dimension  and  to  ensure  reciprocity  with  third  countries. 
These  public  agencies  would  not  be  expected  to  take  over  the  productive  function? 
which  should  continue  to  be  carried  out  by  firms  operating  in  a  climate  of 
competition.  The  creation of  a  genuinely  common  ~arket  in  the .public sector 
is  an  essential  precondition  for  the  maintenance  of  competition;  the  compart-
mentalization  of  national  markets  merely  places  suppliers  in  a  monopoly-type 
situation,  which  ultimately  will  make  them  uncompetitive. 
We  have  fallen  behind  dramatically  in  the  essential  areas  of  public  purchasing, 
industrial  restructuring  and  the  promotion  of  technology  on  a  European·  scale. 
This  must  be  a matter  of  absolute  priority  for  governments  and  Community  institutions. 
Such  is  the  urgency  of  the  need  to  make  up  lost  ground  that,  in  this  case,  we 
should  waive  the  rules  governing  unanimous  decision.  The  solution  is  to  be  found 
by  allowing  those  states  that  are  hesitant  to abstain  and  in  financing  arrange-
ments  which  call  only  in  part  on  the  Community  budget. 
- 78  -Table  10 
Some  examples  of  Europe's  technological  decline 
1.  Share  of  the  world  market  in  electrical  and  electronic  equipment  <excl. 
intra-Community  trade) 
(%) 
JAPAN 
USA 
EEC 
2.  Product ion 
(Number) 
JAPAN 
USA 
EEC 
1 Four  major  countries 
2 Europe 
1978 
22.9 
22.6 
29.8 
Developed 
robots  (1981) 
11.000 
8. 1301 
4.017 
1981 
26.8 
23.9 
22.9 
Manufacturing 
centres  (1980) 
5.231 
2.1292 
1. 459 
2.  Turnover  of  world's  twelve  biggest  producers  in  1980 
('000,  million$)  Integrated  EDP  (management 
circuits  and  production) 
USA  4.6  35.6 
JAPAN  0.8  1 . 7 
EEC  0.4  4.3 
Source:  See  Annex  No.  3 
- 78a  -63.  How  to  reinvigorate  Community  research 
631.  At  a  ti~e when  the  third  industrial  revolution· is  dramati~aLL~·changing 
working  conditions  both  in  services  and  in  industry,  the  state of  scientific 
and  technical  research  in  the  Community  is  characterized  by  two  essential 
features:  on  the  one  hand,  the  financial  resources  of  the  EEC  countries  taken 
as  a  whole  are  far  superior  to  those  of  Japan  but,  on  ihe  other  hand,  by 
refusing  to  join  forces  and  persisting with  their  go-it-alone  policy  in  R & D, 
they  are  merely  accentuating their  collective weakness. 
R & D expenditure  in  the  Community  is still close  to  that  of  the  United  States 
and  about  twice  as  high  as  Japan's  but  spreadirig  our  resources  thinly  Leads.to 
a  dissipation of effort.  This  produces  a  s{tuation  where  Germany~  f6~ instance, 
employs  four  times  fewer  researchers  than  Japan  in  the  machine-tool  industry 
where  traditionally it has  a  dominant  position,  and  France  six  times  fewer 
researchers  ~nd engineers  in  the  transport  field,  despite  the  fact  that  is  in. 
this area  that  its best  export  performance  is  achieved1. 
Whereas  64%  of  Community  expenditure  is  earmarked  for  agriculture,  the  overall 
Community  research  budget  <600  m ECU  in  1982)  is  around  2.5%  of  the  general 
Community  budget  and  2%  of  the  total  public  expenditure  on  research  in  the 
Member  States. 
This  explains  the  increasing  number  of-bankruptcies.  For  instance,  in  the 
communications  industries  <informatics,  electronics),  Europe's  balance  of 
trade,  which  was  in  balance  in  1975,  was  $5,000  million  in deficit  in  1981  and 
close  to  $10,000  million  in deficit  in  1982. 
This  trend  is  so  distressing  to  those  who  are  aware  of  it, that  increasing 
numbe~s of  European  undertakings  are  abandoning  their traditional discretion· 
to  voice  their  views  publicly.  At  the  end  of  1982,  a  dozen  of  the  Largest 
data  processing  companies  took  an  intiative  which  Led  to  the .ESPRIT  project2 
<see  below  633).  Their  testimony  which  is  particularly  insistent,  is  set  out 
in  Annex  4.  It stresses  that  4  million  jobs  are  at  ris~ from  now  until  1990. 
In  April  1983,  17  of  the  major  transnation~L  European  companies  which  h~~e 
1 See  table  on  page  7  of  Telesis. 
2strategic  European  programme  for  research  and  development  in  information 
technologies 
- 79  -participated  in  a  'European  initiative'  project,  revealed  that,  according  to 
the  Latest  Japanese  analysis,  out  of ·37  major  sectors  of  technological  progress 
the  United  States  are  in  a  very  good  position  in  31,  Japan  in  9  and  Europe  in 
only  2  <electronics  switchgear  and  software) 1. 
Finally,  the  famous  American  consultancy  firm  McKINSEY,  recently  submitted  a 
report  to  the  Commission  containing  the  following  estimate  of  the  number  of 
jobs  at  stake  by  1990  in  the  European  information  technology  (IT)  industry: 
- f_~illiQQ_Q~~-iQQ~ if  IT  develops  in  Europe  as  in  the  United  States, 
- ~-~illiQQ_iQ~~-12~!  <out  of  the  existing  5  million)  if  the  IT  industry  in 
the  Community  continues  to  weaken  and  become  dependent  on  other  countries 
following  the  present  trend. 
In all, therefore,  4  million  jobs  are  at  stake:  4  million  jobs  in  about  ten  years! 
It  is  worth  reflecting  on  these  figures:  they  have  been  calculated  on  a 
micro-economic  basis  and  do  not  appear  in  the  overall  projections  used  in 
Chapters  2  and  5.  Measured  against  the. disaster  which  is destroying  the  core 
of  European  industry's  future,  the  dramatic  situations  in  the  textile,  chemical 
and  steel-making  sectors  seem  no  more  than  passing  incidents.  The  moment  has 
come  to  remind  ourselves  that  the  List  of  countries  which,  more  than  a  century 
ago,  proved  capable  of  building  railways  is still, with  few  exceptions,  the 
List  of  the  developed  countries 
Chapter  3  showed  the  impotence  of  the  Member  States  in  the  macro-economic 
sphere.  Similarly,  in  the  industrial  and  technological  fields,  the  Member 
States  are  becoming  Less  able  to  maintain  their  situation  and  finding  it  even 
more  difficult  to  improve  the  effectiveness of their  R & D network.  If  R & D 
continues  to  be  organized  at  national  Level  it will  become  Less  and  Less  co~­
petitive.  But  here  too  combined  European  action  has  a  multiplier effect. 
Proof  of  this  is  seen  in  the  remarkableperfor~ances achieved  in  areas  where 
the  research  is sufficiently  remote  from  national  conflicts  of  interest  for  it 
to  be  easily  run  on  a  cooperative  basis  by  the  scientists  themselves.  This  is 
notably  the  case  for  CERN  (Centre  of  Nuclear  Research)  and  JET  (Joint  European 
Torus). 
1  L  .  .  Te  es1s  report,  op.  c1t. 
- 80  -632.  Of  course,  there  is still time  for  Europe  to  awaken.  The  Japanese 
example.shows  that  in  a  few  years  significant  results  can  be  achieved,  provided 
a  specific  Large~scale policy  is  implemented,  particularly  in  the  field  of· 
micro-electronics.  Development  in this  area  started around  1975  on  both  sides 
of  the  Pacific, first  as  a  result  of  the  American  military  space  programmes 
and  then  from  civil  R & D programmes  initiated by  the  MIT!  in  Japan.  Private 
companies  then  took  up  the  initiative to  exploit  the  spin-off  effects  of  these 
various  programmes. 
The  ESPRIT  programme  is  a  useful  first  step  in  this "direction.  Fjrst  of .all 
it has  the  right  objective:  to  create  a  new  technological  base  for  the  next 
generation.  The  idea  is  not  to  copy  what  already exists  but  to  pave  the  way 
for  a  forward  Leap  in  information  technologies.  Secondly,  it  has  the  right 
method:  provided  the  administrators  do  not  make  the  system  too  bureaucratic 
it should  work,  because  the  programmes  are  drawn  up  by  the  firms  and  institutes 
responsjble  for  carrying  them  out:  But  this  is only  the  beginning:  the  15 
pilot  projects  Launched  in  1983  amount  to  20  million  ECU,  i.e.  200  times  Less. 
than  IBM's  net  annual  profit  of  $4,000 million. 
It  is essential  to  address  this  problem  on  a  completely different  scale  as 
soon  as  possible,  but  without  creating  in  the  process  new  administrations  which 
would  take responsibilityfor defining  the  'right'  sectors  to  be  in,  to  choose 
the  'right'  firms  to  be  given  Community  subsidies.  Competitiveness  does  not 
just  happen,  it has  to  be  acquired. 
633.  The  two  principles  for  recovery  in  this  area  are  as  follows: 
o  the  Community  R & D budget  must  be  gradua~ly increased:on  the  basis  of 
a  ten  year  programme,  by  the  end  of  which  it ought  to  have  reached  about 
half  the  current  Level  of  public  spending  on  R & D in  the  Member  St~t~s, 
i.~ $20,00G million or  0.7%  of  the  Ten's  GNP  (assuming  a  growth  rate  of 
2%,  GNP  will  increase  by  around  22%  in  10  years). 
o  this  would  enable  any  joint  venture.of  European  firms  to  have  its 
research  programmes  part-financed  by  Community  funds,  on  the  unde~~tanding 
that  the  industrialists  would  continue  to  be  solely  responsible  for  the 
implementation  of  the  programmes.  In  return,  the  results  of  the  research 
(patents)  should  be  made  available,  with  the {ommunity  reserving  the 
right  to  allow  any  other  European  industrialist  not  party  to  the  joint 
- 81  -venture  to  take  advantage  of  them.  One  example  is  the  joint  Laboratory 
that  has  just  been  set  up  by  three  data-processing  firms,  Britain's 
ICL,  Germany's  SIEMENS  and  France's  CII-HONEYWELL  BULL. 
It  would  not  be  realistic  to  exclude  European  companies  cooperating  with  American 
or  Japanese  partners  from  these  ventures.  A firm  does  not  have  to  answer  for 
the  nationality of  its partner.  If  the  Community  does  not  want  a  firm  such  as 
CII  to associate  with  HONEYWELL  BULL;  all it  has  to  do  is  to establish  a 
fiscal  and  financial  system  which  makes  it advantageous  for  such  a  firm  to 
associate  with  a  European  partner. 
In  return,  the  Community  should  demand  from  its major  partners  (United  StatesF 
Japan)  complete  reciprocity  in  all  fields:  public  purchasing,  investment, 
standards etc. 
634.  The  world  seems  increasingly  to  be  divided  into  the  innovative  economies, 
which  advance  by  creating new  attractive activities,  and  the  economies  of 
~djustments', which  decline  as  they  protect  the  threatened old  preserves.  The 
Member  States,  acting  in  isolation,  are  being  forced  increasingly  to  pursue 
the  second  type  of  policy. 
If  the  European  Community  is  to  join  the  first  category,  it has  to  reconcile 
the  need  for  a  Large  market  with  national  interests  and  to this  end  gradually 
extend  its field  of  activity,  especially  in  the  industrial  technologies  and 
R & D. 
It  will  need  to  use  all  the  budgetary  and  financial  resources  at  its disposal 
(Regional  Fund,  Social  FundF  EIB)  to  compensate  countries  which  derive  Less 
benefit  from  the  joint  industrial  and  R & D effort,  while  avoiding  Lapsing 
back  into  the  system of  national  contributions  which  would  be  a  retrograde 
step  in  the  construction of  Europe.  In  the  same  way,  the  common  trade  policy 
can  contribute  to  a  general  improvement  if it  is  extended  to  include  export 
assistance,  Licence  agreements  and  so  on. 
Except  for  the  defence  of  Europe  there  is  perhaps  no  aspect  more  essential  to 
its future  than  the  formulation  of  a  positive  policy  for  the  creation of  common 
base  for  industry  and  research. 
- 82  -CHAPTER  7 
A EUROPEAN  'MARSHALL  PLAN'  FOR  ENERGY  AND.REGIONAL  POLICY 
Thi~ heading  may  be  somewhat  surprising.  The  idea  of  a  new  MARSHALL  plan  is 
open  to  a  number  of  serious  objections.  Consequently,  before  outlining  the 
plan  of  action  which  we  propose  here,  it  is  important  to  define  our  motives. 
71  - Explanatory  Statement 
Between  1948  and  1952  the  nations  of  Europe,  drained  by  the  war  effort, 
received  a  substantial  amount  of  aid  from  the  United  States  (approximately 
10,000 million  dollars  per  annum  at  1983  values),  which  made  a  major  con-
tribution  to  the  rebuilding  of  their  economies.  This  is  not  the  place  to 
expatiate  on  the  complex  mechanisms  ~f the  MARSHALL  plan.  The  main  task 
is  to  highlight  the  three  Lessons  which  it  has  taught  us. 
American  aid  was  granted  on  the  express  condition that  its exchange  value 
should  not  be  used  to  finance  the  budgets  of  the  European  countries  concer-
ned,  but  should  go  into  new  investment.  This  condition  appeared  particularly 
rigorous  on  the  war-stricken  peoples  of  Europe  eager  for  consumer  goods. 
But,  in  the  Last  analysis,  the  American  demands  were  undou~tedly to  the 
benefit  of  Europe,  especially  since·the  investment  programmes  had  to  be 
accompanied  by  an  unprecedented  cooperative  effort  within  Europe.  Thi~  Led 
to  the  creation of  the  European  Payments  Union  CEPU)  and  the  OECD,  which 
were  subsequently  to  facilitate  the  start  of  the  movement  towards  European 
integration. 
Finally,  the  generosity  of  the  Americans  (approximately  1%  of  GDP  per  annum) 
worked  to  the  advantage  of  donor  and  beneficiaries  alike:  although  its 
initial objective  was  essentially political,  America  indirectly  benefited 
from  Europe's  economic  progress. 
The  priority  given  to  investment  over  consumption,  the  joint organization 
of  the  investment  schemes  and  the  exploitation of  economic  interdependence 
as  a  way  of  forging  a  common  interest  between  the  rich  countries  and  the 
poor  countries:  such  are  the  three  Lessons  to  be  Learned  today  from  the 
MARSHALL  plan.  It  is  not  hard  to  see  that  they  are  of  particular  relevance 
- 83  -to  the  situation  in  Europe.  Not  only  in  matters  of  energy.  The  proposals 
which  follow  show  this  because  they  are  not  confined  to  the  energy  sector. 
Nevertheless  this  sector  has  high  priority. 
712  - Three  reasons  for  a  MARSHALL  energy  plan 
These  are  as  follows:  the  future  and  the  medium-term  growth  of  the  European 
economy  depend  as  much  as  ever  on  energy  investments;  it  is  in  Europe's 
interest  to  stimulate  such  investments  not  just  in  its  own  territory,  but 
also  in  those  countries  with  which  it maintains  special  relations,  especially 
the  ACP  States;  the  revitalization of  investment  activity  within  the  EEC 
must  be  planned  first  and  foremost  on  a  regional  basis,  since  certain  pro-
tectionist  forces  must  be  combated  as  a  matter  of  urgency. 
The  EEC  imports  a  substantial  proportion  of  its energy  supplies. 
What  would  the  consequences  be  if  in  1985  the  price of  oil  was  brought  back 
to  the  1981  price of  28  or  29  dollars  a  barrel?  The  International  Energy 
1  Agency  notes  that:  'In future  the  total oil  requirements  of  the  OECD 
countries  and  the  developing  countries  together  would  probably  be  far  in 
excess  of  the  quantities  available  on  the  world  oil  market .... Such  an 
imbalance  between  supply  and  demand  would  in all  Likelihood  result  in  further 
price  increases  and  might  well  be  instrumental  in  provoking  fresh  upheavals 
on  the  market,  triggering  massive  and  sudden  price  increases'. 
In  other  words,  maintaining  the  price of  oil  at  its present  level  is  enough 
to  reduce  investment  in  conventional  and  new  forms  of  energy  and  in  energy 
saving  schemes  so  drastically  that  it could  easily  result  in  a  third oil 
shock  towards  the  end  of  the  1980s.  This  takes  no  account  of  what  would 
happen  if,  say,  some  missile  were  to  sink  a  vessel  in  the  Ormuz  Straits. 
Another  oil  shock  similar  to  those  which  followed  the  Yom  Kippur  War  and  the 
revolution  in  Iran  would  leave  Europe  with  several  more  million  unemployed. 
All  of  which  points  to  the  fact  that  Europe  should  at  all  times  give  the 
utmost  priority  to  increasing  its energy  investments.  However,  to  re-employ 
the  phraseology  which  we  saw  fit  to  use  in  Chapter  5,  the  Community's  approaCh 
to  the  energy  question  is  one  of  childish  irresponsibility  and  reckless  levity 
since  in  the  1980s  it  is  proposing  to  devote on average  a  mere  2.2  % of  GDP  to 
its energy  investments  <1.6%  in  1980),  whereas  the  projections  of  Japan  and 
1  World  energy  prospects:  OECD/IEA,  December  1982 
- 84  -the  United  States  are  3%  and  4%  of  GDP  respectively.  This  Lapse  must  be 
remedied  as  a  matter  of  urgency. 
We  would  admit  that  this situation  is partly attributable  to  Europe's  rel-
ative  shortage  of  oil  and  coal  and  to  the  fact  that  the  development  of 
ruclear  energy  is  being  held  up  for  political  reasons.  But  that  is  all  the 
more  reason  why  the  Community  should  embark  on  what  would  represent  t~e most 
or~ginal aspect  of  the  new  MARSHALL  plan:  a  programme  of  action to  boost 
energy  investment  in  those  countries  with  which  it maintains  special .relat-
ions:  the  count~ies of  Africa,  the  Caribbean  and  the  Pacific  which  are 
signatories of  the  Lome  Conventions  and  know  as  the  ACP  States,  the 
Mediterranean  countries  and,  above  all,  perhaps,  the  two  countries which 
have  applied  for  Community  membership,  Spain  and  Portugal.  That  such  a  pro-
gramme  would  be  to  the  advantage  of  both  sides. is quite  obvious.  The  Community 
has  everything  to  gain  from  the  further  economic  development  of  these  countries, 
since  it will  be  able  to  increase  its exports  to  them.  However,  their  expan-
sion  is  impeded  by  their  external  defici~s, for.which  the  high  cost  of  oil 
imports  is  much  to  blame.  Hence,  it would  be  gre~tly to  their  advantage  to 
invest  in  oil  and  in  ~nergy in  general.  Furthermote,  ~hese co0ntries  would 
greatly  benefit  from  the  recove~y of  growth  within  the  Community,  whi~h 
would  be  short-Lived  unless  energy  investments  were  substantia.Lly  increased. 
Lastly,  if  Europe  is  to  be  able  to  open  up  its markets  on  a  sufficiently 
Large  scale  to  imports  from  these  countries,  it,  is essential  that  it  should 
consolidate  and  improve  its measures  in  the  regional  development  field.  The 
Community  is often  tempted  to  close  its frontiers  t6  products  from  the  Less 
developed  countries  in  order to  protect  its  most  b~ckward regions.  Just  as 
these  regions  have  tended  to dictate  its agricultural  policy  in  relation  td 
the  Mediterranean  countries  and  the  applicant  countries,  so  too  have  they 
influenced  its policy  Line  on  the  traditional  industries,  especially textiles, 
which  were  once  concentrated  in  prosperous  areas  but  are  today  in  decline. 
713·- Three  objections  and  the  appropriate  respQDE~ 
While  the  need  to  increase  energy  inv~stment and. improve  regional  policy  in 
Europe  is  not  in  dispute,  the  idea  of  making  additional  sacrifices  for  the 
benefit  of  third countries,  and  for  developing  c9untries  in particular,  is 
opposed,  and  opposed  all  the  more  vehemently  since Community  financing  is 
the  form  of  assistance  proposed. 
- 85  -The  first  objection  is  that,  with  a  recession,  Large-scale  unemployment  and 
deficits  of  every  description  in  Europe,  it  is  simply  not  the  time  to  deprive 
ourselves,  even  partially,  of  the  benefits  of  a  fall  in oil  prices  by  making 
over  to  third countries  a  share  of  the  proceeds  of  the oil  Levy. 
The  mainspring  of  this  objection,  however,  is  opposition to  the  very  principle 
of  the  oil  Levy.  The  only  argument  worthy  of  consideration  here  is  that  the 
fall  in  oil prices  is  having  an  anti-inflationary effect.  But  with  oil  at 
2  ECU  a  barrel,  that  effect  is  0-1%,  which  is  negligible.  It  bears  no  com-
parison  with  the  new  wave  of  inflation which  a  third oil  shock  would  assur-
edly  bring  in  its wake. 
The  second  objection  is that,  while  a 
1MARSHALL  plan•  would  perhaps  have 
been  desirable  when  the  Third  World  countries still had  margins,  today 
further  Loans  would  simply  not  be  repaid.  To  this objection  there  are  two 
replies.  In  the  first  place,  the  breathtaking  rise  in  the  indebtedness  of 
the  Third  World  since  1974  is primarily  attributable  to  the  fact  that  bank 
Loans  have  been  granted  without  conditions  and  their  proceeds  consumed 
instead of  being  invested.  Those  pitfalls would  have  to  be  avoided. 
Secondly,  the  •energy•  Loans  proposed  for  the  purpose  of  investment  in  the 
third  countries  would  not  necessarily  be  granted  to  States  but  perhaps  to 
oil  companies  <and  mining  companies),  whose  main  advantage  would  be  the  pol-
itical guarantee  which  only  the  Community  can  extend  to  them. 
This  brings  us  to  the  third objection.  Why  go  through  the  Community?  Why 
don•t  the  Member  States,  which,  after all,  have  an  interest  in  such  invest-
ment,  do  it?  The  first  answer  is  that  the  Member  States  simply  do  nothing: 
only  1%  of  oil  investments  are  made  in  the  developing  countries  which  are 
not  members  of  OPEC,  which  account  for  roughly  15%  of  global  reserves.  The 
second  answer  is  that  the  rigorous  conditions  to  which  the  financing  of  the 
new  MARSHALL  plan  would  have  to  be  subject  cannot  be  negotiated  in  a  bilat-
eral  context:  any  State  which  tried would  quickly  be  suspected  of  neo-
colonialism.  The  Community  would  make  far  more  progress,  because  tha'nks  to  the 
success  of  the  first  two  Lome  Conventions,  it  has  gained sufficient  trust 
as  a  partner  in  schemes  of  joint  development  that  it would  be  able  to 
negotiate  effectively,  especially  within  a  collective  framework. 
- 86  -72  - Plan  of  action 
The  three  reasons  outlined  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs  suggest  that  it  would 
be  appropriate  to  introduce  three  types  of  scheme.  Loans  with  interest 
subsidies  or  joint  financing  would  be  the  main  component  of  all  three. 
Detailed  studies  are  necessary  to  establish  the  order  of  priorities  and 
suitable  time-scales. 
721  - In  the  Community,  the  energy  policy  to  be  pursued  has  recently  been 
outlined  in  the  5-year  programme  which  the  Commission  proposes  to  finance 
by  a  tax  on  the  consumption  of  energy1  This  is  not  the  place  to  summarize 
the  programme.  We  shall  merely  stress  its  importance  and  make  three  obser-
vations. 
First,  the  projections  made  in  Chapter  6  suggest  that  the  proposed  increase 
in  Community  appropriations  is  necessary  to  reduce  the  excessive  duplication 
of  work  by  the  Member  States  and  to  allow  a  more  efficient allocation of 
resources. 
Secondly,  the  new  resources  available  to  the  Community  should  be  used  to 
promote  cooperation  between  European  enterprises  to  enable  them  to  master 
new  techniques,  such  as  the  exploitation of  deep  gas  deposits and  of  heavy 
oils,  an,d  to  turn  this  to  good  account  by  developing  new  European  resources 
(oil  from  the  Adriatic,  for  example). 
Thirdly,  as  soon  as  the  fall  in oil  prices  reduces  the  profitability of 
investments  in  the  energy-dependent  economies,  incentives  become  necessary. 
In  this  regard,  Japan  has  set  an  admirable  example.  After  reducing  its 
energy  consumption,  as  a  share  of  GDP,  by  20%  between  1970  and  1980,  Japan 
adopt~d the  measures  needed  to obtain  a  further  20%  reduction  between  1980 
and  1990.  The  Community  should  use  its  resources  to  achieve  savings  of  a 
similar order  of  magnitude,  particularly  within  the  framework  of  its demon-
stration programme,  and  continue  to  reduce  1ts  dependence  on  imported  energy 
<see  Graph  4). 
1  Com  C83)  315  final 
- 87  -COMMUNITY  (excluding  UK) 
I  Dependence  on  imported  energy  and  oil 
Dependence  on  energy  Year  Dependence  on  oil 
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1  Percentage  relationship  between  net  energy  (or  oil)  imports  and  gross 
domestic  energy  (+  bunkering)  consumption 
Source:  EC  Commission 
- 87a  -722- Third  countries  with  special  Links  with  the  Communi!Y_ 
The  MARSHALL  plan  technique  for  promoting  investments  in  energy  and  mining 
projects  in  these  countries  would  have  two  advantages  for  the  Community. 
In  the  first  place,  anything  that  fosters  the  development  of  our  partners 
and,  in  particular,  the  development  of  their  energy  and  mining  output,  would 
make  an  increasingly  valuable  contribution  to  growth,  stability and  employ-· 
ment  in  Europe.  Secondly,  the  financing  proposed  should  be  made  conditional 
on  tied  exports  of  equipment  and  services  which  would  help  to bring addit-
ional  growth  to  the  Ten. 
It  was  with  these  considerations  in  mind  that,  under  the  presidency  of 
Mr  MACNAMARA,  the  World  Bank  had  planned  the  creation  of  a  specialized 
subsidiary  to  finance  energy  investments  in  the  developing  countries.  Since 
this  plan  came  to  nothing,  the  renegotiation  of  the  Lome  Convention,  which 
is  due  to  begin  in  September  1983,  offers  a  suitable opportunity  for  insti-
tuting  a  pilot  project  of  cooperation  between  the  Europeans  and  their partners 
in  Africa,  the  Caribbean  and  the  Pacific. 
The  present  deadlock  results  in  part  from  the  excessive  demands  made  by 
some  developing  countries  on  the oil  companies  and,  above  all,  from  the 
Lack  of  security  for  foreign  investments  in  most  of  those  countries.  Hence 
the  need  for  international  guarantees.  The  Community  is particularly  well 
placed  to  organize  such  guarantees  in  that  it  is  preparing  the  new  negot-
iations  in  a  global  context  of  autonomous  development  for  the  countries 
concerned. 
The  most  important  projects  on  which  the  greatest  progress  has  been  made 
apparently  relate  to  the  Liquefaction  and  transport  of  gas  produced  in 
Nigeria,  95%  of  which  is  currently burnt  off;  exploitation of  the  Inga  dam 
on  the  Zaire  river  by  industries  which  are  major  energy  consumers;  and  the 
exploitation  of  newly  discovered  coalfields  in  Botswana.  The  cost  of  these 
projects  is  in  excess  of  10,000 million dollars. 
723- The  Community's  regional  policl  should  be  thoroughly  revised,  for 
three  reasons. 
The  first  reason  is  that  since  the  crisis,  regional  problems  have  taken  on 
an  altogether  different  dimension.  Income  differentials  have  ceased  to 
narrow  (see  Table  11).  The  increase  in  unemployment  has  been  no  Less  severe 
in  the  'strong'  regions  than  in  the  'weak'  regions;  which,  moreover  have 
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- 8&  -lost  the  safety-value  of  migration  and  often  find  themselves  facing  a  return 
flow  of  labour. 
In  the  face  of  these  mounting  difficulties,  the  results  obtained  by  the 
European  Regional  Fund  are  disappointing.  About  8,000  million  ECU  have  been 
spent  in  eight  years.  85%  of  this  sum  has  been  used  to  reimburse  the  Member 
States  on  the  basis  of  predetermined quotas,  instead  of  top~ng up  national 
aid  in  accordance  with  the  common  regional  policy objectives. 
This  dissipation of  funds,  this  pretence,  is  even  more  unacceptable  today 
in  that  the  severity  of  regional  proble~s is  incr~asingly determined  by 
national  conditions.  In  the  Member  States  where  they  are  most  ac~te,  these 
problems  tend  to,exacerbate  the  discrepancies  in inflation and  economic 
......  .·  . 
growth  rates.  This  is particularly  evident  in  two  of  the  new  member  coun-
tries - Ireland  and  Greece. 
For  all  these  reasons,  it would  seem  necessary  to  adjust  the  reduction  in 
corporation  tax  according  to  how  investments  are  distributed  regionally  and 
to  earmark  a  third or  a  quarter  of  the  supplementary  investment  programme 
discussed  in  Chapter  5  for  a  new  Community  regional  policy -a policy  which 
.  . 
is genuinely  new,  since it would  also  apply  fully  to  the  two  applicant 
countries  of  the  Iberian Peninsula. 
Within  the  Community  of  Ten,  there  are  two  priorities.  The  first  is  to  con-
centrate  ERDF  aid  in  a  small  number  of  regions,  particularly  in  Ireland  and 
Greece,  which  are  experiencing  the  most  serious  structural difficulties  and 
to  finance  integrat~d development  programmes  so  as  to  enhance  the  combined 
impact  of  Community  and  national  resources.  To  this  end,  a  small  number  of 
Pilot  regions  should  be  chosen- some  could  be  regions  of  older  industry 
which  are  now  in  decline  but  have  made  special  efforts  to  promote  vocational 
training  - for  the  development  of  new  activities  linked,  for  example,  to  the 
application  of  the  information  technologies  discussed  in  Chapter  6. 
Finally,  the  Community  would  not  only  meet  its  commitments,  but  also serve 
its  own  long-term  interests by  making  a  special  effort  to  assist· Spain  and 
Portugal,  thereby  vindicating  the  idea  of  a  'European  MARSHALL  Plan'.  These 
two  countries  must  now  be  regarded  as  the  new  Mezzogiorno  of  the  Community. 
The  Latter  has  a  duty  to  ease  their  accession  by  making  generous  investments, 
adapted  to  their  specific  needs  and  granted  on  sufficiently flexible  terms 
so  that  they  could  even  be  used  to  promote,  inter alia,  vocational  training 
programmes. 
- 89  -724  - Further  points 
At  what  pace  could  the  investment  proposed  in  this  chapter  and  the  preceding 
one  be  effectively  carried out?  Would  this  pace  be  rapid  enough?  Would 
the  geographical  and  sectoral  redistribution  measures  envisaged  suffice  to 
obtain  in  the  short  term  initial extra  growth  of  around  1%  per  annum?  While 
we  are  convinced  that  the  general  approach  and  the  principle  guidelines  of 
this  report  provide  a  broadly  accurate  reply  to  the  questions  put  by  the 
European  Parliament,  we  nonetheless  Lack  the  time  and  the  means  necessary 
to quantify  our  proposals. 
That  is  why  we  have  been  very  careful  in  Chapter  5  and  the  following  chapters 
not  to  put  forward  detailed  proposals  as  to  how  the  relevant  funds  should 
be  apportioned.  Only  through  in-depth  studies  and  political  negotiations 
could  this  general  sketch  be  transformed  into  a  truly  detailed  programme. 
Such  studies  would  probably  show  that,  had  we  not  been  anxious  to  keep  our 
analysis  and  proposals  as  simple  as  possible  and  to  concentrate  on  Lines  of 
action  for  a  small  number  of  priorities,  we  would  also  have  had  to  demon-
strate the  benefits  to  Europe  of  undertaking  a  number  of  Large-scale  public 
investment  programmes. 
have  greatly  declined. 
Since  the  beginning  of  the  crisis,  such  programmes 
True,  Europe  is  in  the  main  well  equipped  with 
roads,  schools  and  hospitals,  but  the  renewal  of  much  of  our  infrastructure 
is  now  necessary.  Moreover,  the  economic  growth  of  the  EEC  would  be  further 
stimulated  by  the  completion  of  certain  major  projects  such  as  the  Channel 
Tunnel  or  the  Straits  of  Messina  Bridge  and,  above  all  by  the  implementa-
tion of  new  high  technology  programmes,  notably  in  transport  and  tele-
communications  and  in  the  environmental  protection sector. 
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This  is  clearly  shown  in  Graph  5,  which  compares  the  relationship between 
GNP  in  volume  and  productivity  in  the  EEC,  the  United  States  and  Japan  over  a 
long  period  (1961  - 1983). 
It  can  be  readily  understood  that,  if  the  productivity of  an  economy-
expressed  in  terms  of  GNP  in  volume  per  person  employed  - increases  at  the  same 
rate  as  overall  GNP  no  new  jobs  will  be  created whatever  the  overall  growth  rate. 
On  the  other  hand,  if overall  productivity  continues  to  develop  at  a  slower 
rate  than  GNP,  jobs  will  be  created  regardless  of  the  GNP  growth  rate.  This  is 
roughly  what  is  happening  in  Japan,  where  straight  line  R which  denotes  the 
relationship  between  growth  and  productivity  is  virtually parallel  to,  but  below, 
the  bisecting  Line  (45°). 
In  the  United  States  the  relationship  between  growth  and  productivity  i.s  even 
more  favourable  to  employment:  not  only  is  straight  line  R below  the  45°  Line,  but 
its gradient  is  only  half  the  latter's.  This  me~ns that  jobs  will  be  created  even 
if growth  rates  are  very  Low  and  t~e number.of  people  in  work  will  rise  very 
steeply  as  growth  accelerates.  This  explain~ why,  as  we  ~aw  in  Chapter  1,  the 
number  of  persons.employed  in  the  United  States  rose  by  15  million  in  1973-1983, 
while  in  Europe  it  fell  by  3  million. 
!  :· 
The  striking  feature  of  the  EEC  graph  is  that  strai~ht  Line  R crosses  the 
bisecting  Line  at  a  point  corresponding  to  approximately  3.2%  growth  in  volume. 
This  observation  is  central  to the  thesis  of  this  report;  i!~~b~~~--!b~!_!b~r~ 
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Whereas  in  the  United· States  an  economic 
growth  rate  of  the  order  of  1-2%  is  sufficient  to  increase  the  number  of  persons 
employed  by  1%  per  year,  on  the  basis  of  past  experience  the  Community  would  require 
growth  rates  of  the  order  of  6-7%  to  achieve  the  same  increase  of  1%  in  the  number 
of  people  employed! 
1The  situation  in  Germany  is  even  more  serious:  from  1965  - 1983  GNP  increased 
by  61%  or  2.7%  on  average,  while  the  number  of  people  employed  fell  by  1.6 million. 
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- 91a  -Given  this  historical  relationship,  it  is  absolutely  impossible,  in  the  years 
to  come,  to  resolve  the  problem  of  employment  in  Europe  solely  by  means  of'a  recovery 
in  growth  and  investment.  Growth  rates  of  6  ?X  per  annum  for  an  extended  period 
seem  to  be  beyond  us  in  the  present  situation. 
What  should  we  do  to  avoid  increasing  unemployment  during  the  1980s?1 
We  must  of  course  improve  growth  conditions!  An  extra  1%  growth  would 
increase  our  room  for  manoeuvre  <see  Chapter  5).  But  the  historical  relationship 
between  growth  and  job  creation,  which  is  so  unfavourable  in  Europe,  must  also  be 
improved2•  This  calls  for  flexibility  on  the  labour  market,  flexibility  as 
regards  incomes  <relative  costs  of  capital  and  Labour)  and  flexibility  as  regards 
the  length  of  working  hours  provided  that  this  does  not  have  a  cost  effect. 
Hence,  whether  we  Like  it  or  not,  we  are  f6rced  to  concur  with  the  Co~mission's 
view3  that  if  Europe  is  to  avoid  a  steadily worsening  unemployment  situation  it  is 
essential  to  reduce  the  2~~r2g~ number  of  working  hours. 
A Euro-barometer  poll  carried out  in  the  ten  countries  of  the  Community  in 
1983  clearly  shows  that  public  opinion  is  aware  of  this  fact:  of  those  questioned 
about  the  likely  trend  in  unemployment  in  the  event  of  an  economi~ upturn,  66%  replied 
that  this  alone  would  not  resolve  the  problem  of  unemployment.  Among  those· who  were 
better  informed,  the  percentage  was  higher:  more  than  75%  of  those  who  had  continued 
their education  beyond  the  age  of  20  shared  this  view. 
However,  having  established this  fact,  we  must  immediately  make  two  further 
points:  first,  merely  by  studying  Graph  6,  which  shows  the  actual  average  working 
hou~s  in  industry  in  the  major  OECD  countries,  we  can  see  that  there  is  no  correlation 
between  working  hours  and  the  unemployment  rate;  on  the  contrary,  the  two  countries 
with  the  lowest  unemployment  rate,  Japan  and  Switzerland,  are  those  where  actual 
working  hours  are  also  longest.  Secondly,  the  national  policies  to  reduce  working 
hours  that  have  been  implemented  to  date  have  generally  failed:  instead of  improving 
the  employment  situation  they  have  led  to  a  worsening  of  inflation  and,  as  a  result, 
have  adversely  affected  industrial  competitiveness  and  corporate  investment  and  thus, 
ultimately,  employment. 
1one  of  the  most  recent  studies  by  the  Netherlands'  Economic  Institute  in  December  1982 
projects  the  following  unemployment  rates  on  the  basis  of  current  trends 
<December  1982  = 10.5%):  1985  = 12.6%;  1990  = 15.1%. 
2The  American  economy,  on  the  other  hand,  can  tolerate smaller  increases  in  productivit 
for  various  reasons,  chiefly  because  incomes  adapt  more  flexibly  to  the  trend  in 
productivity  (see  Chapter  1,  Table  1) 
3COM<82)  809  final  of  10.12.1982,  Memorandum  on  the  reduction  and  reorganization of 
working  time. 
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- 92a  -As  a  result,  the  European  economy  -much  more  so  than  its partners  - has  had 
to  endure  an  increase  in  unemployment  which  has  become  a  permanent  feature  and  yet, 
.at  the  same  time,  even  the  most  radical  policies  are  unable  to  reverse  this  trend. 
On  the 
one  hand,  the  European  economy  is  QiQ~~Q~QQ by  the  compartmentalization of  its markets, 
the  inertia of  its traditional  activities  and  methods  of  economic  organization  and 
archaic  social  relations,  the  ossified  struct~re of  income  distribution and  the 
excessive  burden  of  compulsory  deductions.  The.combined  effect  of  these  factors  is 
equivalent  to  a  g~Q~r~!_£QQ§~Q§~§_iQ_f~~Q~£_Qf_~Q~m~!Q~m~Q!·  On  the  ot~er hand,  any 
general  policy  which  tries  to  speed  up  the  natural  process  of  reducing  working  hours 
without  thereby  reducing  the  income  available  for  distribution  f~r!Q~r_iQhi~i!§ the 
undertakings  to  which  it applies  and  thus  contributes  to  unemployment.  Justifying 
•work-sharing•  is  easy:  gaining  general  acceptance  for  •income-sharing•  is  harder. 
Faced  with  this  situation,there are  many  who  believe  that  the  most  sensible 
solution  i?  to  do  nothing  and  that  this  is still possible despite  the  increase  in 
unemployment,  since  unemployment  is  not  such  a  burning  political  issue  at  the  moment. 
This  may  be  true,  but  we  should  not  forget  one  fact.  Unemployment  now  is  less 
expl~sive but  more  corrosive,  less  revolutionary  but  more  insidious.  There  is  no 
longer  the  whiff  of  gunpowder  because  it  has  been  replaced  by  a  whiff  of  decay: 
the  will  of  young  people  to  work  is  being  allowed  to  rot.  More  than  on~-quarter of 
them  are  condemned  to  unemployment  (EEC  average  26.4%  at  end  March  1983  and  one-third 
or  more  in  Belgium,  Denmark,  Italy  and  the  Netherlands). 
·What  is  needed  to  accompany  and  strengthen  the  recovery  in  economic  growth 
is  specific  action  to  combat  unemployment,  but  action  which  is dictated  by  the 
gglg~Q_r~l~_!h~!_iQ9~§!ri~l_£Qm~~!i!i~~Q~§§_m~§!~QQ!_~~-~ff~£!~9-~o9_~hi£h_i§_~~§~9 
!Q~r~fQr~_Qo_gr~~!~r_f!~!i~i!i!~_Qf_~Qr~iog_fQOQi!iQO!·  Although  employment 
policies,  like other  social  policies,  should  continue  to  be  implemented  primari1y 
at  ~ational  level1,  European  action  ~roper  is  justified  in  this  case  because 
the  inflexibility which  is at  the  root  of  unemploy~ent and  the  demographic 
changes  which  make  the  next  few  years  crucial  are  specifically  European  phenomena. 
1This  is  why  this  report  does  not  deal  with  the  adaptation of  social  security 
systems,  although  this  is  a  general  problem  for  Europe  and  one  which  is 
closely  linked  to  the  recovery  of  growth.  Similarly,  on  the  whole  issue of  the 
distribution at  incomes  and  assets  which  b~sically  involves  national  traditions 
and  options,  we  felt  that  we  should  not  go  further  than  the  general  proposal 
to  slow  down  nominal  increases  in  salaries  in  the  public  sector,  which  enjoys 
guaranteed  employment  (Chapter  5).  Any  additional  flexibility  would  be  highly 
favourable  to  employment. 
- 93  -Community  action  should  be  taken  at  two  le~els:  specific  policies  to  promote  youth 
employment  and  the  negotiation of  a  Eurooean  collective agreement  on  the  organization 
of  working  hours  and  the  freedom  to  choose  working  hours. 
82- Flexibility  for  you~~  employment 
--~-----~~~----
'More  than  4.5 million' young  people  under  25  are  unemployed  in  the  Community 
at  present.  This  represents  40r.  of  all  unemployed  workers,  whereas  young  workers 
represent  Less  than  20~ of  the  Labour  force.  Thus  the  average  rate  of  unemploymeent 
for  those  under  25  ~s  over  20%  compared  with  11%  overall.  Changing  demographic 
patterns  will,  in  mo~t  Member  Stdtes,  only  havt~  .Jn  imp<.~ct  in  the  1990s.•
1 
This  social  drama  has  a  decisive  influence  on  economic  growth  in  Europe. 
Europe  is  beginning  to  wake  up  to  that  fact. 
The  European  Social  Fund  has  just  taken  an  important  decision  to  allocate  75% 
of  its resources  to  measures  to  combat  youtt1  unemployment,  compared  to  its current 
level  of  one-third.  However,  this' decision,  which  follows  the  line  proposed  by 
the  European  Parliament,  must  not  allow  us  to  forget  the  low  level  of  social  expen-
diture  in  the  EEC  which  is  around  400  times  less  than  spending  on  social  protection 
in  the  Member  States. 
In order  to  help  young  people  to appreciate  the  value  of  what  the  Community 
;s doing  for  them,  certain of  these  measures  will  have  to  be  financed  wholly  from 
the  common  budget.  One  of  the  most  important  facts  in  this  connection  is  that  in 
the  70's  the  percentage  of  young  people  of  20  years  of  age  continuing  with  higher 
education  was  approximately  30~  in  the  United  States,  25%  in  Japan  and  only  11  to 
17%  in  Europe.  It  is  a  fact  that  the  young  people  who  find  employment  most  readily 
are  those  who  have  been  best  trained  and  the  high  level  of  education  in  the  United 
States  and  Japan  is  undoubtedly  a  contributory  facto~ in  their  technological  advance. 
Secondly,  to  restore  the  growth  of  the  European  economy~  there  needs  to be 
a  European  market  which  is  integrated  in  every  sphere,  including  an  increasing 
number  of  young  people  trained  'European-style•.  This  constitutes  a  potential  source 
of  jobs  and  growth  which  compels  the  Community  to  contribute  to  the  decompartmental-
ization of  research  by  setting  up  a  number  of  European  centres  of  excellence 
specialized  in university  teaching  and  research  in  the  sectors of  the  future 
<information  industries,  bio-technologies  and  so  on). 
1  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  of  21.3.1983,  COM(83)  148  final. 
- 94  -Furthermore,  just  as  we  proposed  in  Chapter  6  that  the-Community  should give 
financial  support  to  any  joint  ventures  in  the  field of  research  and  development 
undertaken  by  firms  from  the  various  Community  countriesp·transnational  study 
programmes  between  schools  and  universities  and  exchanges  of  students  and  teachers 
should  al~o be  consider~d as  priorities  for  Community  budget  expenditure~ since 
they  are  profitable  long-term  investments  in  the  recovery  of  employment  a~d growth 
in  Europe. 
The  more  flexible  the  conditions  of  training  and  education  are  and  the ·more  .  '  ·.  ' 
closely  geared  to  tt1e  essential  progress  of  the  Curopean  market,  the  better prepared 
young  people  will  be  for  geographical  and  vocational  mobility  and  the  more  ~ffectively 
the  labour  market  will  be  able  to  contribute  to  the  economic  progress of  the  Community. 
Naturally,  this  alone  will  not  ·be  sufficient.  Only  greater  flexibility  in 
either  individual  incomes  or  working  hours  will  enable  us  td  make  room  for  young 
people  on  the  required  scale.  But  we  must  take  care  that  the  reduction  of  working 
hours  does  not  bring  a  demobiliza~ion of  those  socio-professional· categories  who 
form  the  main  motor  of  growth  (industrial  directors,  management  and  techriic~l · 
staff etc.);  on  the  contrary,  these  categories  should  be  encouraged  by  new  economic 
and  social  prospects. 
83- Flexibility of  working  hours 
--~--------------
831  - The  difficulty of  collective methods 
Not  ~ll  collective  methods  of  reducing  working  time  are  neces~arily doomed 
to  failure.  As  thinking  on  this  subject  lias  devL•loped,  there  have  been  more  and 
more  experiments  in  recent  times  combining  reduced  working  hours  with  increased 
productivity  and  a  limited  reduction  in  salaries.  In  the  German  chemicals  industry, 
for  instance,  an  agreement  was  concluded  on  a  phased ·reduction  of  the  working  week 
<4  hours  per  fortnight  in  1983,  4  hours  per  week  from  1987)  for  salaried  wo~kers 
over  58~  In  return  the  trade  union  agreed  to  a  cut  in  the overall  wage  increa~e. 
Similarly,  in  the  Benelux  countries,  schemes  to  reduce  working  hours  in-
creasingly  involve  a  partial  reduction  in  salaries,  to  avoid  the  intrease  in  charges 
borne  by  the  firms  cancelling out  the  gains  resulting  from  increased 
- 95  -productivity.  The  '5-3  Agreements'  in  Belgium  are  a  case  1n  point 
<collective negotiations  by  sector  for  a  5%  reduction  in  working  time, 
a  3%  reduction  in  salaries  and  a  3%  increase  in  the  workforce).  ln  the 
Netherlands  salaries  in  a  number  of  sectors  were  de-indexed  at  the  start of 
the  year  and  in  return  an  agreement  was  sought  on  a  reduction  of  working  hours 
and  an  increase  1n  jobs. 
ln  France  the  new  'contract  of  solidarity'  concept  introduced at  the  end 
of  1982  combines  a  reduction  in  working  time  with  changes  in  the  way  it  is 
organized;  the  resultant  increases  in  productivity  can  be  distributed  in  a 
manner  which  reconciles  the  interests  of  the  firm  and  of  its  employees  with  an 
improvement  in  employment. 
However,  the  feature  common  to  all  these  experiments  is  their  very  Limited 
scope  in  relation  to  the  overall  unemployment  problem.  In  fact,  they  all 
fail- especially  during  a  time  of  slow  economic  growth- because  of  the 
difficulties  workers  have  in  collectively accepting  a  partial  Limitation  of 
salaries. 
This  is  why,  if  we  are  to  obtain  substantial  results  in  the  employment 
field  in  the  medium-term,  it  is  indispensable  that  any  reduction  in  the  length 
of  working  hours  should principally  be  a  matter  of  free  personal  choice. 
This  free  choice  has  so  far  mainly  applied  to  the  voluntary  reduction 
of  the  retirement  age.  There  are still plans  for  further  initiatives of  this 
kind,  particularly  in  the  FRG.  But  this  is  probably  the  most  difficult  way 
of  fighting  unemployment. 
On  the  other  hand,  when  a  worker  changes  from  full-time  working  to  part-
time  he  quite  naturally  accepts  half  the  salary  thus  making  way  for  another  part-
time  worker  without  substantially  increasing  the  financial  burden  on  his  firm. 
Now  there  is  a  deep-rooted  sociological  evolution  affecting  not  only  women 
but  also,  increasingly,  men- particularly at  the  start or  at  the  end  of  their 
careers  - which  is  making  an  increasingly  number  of  our  contemporaries  feel  a 
desire  to  be  able  to  choose  freely  the  Level  of  their  income  in  relation  to  the 
length  of  their  work.  They  wish  to  determine  their  ~QI~iQg_bQ~I~_!b~m~~!Y~~-
- 96  -What  is  more,  at  a  time  when  purchasing  power  will  inevitably  progress  less 
rapidly _than  it  has  done  in  the  past,  the  development  of  free  choice  for  the 
individual  as  regards  working  hours  could  constitute  one  of  the  most  important 
new  paths  of  social  progress. 
In  all  countries  the  demand  for  part-time  work  - not  only  from  the 
unemp~oyed but  also  fro~ people  in  full-time  employment  - ~~far greater  than 
what  industry  can  offer.  In  most  cases  firms  have  little to  gain directly 
and  prefer, to  manage  fewer  full-time  workers  rather  than  a  larger  number  of 
part-time  workers  for  reasons  of  convenience. 
But  the  immediate  convenience  of  every  firm  must  come  second  to  the  need 
to  reduce  unemployment  in  Europe,  if.onl~  in  ~he collective  interes~ of  industry: 
we  have  seen  in  Chapter  2  how  unemployment  encourages  protectionism,  harms 
invest"ment  and  makes ·individuals  more  hostile  to.  work..  Experience  also  shows 
that  in  the  case of  ~!!!:!im~-~Q!~iog,  as. in  the  case  of  flexible  working  hours, 
firms  which  make  the  effort  to  adapt  their personnel  management  methods  achieve 
satisfaction  in  the  end. 
In  fact,  the  scope  for  part-time  working  in  the  EEC  is.considerable  since 
part-time  workers  account  for  around  1.2%  of  full-time  workers  compared  to  16 
to  17%  in  the  United  States.  The  difference  is  approximately  5  million people. 
If  half  of  them  were  able  to  find  work  where  they  could  voluntarily  determine 
their  h6urs,  and  we  add  the  effect  of  extra  growth  from  the  stimulation of  investment, 
it would  be  possible  within  three  years  to  halt  and  then  reverse  the  upwards 
unemployment  curve.  In  fact, 
we  have  seen  in  Chapter  2  that  the  trend  is. towards  an  increase  of  2  million 
unemployed  from  1984  to  1986.  To  reverse  this  trend  the  number  of  jobs  would 
have  to  be  increased  by  about  3  million; 
the  extra  1%  growth  per  annum  for  three  years  calculated  in  Chapter  ~  would 
make  it possible  to  create  600,000  ~xtra jobs; 
if,  at  the  same  tim~,  2.5  million  new.  part-time  jobs  were  offered,  the 
objective  could  be  attained.  And  if  these  jobs  were  offered primarily  to 
young  people,  the  youth.unemployment  rate  could  fall  from  over  26%  to  about 
11%,  or  the  Community's  overall  average.  On  the  basis of  105  million existing 
- 97  -jobs,  this  corresponds  to  a  conversion  to  part-time  jobs  of  Less  than 
1%  per  annum1•  Who  would  say  that  this  is  impossible? 
It  is  probable  that  if  public  opinion  and  governments  call  on  all 
firms  to  follow  the  example  of  those  firms  which  are  developing  flexible 
working  hours- and  are  satisfied with  the  result- they  will  do  so  because 
they  will  realize  that  it  is  in  their  own  interest.  Flexibility of  working 
time  is  in  fact  the  only  way  in  which  they  will  be  able,  on  a  Large  scale, 
to maintain  their  competitiveness  while  reducing  unemployment,  and  in  a 
manner  which  can  be  reversed  at  any  time. 
However,  should persuasion  not  be  sufficient,  governments  would 
have  no  Lack  of  means  of  providing  incentives,  without  transgressing 
competition  rules.  As  we  mentioned  in  Chapter  4,  they  could  Link  a 
reduction  of  profit  taxes  to  firm  or  industry  policies directed  towards 
reduced  or  flexible  working  hours;  some  administrations  are  thinking 
of  reducing  unemployment  contributions  for  firms  which  encourage  part-
time  working  or  of  allowing  Long-term  unemployed  to  retain part  of  their 
allowances  while  working  part-time,  which  would  avoid  the  tendency  for 
them  to  become  second-class  citizens  and  unemployable.  SimiLarly, 
studies  of  the  French  measures  show  that,  if  need  be,  financial  incentives 
granted  to  full-time  workers  who  are  prepared  to  change  over  to part-
time  working  would,  after  a  few  years,  be  Largely  offset  by  the  reduced 
cost  of  unemployment  benefits. 
Part-time  working  is  developing  rapidly  in  Japan  and  especially  in 
the  United  States,  where  it accounts  for  one-third of  all  new  jobs.  The 
fact  that  Europe  is  Lagging  behind  in  this  area  exemplifies  the  flexibility 
which  is  required  in  view  particularly of  the  demographic  reversal  which 
will  begin  in  the 1990's. 
More  flexibility  would  also  create  fresh  scope  for  individual  freedom 
and  collective  bargaining  in  the  employment  sector. 
At  present  there  are  only  two  European  collective  agreements  and  they 
1This  was  the  assumption  on  which  the  projection  summarized  in  Chapter  5, 
Table  5  was  based  (average  reduction  in  working  hours  up  from  0.7%  on  the 
basis  of  current  trends  to  1.9%  per  year).  Part-time  employment  is  taken 
as  equivalent  to  half-time  working. 
- 98  -concern  agricultural  workers.  A framework  directive1  and  new  European 
collective  agreements  are  needed  as  part  of  the  European  programme  for  growth, 
stability and  employment  proposed  in  Chapter  5  to  enable  the  rights  and  working 
conditions  of  part-time  workers  to  be  harmonized  and  improved. 
This  is  necessary  because,  as  the  Director-General  of  the  lLO  recently 
wrote2,  'full employment  in  the  conventional  sense  is  no  longer  possible. 
There  is  no  long-term  projection  which  allows.of  the  hope  of  a  return  to  this 
type  of  full  employment.  We  must  therefore  show  i~agination,  i.e.  overcome· 
the  inflexibility of  our  ideas  and  remind  ourselve~ that  between  1900  and  1980 
the  total  number  of  hours  worked  by  an  individual  during  his  lifetime  has  fallen 
by  half:  compared  to  the  beginning  of  this  century  we  are  now  virtually all 
part-time  workers  ..• '. 
1Amended  Commission  proposal  to  the  Council  of  17.12.1982,  COM(82)  830  final 
2Francis  BLANCHARD  in  'Futuribles',  January  1983 
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of  European  unity  in  the  beginning.  Nowadays  the  unifying  influence  at  Large 
in  Europe  is  altogether  different  and  it  is  gaining  ground  rapidly.  This  new 
unifying  factor  is  Q~f~Q~Qf~· 
It  is  a  vague  sort  of  word  we  are  not  used  to  hearing  and  one  whose  real 
implications  are  difficult  for  us  to  grasp  since  the  experience  of  our  generation, 
to  which  we  still  implicitly  hark  back,  has  been  one  of  rebirth  and  growth. 
Nevertheless,  the  facts  are  there. 
After  having  surprised  the  world  during  the  1950s  and  1960s  by  their  ability 
to  grow  without  inflation  and  to  lay  the  foundations  of  the  Community  together, 
the  Member  States  saw  the  tables  turned  during  the  1970s,  which  brought  inflationary 
growth  followed  by  inflation  without  growth.  ALL  these  mistakes  have  been  compounded 
by  the  constant  round  of  meetings  in  which  our  ancient  nations  have  behaved  like 
members  of  a  bourgeois  family  fighting  over  an  inheritance.  The  European  Economic 
'Community'  has  become  a  euphemism.  The  first  oil  shock  set  it  on  the  way  to 
becoming  a  non-Europe. 
With  the  second  oil  shock  and  the  advent  of  the  1980s  came  the  time  to  pay  for 
these  mistakes.  Certain  countries  have  done  so  but  they  are  beginning  to 
discover  that  this  necessary  sacrifice  is  not  enough  to  enable  them,  alone,  to 
return  to  the  path  of  stable growth.  Others  who  believed  that  they  had  found 
a  way  to  continue  working  less  and  earning  more  are  now  facing  a  severe  test  -
made  more  severe  by  their  isolation. 
The  game  they  are  playing  is  a  zero-sum  game:  they  have  had  zero  growth  for 
three  years  from  which  they  will  never  extricate  themselves  if  they  continue,  each 
man  for  himself,  to  tend  their  own  private gardens  intensifying  their  mutual 
differences,  failing  to  realize  that  they  are  in  fact  walling  themselves  in  so 
that  they  are  all  prisoners.  Instead  of  looking  for  a  driving  force  which  can 
pull  them  along  together,  they  are  squandering  their  energies  on  quarrels  which 
simply  serve  to  slow  them  all  down. 
Admittedly  it  was  easier  to  embark  on  the  building  of  Europe  while  sharing  out 
the  dividends  of  rapid  growth  than  it  is  to  continue  the  process  when  the  growth 
in  collective prosperity  has  ceased.  But  one  need  only  look  at  Europe's  decline 
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left  to  indulge  in  this petty  self-destructive game  of  every·man  for  himself. 
Tomorrow,  when  the  Community  is nothing  but  a  poor  old  cripple,  it  will  have 
learned  too  late  that  soft  growth  makes  for  hard  societies  and  slow  growth  for 
run-down  societies.  The  'balkanization'  of  Europe  will  have  carried the peoples 
of  the  ten  Member  States of  the  Community  into  a  New  Middle  Ages. 
Non-Europe~ under-employment,  non-growth,  decadence,  are  all  part  of  the  same 
phenomenon,  which  in  everyday  life  is  reflected  in  growing  despair  and  sometimes 
violence.  Just  fifty years  after  the  election of  Roosevelt  and  Hitler's  coming 
to power,  we  need  to  remind  people  of  the  full  sig~ificance of  the  recovery  of 
growth  demanded  by  European  public  opinion  and  the  European  Parliament  alike. 
In  Europe  there  is  a  seam  of  growth  and  social ·progress 
which  has  barelY been  explored  and  is  totally untapped.  It  is  the  'multiplier 
effect of  Community  action'  which  has  been  described  in  this ·report. 
How  can  it be  put  to  work?  At  Community  level  i.t  will  take  an  init1al  impetus 
which  is  strong  enough  to  create  a  psychological  jolt but  sufficiently controlled 
to avoid  financial  upheaval  and,  in  particular,  sufficiently understandable  to 
command  the  broad  support  of  those  involved. 
The  proposal  in  Chapters  5  and  7  can  be  summarized  in  the  expression  !br~~-!im~~ 
!br~!=  1%  of  extra  growth  each  year  for  three  years  and  three million  extra  jobs. 
The  techniques  described  use  investment  as  the  means  of  both  increasing  supply 
and  supporting  demand:  they  aim  to  restore balance  in  public  finance  and  in 
company  accounts;  they  combine  a  consolidation of  purchasing  power  with  an 
improvement  in  employment. 
Over  the  last  ten  years  isolated attempts  at  revival  by  individual  states  have 
e~ded  in  abort~d recovery  followed  by  long  recession.  In  this  case,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  model  simulations  which  have  been  conducted  demonstrate  that  this gentle 
initial  stimulus  at  Community  level  - if  accompanied  by  a  sustained effort  to  reduce 
inflation- will  lead,  all  things  being  equal,  to  a  sustained  revival  of  growth 
in  the  EEC.  At  the  same  time  resources  can  be  allocated - and  above  all  the 
necessary  climate  created- to  enable  Europe  to  respond  to  the  challenges  in  the 
fields  of  energy  and  technology  which  are  threatening  its  future.  By  taking  this 
path  to  recovery  the  Community  will  at  last  be  able  to establish  its credentials  in 
- 101  -the  monetary  field  with  a  strengthened  EMS,  to  open  serious  dialogue  with  the 
United  States  and  Japan  and  to  play  its proper  role  in  working  for  the  progress 
of  the  Third  World  countries,  many  of  which  are  threatened  by  complete  collapse. 
What  is  needed  for  this  project  to  become  reality  and  to  involve  those  who  are 
committed  to  growth,  i.e.  are  motivated  by  a  desire  to  create,  enthusiasm 
for  action  and  the  thrill  of  achievement?  Basically,  the  answer  is  support  from 
public  opinion,  which  is still unaware  that  it  is  facing  a  radical  choice  between 
J 
r~~ii~~!iQO_Qr_§~!!~riog.  One  example  among  many:  throughout  Europe  social  security 
benefits  are  gradually  being  cut  back;  the  public  often believes  that  this  is  a 
result  of  temporary  difficulties  and  that  afterwards  all  will  be  as  before;  in  fact 
it  is  only  the  beginning  of  a  long-term  retrenchment  which  will  get  progressively 
worse  until  Europe  once  again  achieves  sustained  and  stable  growth. 
Europe  Lacks  neither  the  resources  nor  the  technology  to  achieve  a  recovery  in 
growth.  What  it  Lacks  is  a  clear  perception  of  its situation.  But  how  can  it 
perceive  anything  when  it  has  no  eyes?  ALL  that  is  Left  of  the  Community  is  a 
hotchpotch  of  regulations  and  abstractions.  That  is  why  the  slightest  progress 
on  matters  of  practical  detail  is  a  sound  investment  in  growth  because  it  has  a 
direct  impact.  This  applies  to  the  European  passport  and  European  driving  Licence, 
to  the  abolition of  VAT  collection  at  borders  or  to  European  television.  ALL 
these  projects  should  be  implemented  as  a  matter  of  urgency  and  accompanied,  for 
example,  by  Community-wide  postal,  telephone  and  public  transport  rates. 
This  report  is  only  one  of  a  number  of  possible outlines  of  a  common  plan  for 
growth,  stability and  employment.  lts  strength  is  in  its  reliance  on  the  ability 
of  the  European  public  to  understand  where  their  current  interest  and  their  future 
opportunities  Lie,  at  a  time  when  they  are  staking  their  all  and  when  the 
European  population  is  being  enriched  by  growing  numbers  of  better-trained young 
people  with  a  desire  to  work. 
- 102  -COMMENTARY  BY  PROFES~OR BALL 
CHAPTERS  5,  6,  7  and  8 
This  commentary,  I  should  stress,  is  not  concerned  with  the  analytical  section 
of  our  report,  which  as  sta~ed elsewhere,  we  ·are  broadly  agreed  on.  Nor  is  it 
concerned  with  the  seven  key  observations  and  the  policies  we  would  jointly 
support  in  Chapter  4.  However,  the  development  of  some  of  these  policies  which 
have  been  outlined  by  Michel  ALBERT  in  Chapters  5  - 8  r~quire some  comment~ 
I  have  studied  these  carefully and  while  appreciating  the difficulties of 
any  specific  proposals  believe  that  these  are  worthy  of  discussion  and  debate 
in  arriving at  a  final  view.  I  would  have  to  say  however  that  I  have  some 
reservations  about  certain details.  The  proposars  that  he  advances  in 
Chapter  5"  of  the  Report  seem  to  be  as  follows. 
The  Albert  Proposals:  Analysis 
2.  Real  profitability is  one  of  the  key  factors  in  the  provision  of  future  output 
and  employment.  This  means  that  wage  growth  must  be  restrained  for  the 
foreseeable  future  to  permit  an  increase  in  the. share of  profits  if output  can 
be  made  to  rise.  What  is  necessary  is  to  combine  an  increase  in  the  share  of 
profits sufficient  to  sustain economic  growth  with  an  initial  expansion  in 
the  Level  of  demand.  This  requires  two  things.  The  first  is  that  there  should 
be  some'agteement  and  realisation at  a  Community  Level  that  real  wage  moderation 
is  required.  At  the  outset  it is  not  necessary  that  nominal  wages  should  fall, 
but  simply  that  the  real  wages  of  those  at  work  should  not  expand  as  overall 
demand,  output  and  employment  rise.  The  increase  in  the  Level  of  demand  that 
is  to  accompany  wage  restraint  is  to  be  stimulated  by  additional  investment 
in  the  Community  of  some  $15bn  each  year  for  three  years,  which  is  to  be 
allocated to  investments  mainly  in  energy  and  new  technology. 
3.  These  are  the  elements  of  the  'dynamic  process'  to  which  M.  Albert  refers. 
The  Albert  Proposals:  Commentary 
4.  I  have  several difficulties with  this proposal.  The  first  is  that,  even  at  a 
national  level  let  alone  at  Community  Level,  I  have  doubts  as  to  the  meaning 
and  significance of,any  type  of  'dynamic  process'.  I  am  in  no  way  opposed  at 
any  level  to  general  exhortations  to  prevent  people  from  pricing  themselves  out 
of  work  as  too  many  have  done  in  the  recent  and  more  distant  past.  Changing· 
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markets  are  key  factors  in  the  restoration of  profitability,  upon  which 
future  expansion  must  be  soundly  based.  However,  I  doubt  the  reality of  any 
'dynamic  process'  which  makes  an  expansion  of  overall  demand  dependent  on 
wage  restraint. 
5.  Secondly,  the  impact  of  additional  borrowing  on  interest  rates  and  credit 
markets  on  the  scale  envisaged  raised  a  number  of difficult  and  complex 
questions.  The  question  of  an  oil  tax  raises  other  issues  not  simply 
connected  with  the  funding  of  the  Community.  It  is  an  interesting  idea 
which  has  received  and  is  receiving  study  in  other  forms,  as  a  tax  on 
consumption  rather  than  imports  and  as  a  general  tax  on  energy  rather  than 
simply  on  oil.  I  would  argue  that  at  this  stage  it  is  an  interesting  idea, 
the  full  ramifications  of  which  are  not  clear. 
6.  Unlike  M.  Albert,  I  do  not  see  the  Community  as  such  as  a  major  source  of 
funding  for  so-called  European  projects,  either  through  the  European 
Investment  Bank  or  otherwise.  This  is  not  to  say  that  the  Community  may 
not  need  additional  funding  to  carry  out  some  of  its tasks,  but  rather  that 
I  see  no  reason  why  it should  be  a  source  of  finance  in  itself.  I  see  its 
role  more  as  impresario or  conductor  of  the  orchestra. 
7.  Finally,  it is  not  in  general  clear to  me  that  the  real  problems  of  the 
Community  are  related  to  the  provision  of  finance.  Low  investment  in  the 
Community  has  been  substantially  the  result  of  supply  side  factors  of  a 
behavioural  kind,  stemming  from  the  behaviour  of  both  management  and  Labour, 
rather  than  from  a  Lack  of  finance  as  such.  The  real  problem  is  not  a  Lack 
of  supply  of  finance  for  profitable activity within  the  Community.  The 
problem  in  large  measure  has  been  the  lack  of  a  profitable demand  for  it, 
which  stems  from  the  impact  of  the  factors  discussed  in  the  Last  section. 
In  consequence,  the  provision  of  further  Community  resources  must  be  set 
very explicitly against  the  uses  to  which  they  would  be  put.  There  may 
indeed  be  a  case  for  more  Community  initiatives  and  funds  to  support  them. 
I  find  it difficult,  however,  to  justify such  borrowings  in  terms  of  the 
Community's  immediate  role  and  needs  other  than  along  the  lines  of  demand 
pump-priming  through  the  back  door. 
- 104  -Emploi  Partiel:  Reservations 
8.  I  am  sceptical  about  the  other essential  element  in  the  package  promoted 
by  M.  Albert,  namely  the  introduction  of  'l'emploi  partiel'.  Let  me 
say  at  the  outset  that  I  have  absolutely  no  objectioh to  changing  work 
practices  in  any  way  which  increases  the  real  choices  between  work  and 
Leisure  for  people,  or  which  in  a  very  general  sense  increases  the 
flexibility of  Labour  market  behaviour. 
9.  I  recognise  the  important  small  print  in  M.  Albert's  presentation,  namely 
that,  whatever  changes  take  place  in  working  ~ractices, there  sho~Ld be  no 
.  . 
increases  in  unit  Labour  costs.  My  own  view,  however,  is  that  all  serious 
changes  in  Labour  practices  cost  money.  M.  Albert  is quite  clear  that  he  is 
not  advocati~g work-sharing.  Others  are.  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  ultimate 
effect  of  so-called work-sharing policies  would  be  to  raise unit  Labour  costs 
and,  in  the  longer  run,  make  European  industry  even  more  uncompetitive 
vis-a-vis  the  United  States,  Japan  and  the  emerging  industrial  world. 
Even  if  the  proposal  made  by  M.  Albert  were  implemented,  I  have  absolutely 
no  empirical  basis  from  which  to  conclude  that  the  effect  on  European 
unemployment  would  be  other  than  distinctly marginal. 
10.  We  are  Left,  however,  with  the  need  to alleviate the  problems  of  the 
unemployed· during  the  period  of  market  adjustment.  To  deal  with  this 
as  a  social  problem  it  is  necessary  to  do  what  governments  in  the  Community 
are  already  doing  to  target  the  particular  problems  of  the  unemployed 
groups,  providing  additional  training  for  the  young  and  accelerating 
early  retirement  throughout  the  Labour  force. 
A European  Marshall  Plan 
11.  Finally,  I  refer  to  what  M.  Albert  has  described  as  a  ne~ Marshall  Plan 
for  Europe  orientated  towards  investments  in  energy  projects  both  in 
Europe  and  the  Third World  and  towards  current  major  projects  in 
Europe. 
- 105  -12.  Mr  Albert  in  Chapter  7  has  at  length,  and  fairly,  described  some  of 
the  objections  to  such  a  development.  The  first  relates  to  the 
wisdom  from  a  European  point  of  view  in  attempts  to  transfer 
resources  ~rom Europe  to  the  third  World  at  a  time  of  high  unemployment 
in  Europe.  Secondly  there  is  concern  as  to  the  ability of  the  Third 
World  to  service  new  debt.  Thirdly  why  should  not  Member  States  rather 
than  the  Community  undertake  such  a  task? 
13.  I  have  already  set  out  my  general  concern  as  to  the  role  of  the 
Community  as  a  large  borrower  and  disburser  of  funds,  a  view  which  I 
need  not  repeat  in detail.  Apart  from  the  possible  objections  to  the 
proposed  Marshall  Plan  as  discussed  by  Mr  Albert  himself,  I  have  a 
very  specific  concern  as  to  how  the  balance  of  future  development 
should  be  conducted  not  in  terms  of  the  balance  between  the  Community 
and  Member  States  but  between  the  public  and  private sector. 
14.  Mr  Albert  must  be  right  in  saying  that  problems  have  arisen  in  the 
carrying  out  of  energy  investment  in  certain developing  countries  as 
a  result  of  the  demands  placed  on  private  investors.  My  response  to 
this  is  not  to  shift  the  problem  from  private  industry  to  either  the 
Community  or  Member  State  Level.  Developing  countries  cannot  expect 
investment  from  abroad  on  terms  other  than  would  apply  to  investments 
between  developed  countries,  if  such  investmen~are to  be  defined  as 
economically  viable.  When  the  investment  is  deemed  to  be  economically 
viable,  emphasis  should  be  placed  on  the  role  of  private  rather  than 
public  capital. 
15.  As  far  as  the  balance  between  the  Community  and  the  Member  States 
is  concerned,  one  should  note  that,  whatever  the  arguments  are,  it 
is  not  true  that  individual  states  can,  or  do,  do  nothing.  The  recent 
tax  changes  made  in  the  UK  budget  this year,  encouraging  investment 
in  the  North  Sea  and  in  small  and  medium-sized  business  is  a  case  in 
point. 
- 106  -16.  Lastly,  history  Leads  me  to  be  suspicious  of  Large  scale  public 
investment  projects  such  as  the  Channel  Tunnel.  Whether  such 
developments  are  a  good  thing  I  cannot  say.  Each  case  must  be 
decided  on  its own  merit.  I  have  already  indicated  my  support  for 
a  serious  reappraisal  of  the  balance  between  public  capital  spending 
and  public  consumption  in  Member  States.  Care  must  be  taken,  however, 
to  ensure  that  Large  scale  uneconomic  public  capital  projects  do  not 
crowd  out  the  desirable  and  necessary  recovery  of  investment  in  private 
sector  industry. 
- 107  -Commentary  by  Mr  Michel  ALBERT 
There  are  no  universal  and  absolute  truths  in  economic  policy.  It  is 
therefore  hardly  surprising that  two  men  who  are  as  different  as 
James  BALL  and  myself  should  express differing  views  on  several  of  the 
subjects  dealt  with  in  this  report. 
There  were  two  ways  in  which  we  could  approach  our  disagreement.  The 
first  was  to  gloss  over  them  and  sign  a  compromise  text  which  was  so 
watered  down  as  to  be  of  no  interest  whatever.  The  second,  since  this 
report  is  intended  for  a  debate  in  the  European  Parliament,  was  to 
convey  to  that  Assembly  the  tenor  of  our  own  discussions.  We  have 
chosen  the  second  alternative,  which  has  at  the  very  least  two  advantages. 
Firstly,  there  is  the  clarity and  sincerity of  our  texts.  Admittedly, 
each  of  us  has  influenced  the  other.  For  instance,  my  final  version 
pays  closer  attention  to  the problems  raised  by  incomes. 
Similarly,  James  BALL  gradually  became  convinced  that  the  United  Kingdom 
had  a  real  interest  in  participating  fully  in  the  EMS.  Nevertheless, 
our  views  differ on  the  best  way  of  restoring  European  economic  growth 
and  on  the  urgency  of  that  task. 
These  differences  - and  this  is  a  second  advantage  - merely  strengthen 
the  credibility of  our  areas  of  agreement.  The  scope  of  these  can  be 
gauged  by  the  importance  of  the  demonstration  contained  in  Chapter  3 
(the  impotence  of  the  nation  states)  or  our  broadly  common  proposals 
on  the  strengthening  of  the  EMS  (Chapters  4  and  5),  the  new  industrial 
strategy  (Chapter  6)  and  the  common  energy  policy  (Chapter  7)  which 
should  be  pursued  1n  future. 
* 
*  * 
- 108  -On  which  points  do  we  differ?  Mainly  on  three  subjects: 
- unemployment; 
- policy  towards  the  Third  World;  and 
- the  financial  role  of  the  Community. 
Let  us  begin  with  unemployment.  The  opposition  between  us  relates  both 
to  the  diagnosis  and  to  the  proposed  therapy. 
James  BALL  is  not  convinced  that  the  tendency  for  unemployment  to  increase 
will  continue  beyond  19841.  Why  does  he  subscribe  to this  view  when  all 
the  forecasts  point  in  the  opposite direction?  Because  the  increase  in 
unemployment  is  itself a  remedy  to  unemployment  and  to  the  crisis:  'To 
the  extent  that  one  believes  that  real  wage  behaviour  is  likely to  be 
moderated  at  least  for  some  time  by  the  very  existence  of  heavy  unemployment 
in  itself, one  cannot  but  beli~ve that  there  are  some  corrective  forces 
operating  through  the  market  system  that  will  mean  that  the  generality of 
unemployment  forecasts  into  the  eighties are  likely to  be  pessimistic.' 
He  logically  concludes  from  this diagnosis  that  no  further  action  need 
be  taken  at  Community  level  or  at  national  Level:  'it is  necessary  to 
do  what  governments  in  the  Community  are  already  doing  to  target  the 
2  particular  problems  of  the  unemployed  groups'  . 
My  view  is totally different.  It  is  based  on  the  tables  set  out  in 
Chapter  5  and  on  the  graph  in  Chapter  8  which  show  that  to  increase  the 
number  of  jobs  in' the  EEC  we  need  a  growth  rate  in  excess  of  3%  and  a 
growth  rate  of  about  6%  to  reduce  unemployment.  It  seems  to  me  improbable 
that  such  a  rate  can  be  obtained  in  the  next  f~w years.  Above  all,  in  my 
view  unemployment  is not  to  remedy  but  a  cause  of  the  crisis and  lack  of 
growth  from  which  Europe  is suffering3  Hence  the  set  of  proposals 
contained  in  Chapters  5  and  8.  I  express  this  conviction  with  real 
sadness:  if these  proposals  are  ignored,  1984  will  be  the  twelfth 
consecutive  year  in  which  unemployment  has  increased  in  Europe,  1985 
the  thirteenth  and  1986  the  fourteenth 
1  Chapter  4,  point  44 
2  Commentary  above,  point  10 
3  See,  in  particular the  three  adverse  effects  analyzed  in  Chapter  2, 
section  222 
- 109  -The  same  type  of  reasoning  explains  the  criticisms of  my  extremely 
cautious  proposals  concerning  certain  Third  World  countries.  I 
was  merely  proposing  that  energy  investments  should  be  jointly 
financed  in  those  countries  in  return  for  a  tied  export  arrangement. 
The  objection  is that  'developing  countries  cannot  expect  investment 
from  abroad  on  terms  other  than  would  apply  to  investments  between 
developed  countries'.  In  other  words,  the  same  method  would  be 
applied  to  the  unemployed  as  to  the  countries  of  the  Third  World: 
we  should  do  nothing  and  simply  wait  for  an  improvement  in  the 
financial  situation and  real  economic  adjustment  to  have  their effect. 
According  to  this  criterion,  the  World  Bank  is  at  fault  by  distributing 
Loans  on  particularly advantageous  conditions  to  the  Third  World 
countries.  This  explains  James  BALL's  criticisms of  my  proposals 
relating  to  the  financial  role  of  the  Community.  These  proposals 
consist  essentially  in  drawing  the  greatest  possible  benefit,  while 
taking all  the  appropriate  precautions,  from  the  existing  Community 
instruments,  the  most  important  of  which,  the  European  Investment  Bank, 
was  set  up  by  the  Treaty  of  Rome.  However,  on  this  point  the  Treaty 
of  Rome  itself  is  certainly not  above  reproach 
*********** 
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